56 W. Va. 200 | W. Va. | 1904
On 22nd of May, 1888, David Graham conveyed to Melinda McPeck, wife of William McPeck, a tract of one hundred and thirty and one-half acres of land in Preston County in consideration of land owned by William McPeck and conveyed by 'him to Graham. By deed dated 25th of April, 1889, in consideration of $1,175 recited in the deed as the indebtedness of McPeck and wife to Graham, McPeck and wife conveyed back to Graham said one hundred and thirty and one-half acres. Graham died in 1892. In June, 1896, a suit began in the circuit court of Preston county in the name of Melinda McPeck against the represen-
There is some evidence intended to show that Mrs. McPeck was unwilling to sign the deed to Graham, but was forced to do so by her husband by a threat that he would take his pension and leave the family without support, he receiving a pension as a :soldier; but we need not consider coercion as an independent ground of relief on the theory of fraud or duress, because it is not •a basis of relief made by the bill. Ho feature of the bill approaches that basis of relief save the too general charge that ■ “David Graham improperly procured this plaintiff to attempt to convey to him the said tract of land for a pretended consideration of $1,175.” How he improperly did so the bill does not say. 'This does not specify the facts constituting fraud or duress. Zell Co. v. Heatherly, 38 W. Va. 409; 7 Ency. Pl. & Prac. 247. It would be pertinent to undue influence, if charged, but it is not ■ charged.
Ye must treat the bill as grounded alone on the insanity of 'Mrs. McPeck. Was she mentally competent to make the deed? A basic rule, at the outset, is, that it is a legal presumption that ■ the grantor in a deed was sane and competent to make it at the time when made, and he who asserts the contrary must fully and • clearly prove it. Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612; Snodgrass v. Knight, 43 Id. 294. To one reading the lengthy evidence it ■ must be plain that not only is this legal presumption going to sustain the deed not overthrown, but the weight of the evidence, the preponderance, goes decidedly the other way. We cannot ' lightly overthrow muniments of men’s titles on trivial evidence, leaving the mind unwilling to do so. The depositions show seven non-expert, non-professional witnesses testifying in a general way, that, in their opinion, Mrs. McPeck was not sane. They give no defined reasons. They say she was eccentric; would .stand and say nothing; would take children and wander over premises when visiting, and say nothing to people, and stand , silent and apparently troubled. Ho violent action was shown, .no raving mania. We can explain her silence and melacholy on
The defense introduced eleven witnesses, all well acquainted with Mrs. McPeck, and seeming impartial and fair, who fully ■sustain her competency. One of them was a justice, notary, school teacher and farmer, of evident intelligence. He took the acknowledgment to the deed and is clear in stating Mrs. Mo-Peck’s competency. The eases say that the evidence of the officer taking an acknowledgment is entitled to peculiar weight on the question of a grantor’s capacity. Buckey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168. President Pendleton, in Beckwith v. Butler, 1 Wash. (Va.) 286, holds this rule, telling us of an early case where the evidence of such an officer overcame all other evidence before and after the deed. This witness is the same justice who afterwards committed Mrs. McPeck to the Weston asylum. And her. family physician, whose evidence afterwards sent her to Weston, gives evidence that at the date of the deed she was competent. These witnesses say her insanity did not occur till the summer of 1890, in July, more than a year after the deed.
It adds strength to the defense that Graham sold this land back to William McPeck by title bond, 4th July, 1889, and on 4th October, 1893, Mrs. McPeck signed her name as a party to it. She thus treated Graham as owner, and thus when she was confessedly sane recognized her deed.
It appears probable from the whole case that the husband of Mrs. McPeck caused this deed to be made to Graham to protect the land from creditors, and that it was the sedate act of both husband and wife. The justice says that when he was at their house to take the acknowledgment McPeck and wife retired and consulted. This land had been paid for, as all admit, and the deed to Mrs. McPeck from Graham states, with the husband’s property, and was thus liable to creditors; and later McPeck
Another sufficient reason against the case of the plaintiffs is laches. It was more than seven years from the deed to the suit, and four years after Graham’s death. It was more than five-years from Mrs. McPeck’s return from the Weston hospital till suit. It is proven that Mrs. McPeck was sane after such return until her death. She gave an intelligent deposition. When the-■suit began Graham was dead and unable to speak. Cireum--stances had changed. He was never attacked until after death.. How long are titles to remain in uncertainty? Diligence, not lethargy and sleep, is required. Bryant v. Grove, 42 W. Va. 10; Christian v. Vance, 41 Id. 754. No excuse for such delay is-given. A married woman, as to her separate estate or right, is-subject to laches. The statute of limitation excepts her, but not as to separate estate, and she is under the bar of laches, as applied in equity. Phillips v. Piney Co., 53 W. Va. 543; Waldron v. Harvey, 54 Id. 608; 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. (2d Ed.) 107; McKneely v. Terry, 3 Am. & Eng. Dec. in Eq. 391.
We reverse the decree and dismiss the bill.
Reversed.