57 Vt. 316 | Vt. | 1884
The opinion of the court was delivered by
I. As contended by the counsel of Gillett'and Yinson, generally the death of a partner works the dissolution of the co-partnership. Usually, each partner is the agent of all the other partners in regard to the transaction of the partnership business; and thus, special confidence and trust are reposed by each partner in all the others. When one .partner is removed by death, his judgment and discretion in the management and transaction of the partnership business is forever at an end; and, in an ordinary partnership, it is not within ,the contemplation of either the deceased partner, or of his associates, that the partnership business should proceed so as to hind his estate, or the surviving partners, by new transactions after such decease. The law holds, in. ordinary partnerships, that the decease of a partner works its dissolution, because such is clearly the intention and scope of the contract of partnership. But the partnership contract may be such as to clearly show that it was the intention of the parties to it to give it a continuing existence, although there should intervene a withdrawal of some of its members by transfer of stock, or their interest in the partnership, or by death. Hence, where, as in the
II. It is also contended that the purchase of common oats was not within the scope of the partnership business, and that the excepting defendants cannot be made liable for their purchase without proof that they knew of the transaction and assented to it. Raising, selling for seed, and manufacturing hulless oats, was the main business of the partnership, as set forth in the articles of agreement. The articles of agreement also provide that the plan of the business for each succeeding year shall’ be determined by the stockholders; and, except to parties in interest with the company, the rules, regulations, contracts, and affairs, of whatever kind or nature, of the partnership, are to be kept a profound secret. Under these conditions, those dealing with the partnership, through its general agent and sub-agents appointed by him, could only have knowledge of the scope of the partnership by what it allowed the general agent to do in fact. The evidence tended to show that the partnership in its name, and through its general agent, did deal in common oats, and manufacture at its mill oat meal
III. The deposition of the plaintiff, though referred to, and made a part of the exceptions, has not been furnished
IV. The taking of the deposition of Jeremiah Smalley was within the spirit of Rule 21, Washington County Court. That rule is to the effect that, an ex parte deposition, taken ■without the State, must be taken at least fifteen days prior to the first day of the term at which it is to be used. The time for taking the deposition by the notice was August 30; and the time for holding the September Term of Washington County Court for that year, as appointed by law, was September 11. This was less than fifteen days. But before the notice was issued, it had been announced through the public press that the commencement of the term for actual business would begin September 18; and that the court, on convening, would be adjourned to September 18. This was done to enable the presiding judge, assigned to hold the court, to fulfil another official appointment. By this announcement, that term of court was in fact, and for all business purposes, to commence September 18, more than fifteen days subsequent to the time set for taking the deposition. The manifest object and purpose of the rule is to free parties and attorneys from the necessity of being absent from the State to take depositions, within less than fifteen days before they would be required to enter upon the active duties of the term of court, in which the deposition is to be used. Treating the term as in fact commencing September 18, the notice was within the spirit and requirements of the rule. But the taking of the deposition was adjourned to September 13. This was again within fifteen days of the
V. The remark of the court, in the charge to the jury, that the “ depositions would be before them, ” was sufficient leave of the court to allow the depositions to go to the jury under the rule of the court in that behalf. These are all the points insisted upon by the defendants in this court.
Judgment affirmed.