99 Neb. 9 | Neb. | 1915
This was an action in the nature of a creditor’s hill to subject the land of the defendant William C. McNamara to the payment of a judgment for permanent alimony and an allowance for the support of his infant children, rendered by the district court for Dakota county on January 4, 1912. The judgment was transcripted to the district-court for Brown county, where the defendant’s land was situated. Execution was issued thereon on the 17th day of June, 1912, and returned wholly unsatisfied. The action was commenced on the 8th day of July, 1912.
It was alleged in the petition that the judgment of the district court for Dakota county was in full force and effect, and had never been reversed, modified, superseded or appealed from; that there was due from William C. McNamara, to his wife, the sum of |6,000 and interest,
Appellants contend that the court erred in permitting the plaintiff, Mary E. McNamara, to testify against the defendant, who wa.s her former husband, for the reason that the conversations in question constituted confidential communications between husband and wife.
The record discloses that plaintiff left her husband some considerable time before she commenced her action for divorce; that she resided at that time at her father’s home in Dakota county, Nebraska. Plaintiff had informed her husband that she was about to commence her action. In response he wrote a letter to her, in which he stated, in substance, that if she commenced the action he would beat
The other evidence to which objection was made was a •statement to plaintiff by her husband, before they were married, that the ranch in Plymouth county, Iowa, was owned by himself and brother and he had a half interest therein. The evidence discloses that at the time they were residing on the Plymouth county ranch they were visited by defendant’s brother, Cornelius, who lived in- Montana, and in a conversation with plaintiff Cornelius told her that her husband owned an interest in the Plymouth, county ranch. He said: “He does really own the place, but it was put in my name for protection, and I am willing to deed it'back to him any time he wants it.” He further said that if the ranch was sold he “would give my husband his share of it.” We think this evidence was properly received.
It is next contended that this action was prematurely brought, and in support of this contention appellants cite section 47, ch. 25, Comp. St. 1911, which reads in part as follows: “A decree of divorce shall not become final or operative until six months after trial and decision except for the purpose of review, by proceedings in error or by appeal and for such purposes only, the decree shall be treated as a final order as soon as rendered.” It will be observed that the decree was rendered on the 4th day of January, 1912, and this action was not commenced until the 8th day of July of that year. It follows that, so far as the rights of the parties were concerned, the decree at the time of the commencement of this action had become
Finally, it is contended that the evidence does not support the decree. The testimony shows that when the Plymouth county ranch was sold it brought at least $45,000. The plaintiff testified that she was told that it brought $75,000, and there was evidence tending to show that William received $5,100 from his brother, with which he settled a claim with his former wife; that he received $10,000 from his brother, which was used in part payment of the purchase price of the land now in controversy, but as to any subsequent sums paid him by his brother the evidence is such that the trial court was justified in the conclusion that the mortgage executed by him to his brother on March 26, 1907, Avas without consideration, and was made and received Avith the intent to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining anything as the avails of her divorce suit, Avhich as above stated, was commenced on March 7 of that year.
After a careful review of all of the testimony, we have reached the independent conclusion that the findings of the trial court are fully supported by the evidence, and Ave fail to see how a court of conscience could have rendered any different decree than the one here complained of. The judgment of the district court is therefore
Affirmed.