Three separate actions were begun in the superior court, and were consolidated for trial. In the first one, J. E. McMullen, as plaintiff, sought to recover damages for personal injuries, and also property damage. In the second, Jennie McMullen, as adminis-tratrix of the estate of Emma Michael, deceased, sought to recover funeral expenses. In the third, Jennie McMullen, as administratrix of the estate of Warren E. Michael, deceased, also sought to recover funeral expenses. In the first action, the defendants were the Warren Motor Company and Dewey S. Rochester, but the latter was dismissed from the case prior to the trial, “without prejudice” to the bringing of another action against him. In the other two actions, the Warren Motor Company was the defendant.
The trial was to the court and a jury, and resulted in a verdict in the first action in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,847. In the second action, the verdict was for $483.73, and in the third for $617. In each action, a motion was made for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, for a new trial; all of which motions were overruled. A judgment was *456 entered in each case upon the verdict therein, and from the judgments the "Warren Motor Company appeals.
The facts are these: The Warren Motor Company, the appellant, was a corporation with its principal place of business in Wenatchee. One Dewey S. Boch-ester operated a repair shop and service station at Manson, about forty miles from Wenatchee. The appellant was the distributor of Chrysler automobiles in Chelan and adjoining counties, and operated under a contract with the Chrysler Sales Corporation. Boch-ester sold Chrysler automobiles, under a contract with the appellant, which was approved by the Chrysler Sales Corporation. Bochester did not keep any automobile for sale at his place of business, and did not have what is called a demonstrator.
April 25, 1931, Bochester, with a prospective purchaser for an automobile, went to the appellant’s place of business in Wenatchee, and the prospective purchaser was introduced to the president and manager thereof. Soon thereafter, Bochester and the prospective purchaser, with the consent of the president of the appellant, took an eight-cylinder demonstrator Chrysler automobile for the purpose of showing the prospective purchaser how it would operate upon the highways. About five or six miles north of Wenatchee, the Chrysler, driven by Bochester at high speed, struck a Buick automobile, driven by J. E. McMullen, injuring McMullen and killing Mr. and Mrs. Michael, who were riding with him. The appellant, in its brief, admits the negligence of Bochester, and for this reason the facts as to the happening of the accident need not be detailed. Subsequently, the three actions were brought, as above indicated.
It is first contended that no recovery could be had for funeral expenses of either one of the deceased persons, because there was no showing of dependency. *457 Rem. Rev. Stat., § 183, provides that, when the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, his personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 183-1, provides that every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children of the person whose death has been caused, and if there be no wife, husband, child or children, such action may be maintained for the benefit of the parents, sisters or minor brothers who may be dependent upon the deceased person for support. In this case, as indicated, neither of the deceased persons left a husband, wife, child or dependent.
In the departmental opinion in
Castner v. Tacoma Gas & Fuel Co.,
“A majority of the court, however, are of the opinion that the Department was in error in its conclusion that funeral expenses were not recoverable against one causing the death of another by wrongful act, and to that extent the judgment directed in the Department opinion must be modified.”
There is a distinct holding by the majority of the court that funeral expenses are recoverable, and we are not disposed to depart therefrom.
*458 £2] It is next contended that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the cross-examination of a witness. The respondents called Rochester as a witness, and, at the time of doing so, counsel for them stated:
“I am calling Mr. Rochester as an antagonistic witness.”
To this, the appellant objected, and the objection was overruled. The witness thereupon testified, as appears in the abstract of appellant:
“My name is Dewey Rochester. I live at Manson and have a repair shop up there. They call me ‘Duke’ and my garage is known as ‘Duke’s Service’.”
On cross-examination, the appellant sought to inquire into whether Rochester was, in fact, an antagonistic witness to respondents, and to this line of questioning an objection was made and sustained. We shall assume, without so deciding, that Rochester was not an antagonistic witness, that the objection to the statement that he was should have been sustained, and that the court erred in refusing inquiry, on cross-examination, as to whether he was. But the error was not prejudicial, because the witness, on his direct examination, had testified to no fact about which there was dispute. Had he testified to a controversial fact, a different question would be presented, upon which we do not here express any opinion.
£3] It is next contended that the evidence was not sufficient to take the cases to the jury, and that the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts should have been sustained. When the respondents rested, they had shown that the appellant was the owner of the automobile causing the accident, and had called as witnesses the president and manager of the appellant, and also Rochester. The appellant, in support of its defense, called its president and manager, Rochester, and his prospective purchaser.
*459
When the respondents showed that the appellant was the owner of the automobile, they made a
prima facie
case to the effect that, at the time of the accident, the vehicle was in the possession of the owner, and that whoever was driving it was doing so for such owner.
Krust v. Bullock,
The
prima facie
case against the owner of a vehicle which causes damages while in the possession of another, rests upon a presumption which is not evidence, but relates to a rule of law and is a conclusion. The presumption serves as, and in the place of, evidence until the
prima facie
case is met by the opposite party with disinterested testimony. When the
prima facie
case is so met, the presumption has spent its force, and the party in whose favor it operated must meet his opponent’s evidence with evidence.
Scarpelli v. Washington Water Power Co.,
In this case, as already appears, the respondents did not rest their case in chief upon the presumption, but produced other testimony, and the appellant called three witnesses by which it sought to overcome the pre
*460
sumption and the testimony offered by tbe respondents. One of these was tbe president of tbe appellant corporation, and was an interested witness. Eoebester was also an interested witness, under tbe bolding in tbe case of
Kneff v. Sanford,
Aside from tbe question of tbe presumption, tbe testimony offered by tbe respondents would have been sufficient to take tbe case to tbe jury. Prom that testimony, tbe jury bad a right to draw tbe inference that Eoebester was driving tbe automobile for tbe owner’s purpose as well as bis own. Prom tbe testimony offered by tbe appellant, tbe jury could have drawn tbe inference that Eoebester was operating tbe automobile solely for bis own purpose, and was not in any sense tbe agent of tbe owner. It thus appears that tbe court did not err in overruling tbe motions for judgments notwithstanding tbe verdicts.
This brings us to tbe question of whether there • was error in submitting tbe case to tbe jury, and in this connection instruction No. 9 is complained of. In that instruction, it was stated that tbe appellant bad admitted, which was a fact, that it was tbe owner of tbe automobile driven by Eoebester at tbe time and place of tbe collision, and that there was a presumption of law arising from such admission that tbe automobile was in tbe possession of its owner, and then stated:
“You may take into consideration this admission, and tbe resulting presumption, together with all of tbe other facts and circumstances in tbe case, in determining whether or not, at tbe time and place of tbe collision, tbe said Dewey Eoebester was engaged, in *461 whole or in part, in the business of the Warren Motor Company. ’ ’
The instruction concluded with the statement that the presumption referred to was rebuttable, but the question as to whether Rochester was, at the time and place of the accident, engaged in the business of the appellant was one for the jury’s determination. It will be observed that, in the quoted part of the instruction, the jury were told that they could take into consideration the “presumption, together with all of the other facts and circumstances in the case,” in determining whether Rochester was engaged in the business of the appellant at the time of the accident.
The instruction is technically erroneous, in that the jury could infer therefrom that the presumption could be treated as evidence, together with all the other facts and circumstances in the case, while the rule of law is, as above pointed out, that the presumption is not evidence. The presumption, however, was still in the case, because it had not been met by disinterested witnesses, and it should have been called to the jury’s attention, not as evidence, but as a mere presumption or conclusion. Since the presumption would have been sufficient to take the case to the jury without other evidence on the part of the respondents, it does not appear to us that the instruction, while erroneous in the respect pointed out, was prejudicial. It only told the jury that they could take into consideration the presumption, together with all the other facts and circumstances, and only by inference could it be said that the presumption was called to the jury’s attention as evidence.
The appellant also complains because the trial court did not give certain requested instructions. But we find no error in this regard. Except in the particular mentioned, the instructions given fully and accurately *462 cover the case. The requested instructions, in so far as they correctly stated the law, were covered in the instructions given.
The judgments will he affirmed.
Beals, C. J., Blake, Steinert, and Tolman, JJ., concur.