Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paviola A. Soto, J.), entered June 9, 2006, which granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from entering onto the subject premises and bringing onto or leaving thereon equipment, materials or debris, and fixed plaintiffs’ undertaking in the amount of $100,000, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
The facts found by Supreme Court, which have support in the record and are based in part on admissions by defendants, show that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their causes of action for trespass and private nuisance (see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564, 570 [1977]; cf. Gellman v Seawane Golf & Country Club, Inc., 24 AD3d 415 [2005]; B & R Luncheonette Inc. v Fairmont Theatre Corp., 278 App Div 133 [1951]), and otherwise provide ample basis for the preliminary injunction. We emphasize, as did Supreme Court, that defendants utterly failed to justify their entry onto the backyard of the subject premises in connection with their construction work on the adjacent property, and repeated interference with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the premises by, inter alia, leaving thereon construction materials and debris, removing fences, obstructing an exit from plaintiffs’ apartment and bolting closed the fire exit, for which they were issued a violation by the Department of Buildings, and causing damage to plaintiffs’ apartment itself as well as the backyard. Indeed, on the record before it, Supreme Court properly commented that “defendants’ cavalier attitude and disregard of plaintiffs’ rights . . . [gave] additional weight to plaintiffs’ showing of the need for the injunction.” In this regard, we note that defendants’ claim— which was and is central to their opposition to the motion—that plaintiff McMullan’s lease does not include the backyard garden area borders on the frivolous. Even if it is not frivolous, it is as devoid of merit as defendants’ claim of Supreme Court’s “unquestioned bias” and “inherent bias” against it.