116 Mo. App. 289 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1905
(after stating the facts.) — There was evidence which justified the jury in allowing the plaintiff’s demand for the value of the horse. Though Mrs. Roberts sold it and kept the proceeds several witnesses swore to statements by her that the animal belonged to the plaintiff. It is insisted that the demand by plaintiff’s attorney for her personal property and the delivery of certain property to him by the deceased, constituted a settlement of all controversies between the parties which bars plaintiff from recovering either for services or any property of hers retained by the deceased. This position is untenable. Nothing in the nature of a compromise of disputed claims occurred. When the attorney took away some articles of property he left the horse with Mrs. Roberts, not because she asserted it belonged to her, but because he could not conveniently take it at the time, or did not think it worth taking. As to the claim for services being covered by that transaction and included in the supposed settlement, we answer, that not only was there no compromise of any disputed demand, but that if there had been it would, not have embraced plaintiff’s claim for compensation for services, as that subject was not broached. Although plaintiff’s silence about this
The instructions submitted plaintiff’s claim to be compensated for her work on two possible grounds of recovery: first, a finding by the jury that an express contract for compensation had been made with Mrs.Eoberts; second, the inference of a contract from circumstances in evidence going to show plaintiff served the deceased in the expectation of payment and the deceased accepted the work with the intention of paying for it. The defendant contends that the jury should have been instructed to return a verdict against the plaintiff on the ground that the evidence conclusively showed she rendered the services in question in return for board, clothing, schooling and being otherwise treated as the child of the deceased — that the family relation existed and plaintiff looked for no reward for her work except maintenance and education. The evidence as to the conditions on which the plaintiff entered Mrs. Eoberts’ home is inconclusive. As stated, the only positive testimony we have on the question is the mother’s, which was that Mrs. Eoberts said that if plaintiff would come and live with her she (Mrs. Eoberts) would do a good part by plaintiff. Neither that testimony nor any circumstance in proof shows, beyond just inference to the contrary, that plaintiff was taken as a member of the family of the deceased. She may have been; but the words do not necessarily carry that meaning. And if they did, plaintiff might recover nevertheless on a subsequent promise to pay for her work. In considering' plaintiff’s right to recover on an implied agreement, the jury had to determine plaintiff’s status in the household; and so the trial court held. Under the instructions, if the jury found she was a member of the family, it devolved on her to show an understanding or agreement that she was to be paid
We hold there was evidence on which the jury might infer that even if the family relationship existed, Mrs. Eoberts intended to pay plaintiff and plaintiff expected payment for her services. Several disinterested witnesses testified to declarations by Mrs. Eoberts of that intention. Some of these statements were coupled with the condition that payment would be made if Minnie remained in the household until of age; others were not. There was some testimony, too, from which the inference is proper that plaintiff knew of this intention on the part of the deceased and worked with it in mind. An agreement to compensate for services like those rendered by plaintiff may be deduced from relevant circumstances. [Fitzpatrick v. Dooley, supra; Cowell v. Roberts, Excr., 79 Mo. 218.]
The court below was generous to defendant in instructing regarding' plaintiffs right, as against any claim by her father or mother, to recover her earnings. The instructions on this point were, in effect, that if the services in suit were rendered while plaintiff was a min- or, to entitle her to recover for them she was bound to prove by the weight of evidence, that her father was dead, and that her mother, at the time the services were performed, had parted with the right to plaintiffs services or earnings. We might not be able to yield assent to the
The emancipation of a minor child and the relinquishment of its wages, may be shown by conduct — implied from circumstances. If a parent knows a child is working for stipulated wages, or in expectation of payment; knows, too, that the employer and the child understand payment is to' be made to the child, and interposes no objection, these circumstances are evidence for the inference that the parent’s right was waived. In the present case no conclusion is fairly possible except that if plaintiff was serving Mrs. Eoberts for pay, plaintiff’s mother had waived any right she might have to the fruits of the service. Mrs. Levy’s own testimony is incompatible with the contrary conclusion, as are likewise the conceded facts that she took plaintiff when very young to live in Mrs. Eoberts’ home and allowed her to live there until grown without making any demand on Mrs. Eoberts for remuneration. It was not essential to' plaintiff’s recovery that she should prove Mrs. Levy had parted with her right to plaintiff’s earnings at the time, or before, the services were rendered. She could have waived them by her conduct while the services were íd progress.
The serious exception in the case goes to' the competency of the plaintiff’s mother, Mrs. Levy, as a witness
If the above views are sound, the essential inquiry in ascertaining Mrs. Levy’s competency is whether she was a party to the contract in issue and on trial or not. We have said that plaintiff sought relief on two theories, both of which were submitted to the jury, to-wit; an express agreement-by the deceased to pay her and an agreement to be implied from circumstances tending to show that, though no express agreement was made, plaintiff worked with the expectation of being paid and the deceased intended to pay her. Now Mrs. Levy could not have been, in any real sense, a party to an implied agreement by the deceased to reward the plaintiff. It was necessary, of course, for the jury to find Mrs. Levy had waived her right to plaintiff’s earnings; and we have held that the evidence showed conclusively she did waive it. Every waiver of a legal right which the law will enforce, does not amount to a contract, for some of the elements essential to a contract may be lacking; for instance, a consideration. But in the case at bar the waiver, whether regarded as constituting a contract, or simply consent to the payment of plaintiff’s earnings to herself, cannot, except by the most forced and unnatural construction, be made a part of the implied contract between plaintiff and the deceased. Hence, we hold that Mrs. Levy was no such party to an implied agreement as would disable her to testify. But the particular bit of testimony with which we are dealing had some tendency to prove an express agreement between the deceased and Mrs. Levy for compensation to plaintiff. The deceased
Mrs. Levy also1 testified as follows over the objection of the defendant:
“Q. Bid you ever hear the matter (that is regarding compensation for plaintiff’s work) referred to again? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. On what occasion? A. I was down there once and there was going to be threshing and she wanted some of her nieces to come help her cook for the threshing.
“Q. Who did? A. Mrs. Roberts, and they wouldn’t do it and I stayed myself and helped her, and she says, ‘Minnie, you stay,’ She says, ‘You stay and help me out and I will pay you well for it.’
“Q. What nieces was it that she had requested to come and help her? A. It was John Dowell’s daughter and one of Frank Dowell’s daughters.
“Q. What did Minnie do? A. She stayed there and done the work.
“Q. And the other girls went to. the picnic? A. yes, sir.”
Obviously that testimony had no tendency to prove a contract to pay plaintiff for her services generally; that is, to establish the demand in suit. It related to' a particular incident and was an agreement to compensate plaintiff for particular work done on an occasion when country households have much extra labor in entertaining the men who work with threshing machines. The testimony was irrelevant to the issue on trial and if objected to on that ground should have been excluded. But the only objection offered was that Mrs. Levy was an incompetent witness. The facts related showed no contract between the witness and Mrs. Boberts which would render the former incompetent.
Mrs. Levy gave other testimony conducing to show an express contract between Mrs. Boberts and the plaintiff in person to compensate her for her work. We will quote that testimony, as an exception to its admission was saved:
“Q. Well, Mrs. Levy, you took the child to Mrs. Boberts and left her with Mrs. Boberts when she was four years old? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. When was the next time this matter came up, about Minnie’s staying there and the terms under which she was to stay there? A. When Minnie was between ten and eleven years old.
“Q. Where was the conversation, where did it take place? A. At her house.
“Q. Where had Minnie stayed from the time she was four years old until this other conversation came up. At Mrs. Boberts.’
“Q. Tell the jury what was said on that occasion?
“Q. Was Mrs. Roberts present? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You were talking to Minnie? A. Yes, sir, and me and Mrs. Roberts was talking and she says, ‘Minnie, stay with me till you are grown,’ and she says, ‘I will pay you well for it,’ and M'innie says, ‘Aunt Bet, I will do it.’
“Q. That was when Minnie was how old? A. Between ten and eleven.
The substance of the above testimony was repeated several times. Plainly it tended to show a positive agreement between- plaintiff and the deceased for compensation for plaintiff’s work; and, if Mrs. Levy was a competent witness, required the court to submit to the jury the question of whether such an agreement was made. It is contended that the testimony was incompetent, because the promise of the deceased occurred in the course of a conversation between Mrs. Roberts and Mrs. Levy, in which the former was agreeing with the latter regarding plaintiff’s services. But Mrs. Levy said the conversation between her and Mrs. Roberts was about Minnie’s age and the stock on the farm. It seems to have been a miscellaneous talk on different topics. “I was talking to Minnie and me and Mrs. Roberts .vas talking,” said the witness. The remarks- interchanged between Mrs. Roberts and plaintiff, then a child, are rather meagre to- establish a contract; but it is apparent at a glance that what Mrs. Roberts said to the plaintiff and the plaintiff replied, go toward establishing an express agreement to pay for plaintiff’s work. There is then no question about the relevancy of the evidence. It was positively sworn to- by the witness; therefore was substantial and for the jury’s consideration, provided Mrs. Levy was a competent witness. For aught that appears she was. She is not interested financially or from a legal point of view in the result of this action.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.