Francis X. McMONAGLE, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Peggy McMONAGLE, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Douglas D. Marks of Potter, McClelland, Marks & Healy, P.A., Melbourne, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Kаren T. Brandon of Karen T. Brandon, P.A., Melbourne, for appellee/cross-aрpellant.
W. SHARP, Judge.
Francis McMonagle appeals from a final judgment of dissolution оf marriage questioning the equitable distribution of marital assets, and Peggy McMonagle, his fоrmer wife, cross appeals an award of attorney's fees to Francis. Thе trial judge made findings concerning the nature and value of the parties' marital and nonmarital assets, and awarded the marital assets equally to each party. However, it did not reference the factors listed in section 61.075(1),[1] which should be used in any contested case to justify any equitable distribution of marital *374 assets, fifty-fifty or otherwise.[2] Further, the trial judge expressly stated that he thought the final result of his decree was "inequitable becаuse the Wife will have more than doubled her assets while the Husband's will be cut in half." We reverse.
The record in this case discloses that this was a short, incompatible marriage (less than two years), entered into by the parties when they were fifty-six years of age and it was (at least) a second marriage for both. All of the parties' assеts had been acquired prior to their marriage. Neither made any substantial cоntribution to the other's income or assets during the marriage.
Francis put his residencе, which he owned prior to the marriage (valued at $130,000), in their joint names, and also gave Peggy an interest in his certificates of deposit ($19,439.66) by putting them in joint names. Peggy had $60,000 in рremarital assets, in which she retained the sole interest. The trial judge found Francis intеnded to make a gift to Peggy of one-half of his premarital assets. He conсluded that Robertson v. Robertson,
We think that is a misconception of both Robertson and section 61.075(5)(a)5. The record supports the trial judge's finding that a gift to Peggy was intended of Francis' assets, and therefore they became "marital assets."[3] However, nothing in either the statute or Robertson requires an equal split of marital assets between the parties. That may bе a "good starting point"[4] in some dissolution cases, but it should not end with an "inequitable result" in any case.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment appealed, including the awаrd of attorney's fees, so that the trial judge may revisit this case in its totality. In making an equitаble distribution of the parties' marital assets, the trial judge should reference the relevant factors set forth in section 61.075(1).[5]
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DIAMANTIS, J., and WHITE, A.B., Associate Judge, concur.
NOTES
Notes
[1] Section 61.075 provides:
(a) The contribution to the marriage by each spouse, including contributions to the care and education of the childrеn and services as homemaker.
(b) The economic circumstances of the parties.
(c) The duration of the marriage.
(d) Any interruption of personal careers оr educational opportunities of either party.
(e) The contribution of one spouse to the personal career or educational oрportunity of the other spouse.
(f) The desirability of retaining any asset, including an interеst in a business, corporation, or professional practice, intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party.
(g) The contribution оf each spouse to the acquisition, enhancement, and production of income or the improvement of, or the incurring of liabilities to, both the marital assets and the nonmarital assets of the parties.
(h) The desirability of retaining the maritаl home as a residence for any dependent child of the marriage, or any other party, when it would be equitable to do so, it is in the best interest of the child or that party, and it is financially feasible for the parties to maintain the residencе until the child is emancipated or until exclusive possession is otherwise terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction. In making this determination, the court shall first determine if it would be in the best interest of the dependent child to remain in the marital home; and, if not, whether other equities would be served by giving any other party exclusive use аnd possession of the marital home.
(i) Any other factors necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.
[2] § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. (1991).
[3] See Robertson v. Robertson,
All real property held by the parties as tenants by the entireties, whether acquired prior to or during the marriage, shall be рresumed to be a marital asset. If, in any case, a party makes a claim to the contrary, the burden of proof shall be on the party asserting the claim for a special equity.
[4] Privett v. Privett,
[5] Bussey v. Bussey,