218 Miss. 264 | Miss. | 1953
This is another “beaten path” liquor conviction. Appellant says the testimony does not sustain the verdict that the whiskey was in his possession. This, in substance, is the evidence:
The sheriff, armed with a search warrant, and accompanied by a deputy and two city policemen, appeared at the residence of appellant situated some five miles northwest of Philadelphia, Mississippi. Appellant was not at
The road had been made years before by hauling staves from a sawmill and originally extended some distance south, or southeast, from the wire fence, which appellant had constructed a year before, and which fence, of course, obstructed travel by vehicles along that road. That road ran from the residence of appellant through his pasture and near his pond and cultivated fields. The sheriff thought he detected tracks of vehicles other than his automobile along that road. However, a number of witnesses, who inspected and examined the road the next morning,
The only other incident tending to connect appellant with the whiskey was that the policemen said as they went along this road they saw appellant some two hundred yards from his residence walking towards it from a southerly direction.
We have held that the finding of whiskey at the end of a beaten path on premises in the possession and under the control of accused, which path extends from the residence or place of business of accused to the whiskey, raises a presumption that the liquor is in his possession. Creel v. State, 183 Miss. 158, 183 So. 510; Smith v. State, 187 Miss. 96, 192 So. 436; Goss v. State, 187 Miss. 188, 192 So. 494; Wallace v. State, 189 Miss. 763, 199 So. 78; Williamson v. State, 191 Miss. 643, 4 So. 2d 220; Jenkins v. State, 207 Miss. 281, 42 So. 2d 198; McInnis v. State, 213 Miss. 491, 57 So. 2d 137; Brown v. State, 192 Miss. 314, 5 So. 2d 137. But where the whiskey is not found upon premises in the exclusive possession and control of the accused there must be additional incriminating facts connecting him with such possession, other than the mere finding of the whiskey, aided or unaided by a trail, to sustain a verdict of guilty. Lewis v. State, 198 Miss. 767, 23 So. 2d 401; Walker v. State, 199 Miss. 289, 24 So. 2d 751; Sellers v. City of Picayune, 202 Miss. 741, 32 So. 2d 450; Baylis v. State, 209 Miss. 335, 46 So. 2d 796; Hansbrough v. State, 209 Miss. 625, 48 So. 2d 120; Everett v. State, 209 Miss. 860, 48 So. 2d 511; Foster v. State, (Miss.), 49 So. 2d 258. As an illustration, in Walker v. State, supra, the whiskey was not found upon premises in control of Walker. It was upon the public highway, but it was only twenty-one steps from his cafe and the officers, from their hiding places, saw Walker go to the spot where the whiskey was hidden, gather up packages and deliver them to purchasers thereof. In Brown v. State, supra, the whiskey was about forty steps of the
In the case at bar the whiskey was found over a quarter of a mile from the residence of appellant. It was not on his land. The path, or trail, was not on his land. Other people, including the landowner, lived as near, or nearer, to where the whiskey was found than did appellant. He was not seen near the path or the whiskey. That is not enough to sustain a conviction. We must recognize the age-old principle that every accused person is presumed innocent and, to sustain a conviction, must be shown to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is better that some guilty persons go free than to sacrifice these principles.
Reversed and appellant discharged.