61 Fla. 360 | Fla. | 1911
The defendant in error brought an action of unlawful entry against the plaintiff in error, which was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the court below. This judgment is brought here for review by writ of error. Twenty-three errors are assigned, which present several interesting questions and -which are ably discussed by the counsel for the respective litigants, but, in view of the conclusion which we have reached, it becomes unnecessary to discuss all of the assignments.
The first assignment is that “the court erred in admitting in evidence the written agreement under seal sighed by Thomas C. Watson, Agent, and J. A. White, dated October 3rd, 1903.” White was the first witness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, who testified in substance that he executed the instrument in question and went into the possession of the land in controversy thereunder, remained in possession four or five years, made certain specified improvements thereon, and went out of possession about three years before the trial, when he sold all of the buildings and improvements which he had put upon the land to the defendant; that he had paid rent under the instrument for several years, when he was forbidden to pay more by different parties and ceased to pay rent about two years
The second assignment is that “the court erred in admitting the testimony of the witness, J. J. Hooton, as to the agency of Thos. C. Watson over the property involved in controversy at the time of leasing same to J. A. White.” We find that, after such witness had testified both on direct and cross-examination as to the agency of Thos. C. Watson, “the. defendant objected to and moved to strike the testimony of the witness as to the agency of Thos. C. Watson over the property upon the ground that it appeared that such agency was given by a power of attorney, which writing had not been produced. But the court overruled the objection and denied such motion, to which ruling the defendant did then and there except.” Objections to the admissibility of evidence must, as a general thing, be made when it is offered, or its admissibility cannot be assigned as error. Schley v. State, 48 Fla. 53, 37 South. Rep. 518, and Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138, 50 South. Rep. 749.
The third assignment is that “the court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of the witness, J. J. Hooton, in the preceding assignment of error.” Immediately after the proceedings, which we have copied above, the following took place: “The witness was here asked by plaintiff’s counsel if there was a power of attorney to lease the property. The witness answered: ‘No; I think there may have been some years ago, but I don’t know what has become of
At the close of the testimony of the witness, J. J. Hoot-on, the plaintiff offered in evidence “the record of a deed,” bearing date the 5th day of October, 1907, .from Julia J. Yonge et al. to J. Simpson Reese to the following described property: “An undivided three-fifths of the Juan Dominguez Tract being Section thirty-four (34) Township two (2) South of Range thirty (30) West, Escambia County, State of Florida, containing about One thousand three hundred and fifty-four and a half (1,354 1/2) Acres, excepting such portions of said tract as have heretofore been sold and conveyed to the other parties by C. C. Yonge late of Escambia County, Florida, and about ten (10) acres conveyed by his heirs, viz: about five acres to Carl Gluckstadt by deed dated March 14th, 1890, and about five (5) acres to Thomas J. Majors by deed dated June 19th, 1889, the portion of said tract hereby conveyed being a three-fifths interest in about six hundred and fifty-eight (658) acres.”
The following proceedings were then had: “To the introduction of which instrument the defendant did then and there object upon the ground that the document purports to have been made in July, 1907, long after defendant en
But the court overruled said objections and admitted the said deed in evidence to which ruling the defendant did then and there except.”
This ruling forms the basis for the fourth assignment. 'As we have already seen, under the statute, the question of title is not involved in this action. It necessarily follows, and we have so held, that proof of title is inadmissible. Walls v. Endel, 17 Fla. 478, and Perry Naval Stores Company v. Griffin, 57 Fla. 133, 49 South. Rep. 554. We do not feel called upon, in discussing the assignments of error presented in this case, to analyze and distinguish the two cited cases. Even if it be true that a good and sufficient deed might be admissible in evidence, not only “for the purpose of showing the boundaries or extent of the possession claimed,” when a possession of a part of the land in dispute has been shown, as was therein held, but also for the purpose of showing the right of possession, under the statute, the deed so offered and admitted in evidence is not such a deed. We shall not discuss the grounds of objection urged in detail. The deed certainly Avas not admissible “for the purpose of showing the boundaries or extent of the possession claimed,” for on its face
Having reached this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to consider the other assignments, as the questions presented by them may not arise upon another trial.