13 Ga. App. 23 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1913
This was a suit on a note antedating the act of 1912 which requires that notes given for mining stock shall state their consideration. The defendant pleaded non est factum; that the consideration of the note was mining stock which was worthless, and for this reason the consideration wholly failed; and that the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser for value. The court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and overruled the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
It appears, from the evidence, that Stump, the payee of the note, sold to the maker a number of shares of mining stock in the Georgia-Nevada Mining Company, and that the defendant executed the note sued on in payment for this stock. The note was discounted by the plaintiff bank before its maturity, the bank paying for the note its face value, less a discount of 8 per cent. At the time the note was discounted Stump was indebted to the bank on a promissory note, and the proceeds of the note sued on were applied as follows: $200 to Stump’s indebtedness to the bank; $300 in cash to Stump, and $500 by check made payable to Stump, which was later indorsed over to and collected by one
The case turns on the question whether the consideration of the note had failed, and whether the bank was an innocent purchaser for value before -maturity. There was no evidence which would warrant the inference, that the bank knew the consideration of the note had failed, or that it had knowledge of any circumstances which would place a prudent person upon his guard in purchasing negotiable paper. Civil Code, § 4291. Knowledge by the bank that the note was given for mining stock was not sufficient to put it on inquiry in reference to the failure of consideration. Brooks v. Floyd, 12 Ga. App. 530 (77 S. E. 877). The statement made to Ashley by the attorney was no more than an expression of the attorney’s opinion, without stating any facts or information which would bring home to Ashley knowledge of the worthless character of the note; being no more than a loose statement by the attorney that Stump was engaged in the business of selling worthless mining stock. It does not appear even that the stock sold to the defendant by Stump was of the character of stock referred to by the attorney in his conversation with Ashley. But the discussion in reference to whether the plaintiff bank knew that the consideration of the note had failed is really unimportant, because the evidence wholly fails to show that the stock was worthless.
Proof of the execution of the note made a prima facie case for the plaintiff, and there was no evidence which would have warranted a contrary finding. Judgment affirmed.