52 N.C. 435 | N.C. | 1860
The land in question was that of which James Teachy died seized and possessed, and the lessors of the plaintiffs are his heirs at law.
The said Teachy died intestate about twenty-five or thirty years ago, leaving a widow. A witness testified that after her husband's death, there being other lands, he heard her father propose to the administrators that his daughter should take the tract in question in lieu and satisfaction of her dower, to which there was no reply; but she immediately entered into the occupation of the same, and held it for more than twenty years, holding part of the time by herself, partly by a second husband, who cleared and cultivated the same at will, and partly through tenants, who used the pine timber for the collection of turpentine and obtaining tun-timber. This suit was brought in January, 1858.
The defendant's counsel asked the court to charge, first, that there was evidence from which the jury might presume that the locus in quo had been assigned to the widow of James Teachy (under whom defendant claimed), as her dower; and, secondly, that there was evidence that the widow of James Teachy, and her second husband, were in possession of the locus in quo, claiming it adversely at the time the alleged trespass *337 was committed, and that in either aspect the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover. The judge declined giving such instruction, and defendant excepted.
Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which defendant appealed. Whether the first instruction which the counsel for the defendant requested the court to give to the jury is a proper one, it is unnecessary for us to decide, because we are clearly of opinion that the second ought to have been given, and that is fatal to the right of the plaintiff to recover in the present form of action. (437)
In Spencer v. Weston,
There is a strong intimation of the Court, in Spencer v. Weston, that a release, if properly pleaded, might be presumed against a widow who had failed to claim her dower for twenty years or more.
We have said that the second instruction asked for by the defendant's counsel ought to have been given, and we think Smith v. Bryan,
PER CURIAM. Venire de novo.
Cited: McLean v. Murchison,
(439)