105 Ala. 382 | Ala. | 1894
McMichael and another were plaintiffs in this action, and Craig and others are the defendants. It is a statutory action of ejectment. The land belonged to the father of plaintiffs, who died in 1858, devising it to the mother of plaintiffs, Biddy McMichael, for life with remainder in fee to the plaintiffs. In 1877 it was sold under an order of the probate court for the payment of the debts of the estate of the testator, William McMichael. The purchasers at that sale received a conveyance, executed under the order of the probate court, and immediately went into possession. They subsequntly sold and conveyed the land, and by mesne conveyances the present defendants have succeeded to such right or title or claim as these purchasers acquired or asserted. The possession has passed in regular succession from said purchasers to these defendants, and has all along been and is now held openly, exclusively against all the world, under a claim of right and the color at least of title. It is insisted for plaintiffs that the probate sale and conveyance was utterly void, because the will of William McMichael authorized the sale of this land for the payment of his debts, and, they say, this power passed to the administrator cum annexo testamento upon whose application the sale was ordered and by whom it was made. For the purposes of this case it may be admitted, without being decided, that this sale was utterly void.
This suit was commenced on July 14, 1892, more than ten years from the begining of the possession of the defendants and those to whose possession, claim of right and color of title they succeeded. Biddy McMichael, the tenant for life is still living, and there is no pretense-of any obstacle to the running of the statute of limitations of ten years against her. This statute was pleaded by the defendants, and upon this plea (we suppose) the judge of the circuit court — trial being without jury— found for the defendants, and entered up judgment accordingly. We have no doubt of the correctness of that conclusion and judgment.
The contention upon which it is assailed here by the appellants, that a conveyance by the life tenant either of a nominal fee or of her estate for life, or the'suffering of a disseizin byher, forfeits the particular estate to the remaindermen, is not and never has been the law of Ala
The true doctrine is, that nothing done or suffered by a tenant for life can operate a forfeiture of his estate to the tenant in remainder, but that his estate may be divested and passed as any other, either through muniment of title executed by him or through a possession . adverse to him for the statutory period and the operation ■■ of law thereon. So it is held in Woodstock Iron Co. v. Fullenwider, 87 Ala. 586, and upon this point that case has never been questioned; and so in Gindrat v. Western Railway of Ala., 96 Ala. 162, and so expressly declared in a - Pennsylvania case on facts substantially identical with the case at bar.—Moore v. Luce, 29 Pa. St. 260;S. C. 72 Am. Dec. 629. See also 6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 881, and authorities cited in note 4; Delaney v. Ganong, 9 N. Y. 9.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.