26 Ga. App. 744 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1921
1. “ The general rule, in the absence of a different agree-. ment, is that a real-estate broker, in whose hands property is placed for sale, earns his commissions when, during the agency, he finds a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy, and who offers to buy on the terms stipulated by the owner.” Civil Code (1910), § 3587; Smith v. Tatum, 140 Ga. 719 (79 S. E. 775); Odell v. Dozier, 104 Ga. 203(2) (30 S. E. 813); Doonan v. Ives, 73 Ga. 295; Edwards v. Andrews, 24 Ga. App. 645 (101 S. E. 775). The petition, having stated facts fully conforming to these statutory provisions, was not subject to general demurrer. The failure to allege knowledge on the part of the owner that the offerers had been sent or obtained by the brokers could not be taken advantage of by general demurrer.
2. The ground of special demurrer to paragraph 4 of the petition, that it fails to allege the name of the officer, agent, or employee of the defendant corporation who made the contract with the plaintiffs, is not well taken. Georgia Engineering Co. v. Horton, 135 Ga. 58(2) (68 S. E. 794). Moreover, the name and office of the person so acting are expressly stated in paragraph 11.
3. The ground of special demurrer to paragraph 11, that it fails to allege the authority of the person named as president of the defendant corporation to make the contract with the plaintiffs, is without merit, in view of the express averments, in paragraph 4 and subsequent paragraphs, that such act and the transactions with the prospective purchasers were the acts of the defendant corporation.
4. When a defendant presents a special demurrer, he is entitled, so as to enable him to prepare his defenses, to be fully informed of the facts which are relied upon by the plaintiff as a part of his cause of action (Kemp v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 122 Ga. 562, 50 S. E. 465; Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Mitchell, 95 Ga. 78, 85, 22 S. E. 124) ; and while this rule may sometimes have more especial application when the facts arc such as lie primarily within the plaintiff’s knowledge Cherokee Mills v. Gate City Cotton Mills, 122 Ga. 268(2), 272, 50 S. E. 82; Miller v. Southern Ry. Co., 21 Ga. App. 367 (1), 94 S. E. 619), the 4th ground of special demurrer should, under the general rule, have been sustained, so as to require the plaintiffs to allege the facts as to what occurred between the defendant and the prospective purchasers, and upon which the plaintiffs rely in support of their claim for commissions. For this reason only, the judgment of the court below overruling the demurrers is
Reversed.