McMahon v. MeadMcMahon v. Mead
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Avhiting
The relator is an inmate of the South Dakota State Hospital, a public institution devoted to the care and treatment of the insane. The respondent is the superintendent of such hospital, and has had the relator under his care and custody under and by virtue of a warrant of commitment issued by the commissioners of insanity of Meade county, S. D., under date of October 25, 1911, which warrant recites, among other things, that the commissioners had found relator to be insane. Upon a petition filed on behalf of relator, which petition sets forth the above facts, and alleges “That this plaintiff is not insane, but has full reason, and is now of sound mind, and able to in all respects maintain and care for herself,” this court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding respondent to have the said relator before this court, together with the time and cause of her detention. The respondent by way of return to said writ ad7 mitted that he held said delator in his custody under and by virtue of the said warrant, a copy of which was made a part of the return. Besides evidence bearing directly upon the present mental condition of relator, there was undisputed evidence showing that, immediatel}’ after the issuance of the warrant of commitment, relator sued out a writ of habeas corpus before the judge of the Sixth judicial circuit, and that but a few months ago she sued out another writ of habeas corpus before the judge of the First judicial circuit; that, upon the hearing of each of said writs, the question of the then present sanity of relator was fully gone into, *518and, at least upon the last of- said hearings, every question raised by relator upon the present hearing was fully gone into and passed upon by the learned judge by whom the writ was issued; and that upon each of said hearings the relator was remanded to the custody-’ of respondent.
Relator bases her petition for á discharge on three separate contentions,■ to-wit: (i) That the law under which-‘she was committed was unconstitutional; (2) that the warrant of commitment was not properly issued, and is therefore void; (3) that relator is now sane.’
*519U. S. ex rel. James Scott v. Burdick, 1 Dak. 137, 46 N. W. 571, the territorial court, after a full discussion of its reasons therefor held -that an appeal lay from the order of the district court in a habeas corpus proceeding. At the same term of court, in Re James Scott, 1 Dak. 135, 46 N. W. 512, 513, the court said: “After careful consideration, we have arrived at the conclusion that this writ should be abated. Under our laws, the principle of res judicata is applicable to a proceeding upon habeas corpus. In such cases the district court has original concurrent jurisdiction with this court, and, where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause; and, whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment until reversed is binding in every other court. In the application of the principle of res judicata, it ought to. make no difference whether the first writ was returnable before a court of record or a Judge out of court; for in neither case ought the party suing out the writ be permitted to proceed ad infinitum before the same court or officer, or before another court or officer having concurrent jurisdiction, to review the former decision, while the facts and conditions remain the same. If the relator is dissatisfied with the -decision of the court below, he cannot properly ask us to review it in- this mode. Our appellate jurisdiction can only be invoked and exercised in the manner prescribed by law.” This court in the case of In re Hammill, 9 S. D. 390, 69 N. W. 577, said: “Proceedings in habeas corpus are in their nature civil. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556, 2 Sup. Ct. 871 (27 L. Ed. 826). When instituted in the circuit court, its decision will be a final order, affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, from which an appeal will lie to this court.” A discussion of the principles underlying the question before us is to be found in the case of People ex rel. Campbell v. Second Judicial District Court, 26 Colo. 380, 58 Pac. 608, 46 L. R. A. 855. The court made the following statement, which recognizes the principle which we uphold: “In the exercise of our original jurisdiction, we may properly, as we have recently done, determine on habeas corpus the constitutionality of a statute under which a person was convicted, if no other remedy exists, but we have always declined to exercise such jurisdiction when adequate relief can be afforded by write of ‘error.” Inf Church on Habeas Corpus, par. 389b, the author says: “No appeal is allowed from a judg*520ment in a habeas corpus case unless authorized by statute; but in many of the state courts, and in the federal courts, as well as in England and Canada, this statutory right of appeal is now given; and it operates as a kind of a substitute for successive applications from court to court, which -the prisoner had a right to make at common law, in case his application was refu‘sed.”
The reasoning- and conclusions in the case of Perry et al. v. McLendon, 62 Ga. 598, are so directly applicable to the case now before us that we feel warranted in quoting at considerable length from the decision;_ the underscoring being ours. The relators had been arrested in a civil action and were seeking discharge on hab-eas corpus, but we thing the words of the court are applicable whatever the nature of the confinement. The court said: “Successive judgments on the same matter and between the same parties have been’ rendered, all of them by courts of competent jurisdiction, and each of them either directly adjudicating the imprisonment complained of to be legal, or applying the bar of a previous direct adjudication of that question. In deciding the second case of the whole series (the first before him), the judge of the superior court entered fully into the legal questions involved in the cause of the imprisonment, ruled the same adversely to the petitioners, and, as a consequence, remanded them to the custody from whence they came. That judgment hais never been reversed, nor even excepted to. After it was rendered, the third writ in the series was applied for and granted; and, after an adverse judgment on the same by the ordinary (which also still stands in full force), the fourth writ was applied for and granted. In the sheriff‘s answer to this laust he set up as a bar the judgments rendered in the preceding cases, besides again urging the legality of the original cause of arrest and detention. Can there be a doubt that the bar is effective, inasmuch as judgments on habeas corpus are, in this state, subject to review by writ of error, if rendered by the judge of the superior court; by certiorari, if rendered by the ordinary? See (Livingston v. Livingston) 24 Ga. 379. It would seem from the .authorities, or some of them (see Hurd on Habeas Corpus), that, where there is no such power of review, there may be one writ of habeas corpus after another ad infinitum. But, if there can be a review, is there any reason, especially in civil cases, in which the struggle is between party and party, and not with the *521king or commonwealth on one side, and the subject or citizen on the other, why the first adjudication, if • acquiesced in, should not be final and conclusive? We can think of none. Such is the general rule of law in other cases, and why cases of habeas corpus should not be included in its application we cannot perceive or divine. Should the legality of an imprisonment in a civil case forever be and remain an open question, so long as the restraint continues ? Is there no way to close -it, and ought there to be none ? Is liberty so precious? There is no such indulgence to anything else, not even to life itself. A single judgment will serve to hang a man, if left to stand unreversed. He cannot have trial after trial to ascertain if he is guilty, and determine whether he is to be executed. One complete trial, fair and legal, will cany him out of the world; and why should it not suffice to keep him in jail until some new right to a deliverance has arisen? Is the grievance, real or supposed, of a prisoner the stone of Sisyphus which courts can never bring to a place of rest? And, if called to lift it up the same hill as often as it rolls down, must they comply? Doubtless there is an obligation to issue the writ of habeas corpus whenever, and as often as, it may be applied for, provided the petition contains the requisite matter, is in due form, duly authenticated, duly presented, and does not show on its face that the imprisonment, though complained of as illegal, is in ‘fact legal. Code, 4012. But, when it appears on the return or at the hearing that the legality of the imprisonment has already been adjudicated upon a previous writ between the same parties by a competent tribunal, the production of that judgment is the end of controversy. Further writs may be applied for and issued, but to each and all of them the one valid and subsisting judgment will be a conclusive answer as to any and all objections to’ the legality of the restraint which were embraced in the first petition, or which could and should have been embraced in it.” In Hurd, on Habeas Corpus, 575, it is stated: “Giving to the order on habeas corpus the effect of a final judgment may lead in a degree to the gradual introduction into the practice under the writ of the stricter rules of proof and the more circumspect delays of regular actions; and must deprive the prisoner of the right of repeated application for the benefit of the writ, not only to the court of last resort, but to the several judges of it in vacation.” We therefore conclude that, *522where, as in this state, an order made on habeas corpus is a final order, and, as such, appealable, such order, until reversed upon appeal, is res j.udicata upon all questions which were, or could properly have been, determined thereby.
. So far we have discussed the question of an order on habeas corpus being res judicata as though there was no statute making it so other than statutory provisions allowing appeal. We have, however, as a part of the law under which the warrant of commitment was issued herein, section 2826, Pol. Code, which reads as follows: “All persons confined as insane shall be entitled to the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, and the question of insanity shall be decided at the hearing, and if the judge or court shall decide that the person is insane, such decision shall be no bar to the issuing of the writ the second time whenever it shall be alleged that such person has been restored to reason.” Under such section no person confined as insane is entitled to a second writ of habeas corpus, unless it be alleged “that such person has been restored to reason.” It follows that this one question of fact as to present sanity is the only matter that can properly be considered upon a second writ, and that the order upon the prior writ stands as res judicata upon all matters that could have been presented upon such writ.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Dowdell, Petitioner, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N. E. 1033, 61 Am. St. Rep. 290, said of their statutes: “These statutes do not in terms require any notice to- the *527person alleged to be insane before the order of commitment is signed; and probably no such notice is required by construction, in view of the long usag‘e to the contrary in this commonwealth. But ample provision is made by later sections of the same chapter for his discharge afterward by any two of the trustees of the hospital, or, upon judicial proceedings, by a justice of the supreme judicial court, upon the written application of any person, if it appears that the person so confined is not insane, or that he is not dangerous to himself or others, and ought not longer to be so confined: Bub. Stats, c 87, 40-44..” And the same court in “the case of Bumpus v. French, 179 Mass. 131, 60 N. E. 414, speaking through Justice Holmes, now of the federal Supreme Court, said: “The great provisions intended to protect liberty and property cannot be read as e.\ lending with mathematical logic to every case where there is an unpaid-for diminution of property rights ór a temporary restraint cf personal freedom without a hearing of both sides in court. It does not need argument to show that sometimes it may be necessary to impose such temporary restraint without the delay required for a hearing and even before notice to the party restrained. Not to mention other instances familiar to the law, the necessity in eases of alleged insanity to protect the property until the principal question is decided has been recognized and acted upon many times under or possibly even without special authority of statute.” An examination of our statutes discloses that, outside of the provisions found in the sections hereinbefore quoted, he have in section 2824, Pol. Code, ample provision made whereby one confined in the State Hospital, or any one in his behalf, may make application to have his sanity inquired into and to have him discharged if found sane. Our statute is clearly constitutional.
The writ heretofore issued herein is discharged, and the relator remanded to the custody of respondent under the warrant of commitment held by him.