Case Information
*4 Before J OLLY S MITH , and D OSS out of a series of lawsuits filed in the
Circuit Judges. mid-1990’s against numerous oil producers by oil royalty and interest owners. The plaintiffs J ERRY E. S MITH , Circuit Judge: [*] sued in various state and federal courts,
charging the oil producers with the systematic
Chesapeake Exploration Limited Partner- underpayment of royalties for oil purchased at ship (“CELP”) appeals the denial of its motion the wellhead. The litigation was consolidated to enforce the terms of a class action in January 1998 by the Judicial Panel on settlement. The district court’s order is but Multi-District Litigation and assigned to the one action taken in its capacity as an ad- Southern District of Texas for further ministrator of the settlement fund. The order proceedings.
neither fully resolves the rights and liabilities of
all the parties nor fulfills the court’s mandate Thereafter, most of the original defendants to interpret and administer the settlement. It is settled, reaching an agreement that divided the accordingly not a final appealable order, so we parties into four classes: settling plaintiffs, dismiss the appeal. non-settling plaintiffs, settling defendants, and
non-settling defendants. Non-settling plaintiffs I. and non-settling defendants are regarded as CELP, a wholly-owned subsidiary of being outside the settlement class and are Chesapeake Energy Corporation (“CE”), neither bound by the terms of the agreement proceeding by way of motion in the Southern nor entitled to file claims under it. In addition, District of Texas, attempts to assert its the agreement excludes “affiliates” of non- putative rights to partake in a settlement from settling defendants, defined as entities in which which it has previously been excluded. The a non-settling defendant possessed a fifty settlement (the “Global Settlement”) arises percent or more ownership interest at any time
between January 1, 1986, and September 30, 1998.
monies to the settlement fund. CE timely the three companies was acquired by CELP objected to this classification and its exclusion before the effective date specified in the Global as a class member. The district court certified Settlement’s definition of “affiliates” of a non- the Global Settlement over these objections, [1] settling defendant. As a result, the court and CE timely appealed, then voluntarily concluded, the companies’ claims were exclud- abandoned the appeal. [2] Despite entering a ed by the terms of the agreement and could final judgment, the district court retained not be asserted by CELP. [4] “continuing jurisdiction over the Settlement
Agreement . . . for the purposes of enforcing, II.
implementing, administering, construing and With limited exception, this court has jur- interpreting [the] Settlement Agreement.” [3] isdiction only over final judgments. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291;
Graham v. Johnson
, 168 F.3d
The present appeal arises out of a motion
762, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). “A ‘final decision’
by CELP asking the district court to order a
generally is one which ends the litigation on
settlement disbursement in satisfaction of
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to
claims owned by three of CELP’s newly- ac-
do but execute the judgment.”
Catlin v.
quired subsidiaries: DLB Oil & Gas, Inc.
United States
, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
(“DLB”), Hugoton Energy Corp. (“Hugo-
Where an action involves multiple parties, “a
ton”), and Anson Corporation (“Anson”).
disposition of the action as to only some of the
DLB, Hugoton, and Anson are formerly class-
parties does not result in a final appealable or-
action plaintiffs who asserted a right to
der absent a certification by the district court
damages for barrels of oil they sold at
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).”
artificially deflated prices in the preceding
Transit Mgmt., Inc. v. Group Ins. Admin.,
decade.
Inc.
,
The district court, having previously The district court order is not a final determined that CELP could not assert claims judgment, because it neither resolves the rights on its own behalf because it is a non-settling and liabilities of all the part ies nor concludes defendant, denied CELP’s motion, because it the district court’s role as an administrator of concluded DLB, Hugoton, and Anson are af- the settlement. The parties do not dispute that filiates of a non-settling defendant. Each of the original order certifying the Global *6 Settlement was a final appealable order, or that tained jurisdiction over the settled case for the CE’s initial appeal of that decision was purpose of “enforcing, implementing, properly initiated. Rather, the question is administering, construing and interpreting” the whether a subsequent order interpreting that settlement. The issuance of an interpretive settlement to determine the rights and order defining CELP’s rights and obligations liabilities of one party is a final appealable under the agreement may be an action that is judgment. On the facts of this case, it is not. consistent with this retained grant of
jurisdiction, but it is not an action that marks Of singular importance to our conclusion is the termination of the court’s role as an the manner in which CELP initiated the administrator of the settlement. So long as the present dispute. Instead of pursuing a private court retains its residual grant of jurisdiction cause of action between itself and the plan ad- further to enforce, administer, and interpret the ministrator, CELP proceeded by way of settlement agreement, any action it takes in motion in the pre-existing class action case. It this capacity lacks the attribute of finality that did not serve a complaint on a defendant [5] or is necessary to make the order immediately seek to have its claims adjudicated under a appealable. [6]
new docket number. Indeed, under Kokkonen
here. As a result, the present action is a continuing part of the original class action, subject to the terms and conditions by which the district court retained the subject matter jurisdiction necessary settlement and issue binding orders thereunder. to interpret the CELP could have brought this claim that would have lent themselves to a quicker appeal: (1) by pursuing an independent claim against the plan’s fiduciaries in state (or with the proper jurisdictional [6] There are several alternative means by which
basis, federal) court for breach of contract, thereby asserting its rights to a settlement distribution in a Among the consequences for CELP’s deci- vehicle that presents that singular issue for sion to pursue its claim in this fashion is the adjudication; (2) by accepting its status as a non- subordination of its interests to the larger ac- settling defendant and instituting a new cause of action to prevail on the merits of the underlying tion pending in the district court, which re-
antitrust and state tort claims; or (3) having pro-
ceeded as it did by way of motion, by asking the
district court to determine that there exists no just
[5]
And indeed, at oral argument, CELP’s attor-
reason to delay an appeal of its individual rights
ney had difficulty even identifying the defendant.
and to certify the issue for appellate review under
The motion to enforce the settlement is ostensibly
rule 54(b).
See
F ED . R. IV . P. 54(b);
Wither-
a claim to require the administrator of the settle-
spoon v. White
,
not reach the merits of the district court’s con-
clusion that CELP may not assert rights on be-
half of DLB, Hugoton, and Anson.
Notes
[*] Pursuant to 5 TH IR . R. 47.5, the court has CE was designated a non-settling determined that this opinion should not be pub- defendant, because it did not contribute lished and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH IR . R. 47.5.4.
[4] The district court misconstrued CELP’s mo-
[1] In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II) , 186 tion as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief F.R.D. 403 (S.D. Tex. 1999) from the judgment on the basis of the court’s belief
[2] As a result, the fairness of the settlement is no that CELP sought to be re-designated as a class member. To the contrary, CELP’s motion asserts longer an issue CELP can raise on appeal. a right to collect based on an independent ground
[3]
See also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
that was not the subject of the court’s earlier rul-
of Am.
,