Mаureen McLeod entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of improperly stopping her car, OCGA § 40-6-123 (c). Proceeding pro sе, McLeod appeals, contending the trial court failed to advise her that a plea could have an impact on her immigration status, as required by OCGA § 17-7-93 (c), аnd that the trial court imposed an overly severe sentence. 1 For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
McLeod’s vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Eric Albert Tillman. McLeod was chargеd with reckless driving, OCGA § 40-6-390; Tillman was charged with following too closely, OCGA § 40-6-49. After a hearing, Tillman entered a nolo plea, and the trial court suspended the fine. McLeod entered a nolo plea to improper stopping; the trial court sentenced her to 60 days in jail, suspended on completion of defensive driving school, аnd fined her $300 plus court costs.
1. McLeod contends the trial court violated OCGA § 17-7-93 (c) which provides:
In addition to any other inquiry by the court prior to acceptanсe of a plea of guilty, the court shall determine whether the defendant is freely entering the plea with an understanding that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, then the plea may have an impact on his or her immigration status. This subsection shall apply with respect to acceptance of any plea оf guilty to any state offense in any court of this state or any political subdivision of this state.
As a preliminary matter, we conclude this Code section applies when a defendant pleads nolo contendere.
Williams v. State,
McLeod seeks to set aside her nolo plea because the trial court “did not inform [her] of any possible implications on her immigration status by entering a plea.” OCGA § 17-7-93 (c), however, does not require the trial court to recite formulaic advice to a defendant, but rather requires the trial court to “determine” that the defendant is entering the plea “with an understanding that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, then the pleа may have an impact on his or her immigration status.” Here, the record as a whole indisputably shows that McLeod realized a plea could have an effect on her immigration status. At the hearing, McLeod’s attorney objected to the imposition of probation because “the probation . . . could serve as аn impediment to . . . her ability to apply for U. S. citizenship which has been ongoing.” Indeed, the attorney told the court that a previous plea and probated sеntence had interfered with earlier immigration proceedings. Therefore, the face of the record shows that the trial court complied with OCGA § 17-7-93 (c).
Furthermorе, OCGA § 17-7-93 (c) is the only source of a requirement that a defendant be advised of the possible effect of a plea on immigration status.
Palacios v. State,
We take this opportunity to emphasize that the language of OCGA § 17-7-93 (c) does not limit the trial court’s duty to those cases in which the trial court is aware of a defendant’s immigration status. Because a person’s citizenship may not be apparent, we urge all *373 courts accepting pleas of guilty or nolo contendere to any state offenses to include this disclosure as a matter of routine. See USCR 33.7; 33.8.
2. In three related enumerations, McLеod contends the trial court punished her too severely.
“There is a presumption that a sentence was correctly imposed, and the burden of showing that a sentence was not correctly imposed is with the party asserting its impropriety.” (Citation omitted.)
Palmore v. State,
McLeod contends the trial сourt informed her “that it would be punishing her for her holding out for a jury trial.” But McLeod failed to cite any evidence in the record or transcript that the trial court punished her “for exercising her constitutional right to a jury trial” by initially pleading not guilty.* 3 Accordingly, this Court will not consider this enumeration. Court of Appeals Rule 27 (c) (3) (i).
McLeod also contends that the sentence the trial court imposed was disproportionate to the charge and that it was disproportionate to the sentence given to Tillman. 4 First, the sentence imposed fell within the allowed sentencing range. OCGA §§ 17-10-3; 40-6-1; 40-13-60. Georgia law does not require courts to treat equally both drivers cited for an аccident. See Daniel, Ga. Criminal Trial Practice (1999 ed.), § 26-4, pp. 794-795. Furthermore, in this case there was a factual basis for the severity of McLeod’s punishment and the disparate treatment as between the two drivers. Specifically, McLeod had several previous convictions for moving violations. More importantly, the triаl court heard evidence that McLeod intentionally braked in front of Tillman’s vehicle in retaliation for an earlier incident in which McLeod had been unable tо pass Tillman. During McLeod’s sentencing, the trial court told her that the ‘Very aggravating” factual basis for her plea resulted in the harsher sentence. See Daniel, *374 Ga. Criminal Trial Practice (1999 ed.), § 26-31, pp. 853-856. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing McLeod.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
We note that in the State’s brief the prosecutor informs this Court that the Stаte does not object to the withdrawal of McLeod’s nolo plea. Indeed, the State affirmatively requests this Court to remand this case with instructions that the trial court declare the plea void, ab initio, and grant McLeod a trial. A remand for this purpose would be useless, however, because more than 180 days have pаssed since McLeod’s misdemeanor conviction of traffic laws became final, and Georgia law therefore forbids any new challenge to the conviction. OCGA § 40-13-33; see
Grant v. State,
By comparison, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of the constitutional rights waived thereby is invalid and subject to reversal under
Boykin v. Alabama,
Indeed, the record suggests that the trial court rejected the prosecutor’s argument that McLeod’s delay in pleading guilty had caused “additional prosecutorial expense.”
Although not set out in an enumeration of error, McLeod raises the specter of “racial animus,” implying that the trial court favored Tillman, who is white, over McLeod, who is black. Again, McLeod failed to support this assertion, and we do not address it.