181 Ga. 462 | Ga. | 1935
(After stating the foregoing facts.) In all of the Codes of Georgia (1863, § 3716; 1868, § 3740; 1873 and 1882, § 3793; Penal Code of 1910, § 1932; Code of 1933, § 38-411), the rule governing the admissibility of confessions is embodied in the following pungent language: "To make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another, by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” Our reports are full of adjudicated cases upon the subject of the admissibility of evidence of confessions, and of rulings in particular cases upon the point as to whether the alleged confession under review was or was not voluntary, in the ample sense which the language of our Code implies. To quote the language of Mr. Justice Lumpkin upon this point in Green v. State, 88 Ga. 516, 518 (15 S. E. 10, 30 Am. St. R. 167) : "A careful and laborious examination of a large number of textbooks and decisions, touching the admissibility of confessions in evidence in criminal cases, shows that the authorities are in considerable conflict, and that it is difficult to draw a precise line between confessions which should be received and those which should be rejected. The tendency of modern judicial opinion is to refuse to admit them when there is any reasonable ground to believe that they were induced by hope or fear. Precisely what words or conduct will constitute such inducement is not easily determined, and differences of opinion concerning the effect and meaning of many expressions, varying in language but more or less similar in import, have given rise to the conflict mentioned. We do not think it would be profitable now to review and discuss these authorities, either with the view of attempting to harmonize them, or of deducing from them a rule which could be applied to all cases. We shall content ourselves, in this case, with announcing our purpose to adhere closely to the plain mandates of our own statute.” The writer has heretofore expressed his opin
In establishing whether or not air alleged confession is prima facie admissible, does the burden of proof rest upon the State, or upon the defendant accused of crime? The solicitor-general contends that the burden is upon the accused to show that the alleged confession was not voluntary. In support of this proposition we have had our attention called to Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598, 608. The question now before us was not raised in that case. In the opinion it was said: “It appears from the record that these confessions were offered, and no objection made by the prisoner’s counsel to their going in.” However, our view of the language of § 38-411 is supported by the remark of the court in finding no error in the admission of the confessions of the defendant; for the court stated: “As his counsel permitted the evidence - to go in without objection, we must take it for granted that they preferred not to insist . . We incline to think that, if objected to, it would have been the duty of the State to show the circumstances under which they were made, that the court might see if they were voluntary.” In Adams v. State, 129 Ga. 248, 251 (58 S. E. 822, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 468, 12 Ann. Cas. 158), a verdict of guilty of murder was reversed upon the ground that sworn statements before the coroner’s jury em
In other words, the court may submit to the jury a confession affirmatively shown to be prima facie admissible; but where the evidence on behalf of the State fails to show that there was no inducement offered the prisoner, or leaves that question in doubt, the State has failed to make a prima facie case, by that witness at least, and his testimony should be withdrawn from the jury. Even where the State establishes a prima facie case of admissibility, as well as in a case where there is conflict of evidence as to whether the confession was freely and voluntarily made, the judge in submitting the ease is required to charge the jury the substance of § 38-411, as well as of § 38-420, as follows: “All admissions shall be scanned with care, and confessions of guilt shall be received with great caution. A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.” The State’s witness in this case testified, as to the circumstances attending the making of the purported confession: “•Well, I don’t know that we used the words, ‘it would be better for him to go on and tell the truth.’ I don’t recall whether we did or not. I don’t say we did not, but he wasn’t afraid. I might have said it would be better for him to make a confession. I wouldn’t say I did or did not. I might have told him it would be better to tell the whole story, to come clean. . . I told him it would be better for him just to make a full disclosure.” The statement of the accused contained in the testimony of the witness to whose evidence objection was offered was made in the jail of Muscogee County, and, as testified by this witness: “At the time he made the statement Mr. H. M. Adair, city detective, Sheriff C. C. Layiield, of Mrrscogee County, Mr. Reese, and Mr.
So we are of the opinion that the court erred in refusing to withdraw the testimony of the alleged confession from the jury, because the evidence did not establish a prima facie case of its admissibility as a voluntary confession obtained without "the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury,” and we the more readily concur in this view when we consider the record as to the time, place, circumstances, and official surroundings of the defendant at the time the alleged statements were made. For the latter would seem at least to leave a reasonable mind in doubt as to whether the statement was not more or less induced by these influences. The present case is distinguished from Hicks v. State, 178 Ga. 561 (173 S. E. 395), where it was held that the confession was not inadmissible because it appeared to have been made in response to a statement to the prisoner that it would be better for him to tell the truth. The decision in that case may or may not be in accord with the ruling made in Green v. State, supra. It is unnecessary at the present time to determine any question of conflict between these two decisions. For the present purpose it is sufficient to say that in the case at bar the witness to whom the alleged confession was made testified that he "might have said it would be better for him to make a confession.” There is a material difference between a statement to a prisoner that it would be better for him to tell the tmili, and one wherein he is told that it would be better for him to make a confession. The court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.