McLemore v. Clinton Cty. Sheiff's OfficeMcLemore v. Clinton Cty. Sheiff's Office
Faith McLemore, pro se.
Rohrbachers Cron Manahan Trimble & Zimmerman Co., L.P.A., and J. Mark Trimble and Tracy B. Selis, for appellees, Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center, Morgan Keilhoz, Brianna Schultz, and Alexandra Fehder.
Isaac Wiles & Burkholder, LLC, and Jeffrey A. Stankunas, for appellees, Clinton County Sheriff‘s Office, Ralph Fizer Jr., Brian Prickett, Doug Eastes, Brett Prickett, Terence Meehan, Thomas Crouch, Robert Gates, Morgan Wages, Elliott Sylvester, the Clinton County Board of Commissioners, Kerry Steed, Brenda Woods, Mike McCarty, the Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney‘s Office, Andrew McCoy, John Kaspar, Stephen Payne, Gary Garrison, Marvin Corbin, and Arlene Soto.
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, and Justin M. Burns and Gary E. Becker, for appellees, City of Wilmington, City of Wilmington Police Department, City of Wilmington Police Chief Ron Cravens, City of Wilmington Fire Department, City of Wilmington Prosecutor David Henry, City of Wilmington Law Director Brett Rudduck, City of Wilmington Mayor John Stanforth, City of Wilmington City Council Members (Jonathаn McKay, Michael Snarr, Kristi Fickert, Matt Purkey, Kelsey Swindler, Bill Liermann, Nick Eveland, and Mark McKay), and City of Wilmington Fire Department/EMTs Brett Terrell and Mark Duncan.
BYRNE, J.
{¶1} Faith McLemore appeals the decision of the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas striking her pleadings and dismissing her claims. For the reasons described below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
I. Facts and Procedural Posture
A. The Complaint
{¶2} On or about November 25, 2019, Marvin “Andy” Napier, Jr. (“Andy“) died while he was in the custody of the Clinton County Sheriff‘s Office. Nearly two years later, on November 24, 2021, a complaint bringing claims concerning the circumstances of Andy‘s death was filed in the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas. The complaint purported to be brought on behalf of four individual plaintiffs: (1) Faith McLemore, who is Andy‘s daughter; (2) Mary Napier, who is Andy‘s daughter and McLemore‘s sister; (3) Devin Napier, who is Andy‘s son and McLemore‘s brother; and (4) their deceased father, Andy. The complaint purported to bе brought by these Plaintiffs pro se—that is, with the Plaintiffs representing themselves, rather than being represented by a lawyer.1
{¶4} The complaint identified ten government entities, one non-profit organization, and 37 individuals associated with those entities as defendants. Specifically, the complaint identified the following defendants:
- The Clinton County Sheriff‘s Office, and the following individuals allegedly associated, either then or previously, with that office: (1) Sheriff Ralph D. Fizer Jr.; (2) Brian Prickett; (3) Brett Prickett; (4) Doug Eastes; (5) Morgan Wages; (6) Elliott Sylvester; (7) Terrence Meehan; (8) Thomas [Crouch]; and (9) Robert Gates;2
- The Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney‘s Office, and the following individuals associated with that office: (10) Prosecuting Attorney Andrew McCoy; (11) Assistant Prosecuting Attorney John [Kaspar]; and (12) Investigator Stephen Payne;
- The “Wilmington City Prosecutor,” which appears to have been a reference to the City of Wilmington‘s Office of Law Director, and the following individuals then-associated with that office: (13) Law Director Brett Rudduck; and (14) Prosecutor David Henry;
- The “Wilmington Coroner‘s Office,” which appears to have been a reference to the Clinton County Coroner‘s Office, and the following individuals associated with that office: (15) Gary Garrison; (16) Marvin Corbin; and (17) Arlene Soto;
- The City of Wilmington Police Department, and (18) Police Chief Ron Cravens;
- The City of Wilmington Fire Department, and the following individuals associated with that department: (19) Brett Terrell, and (20) Mark Duncan;
- The Montgomery County Coroner‘s Office/Miami Valley Crime Lab, and the following individuals associated with that office: (21) Dr. Susan Brown; and (22) Dr. Kent Harshbarger;
- The Clinton County Board of Commissioners, and the following three county commissioners: (23) Kerry Steed; (24) Brenda Woods; and (25) Mike McCarty;
- The City of Wilmington‘s Mayor‘s Office, and (26) Mayor John Stanforth;
- The City of Wilmington‘s City Council, and city council members (27) Jonathan McKay; (28) Michael Snarr; (29) Kristi Fickert; (30) Matt
Purkey; (31) Kelsey Swindler; (32) Bill Liermann; (33) Nick Eveland; and (34) Mark McKay; - The Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center (“OCVJC“), a non-profit organization based in Powell, Ohio, and the following individuals associated with that organization: (35) Morgan Keilholz; (36) Brianna Schultz; and (37) Alex Fehder.
{¶5} The complaint was not signed by any of the Plaintiffs and did not list any of the Plaintiffs’ addresses. A certificate of service appearing at the end of the comрlaint stated, “I hereby certify that a copy of the for[e]going has been sent via email to the following email addresses,” followed by a list of 31 of the 37 individual defendants and email addresses for each of those 31 individuals. The certificate of service then stated that three of the individual defendants—David Henry, Brett Terrell, and Mark Duncan—were “[s]erved in person” at their places of employment. Though the certificate of service stated that “I” served the 31 individuals by email, it is not clear to whom “I” references. Likewise, it is not clear what person served Henry, Terrell, and Duncan in person. The certificate of service did not indicate that any effort whatsoever was made to serve three of the individual defendants: Terrence Meehan and Thomas Crouch with the Clinton County Sheriff‘s Office, and Dr. Susan Brown with the Montgomery County Coroner‘s Office. In placе of a signature block, the complaint simply listed the names of the four Plaintiffs after the certificate of service—one of whom, Andy, was deceased, and so he could not have participated in serving anyone. The names were typed, not signed, and were not preceded by the standard “/s/” designation for electronic signatures.
B. The Amended Complaint
{¶6} On December 21, 2021, a 167-page amended complaint was filed, purportedly by the same four Plaintiffs identified in the initial complaint. The amended complaint named the same defendants as the initial complaint. As with the initial complaint, the certificate of service stated that the same 31 of 37 individual defendants who were served the original complaint by email had again been served with the amended complaint by email, and that Henry, Terrell, and Duncan were again served with the amended complaint by in-рerson service. The amended complaint was not signed, but concluded with the typed names of McLemore, Devin Napier, and Mary Napier (but not Andy). The certificate of service was also unsigned, and lacked even any typed names that might indicate who performed the attempts at service described in the certificate.
C. The Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Strike
{¶7} The defendants associated with the City of Wilmington, i.e., those departments and offices, elected and appointed officials, and employees listed above (collectively “the Wilmington Defendants“), moved to dismiss the initial complaint. The Wilmington Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to
{¶8} Next, the defendants associated with Clinton County, i.e., those departments and offices, elected and appointed officials, and employees listed above, but not including the two employees of the Clinton County Coroner‘s Office who were named as defendants (collectively “the Clinton County Defendants“), moved to strike both the complaint and the amended complaint becausе those pleadings, in violation of the requirements of
{¶9} McLemore then individually filed a memorandum opposing “the defendant‘s motion to dismiss,” without specifically identifying the motion or motions she was opposing. Notably, the other Plaintiffs were not identified as joining McLemore‘s memorandum.
{¶10} Next, OCVJC and its employees named as defendants (collectively, “OCVJC Defendants“) moved to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to
{¶11} Finally, the Clinton County Coroner‘s Office and its employees named as defendants (“Clinton County Coroner Defendants“) moved to strike both the initial complaint and the amended complaint pursuant to
{¶12} Neither McLemore individually nor the Plaintiffs collectively ever filed any memoranda opposing the motions filed by the OCVJC Defendants and the Clinton County Coroners Defendants.
{¶13} The Montgomery County Coroner‘s Office and the individual defendants associated with that office (“Montgomery County Coroner Defendants“) never filed any form of responsive pleading or motion, and in fact never appeared in the case.
D. Hearing and Written Decision on Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Strike
{¶14} On May 19, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the various motions to dismiss and motions to strike. On June 6, 2022, the trial court issued a decision and judgment entry in which it addressed all the pеnding motions. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the Wilmington Defendants and the OCVJC Defendants, dismissing all pending claims against them based on the Plaintiffs’ failure to serve them with a summons and the complaint. The court also dismissed all claims against the Montgomery County Coroner for the same reasons. The trial court also struck the complaint and the amended complaint with respect to all defendants because those pleadings, in violation of
{¶15} The trial court also addressed the
{¶16} No claims remained pending against any party after the trial court‘s decision and judgment entry. Finally, we note that in its decision and judgment entry, the trial court denied a request made by McLemore for the appointment of legal counsel. McLemore timely appealed.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶17}
{¶18} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 1 (originally McLemore‘s “Issue Presented for Review No. 1“) states:
WAS THE PLAINTIFF‘S ABILITY AND CHANCES TO OBTAIN PROPER LEGAL COUNSEL AND DISCOVERY EFFORTS HINDERED AND CRITICALLY RESTRICTED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE? DID THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND SERVANTS WHO ARE ALSO DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE COMMIT AT A MINIMUM, A CRIME OF DERELICTION OF DUTY AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS?3
{¶19} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 2 (originally McLemore‘s “Issue Presented for Review No. 2“) states:
DOES DISABLED AND FINANCIALLY LIMITED/RESTRICTED PLAINTIFF MCLEMORE DESERVE THE APPOINTMENT OF PROPER LEGAL REPRESENTATION WHEN CONSIDERING THE FACTS AND THE ONE OF A KIND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS CASE?
{¶20} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 3 (originally McLemore‘s “Issue Presented for Review No. 3“) states:
DO ALL OF THE ATTACHED DEFENDANTS WHO ARE ALL PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OR PUBLIC SERVANTS HAVE A DUTY OR OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE TO THE PUBLIC? SHOULD THE DEFENDANTS WHO ARE ALSO PUBLIC OFFICIALS HAVE TO PROVIDE ANSWERS, ACCURATE INFORMATION, REPORTS, FACTS, PUBLIC INFORMATION, AND TRUTH TO FAMILIES WHO HAD A LOVED ONE DIE WHILE IN CUSTODY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT?
{¶21} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 4 (originally McLemore‘s “Issue Presented for Review No. 4“) states:
DID THE COURT ERR WHEN DISABLED PLAINTIFF FAITH MCLEMORE‘S LEGAL RIGHT TO USE A POA TO ASSIST HER WITH PRESENTING AN ORAL ARGUMENT TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS DENIED?
{¶22} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 5 (originally McLemore‘s “Issue Presented for Review No. 5“) states:
SHOULD THE COURT DISMISS THIS CASE OVER MISSING SIGNATURES, CLERGY AND PROCEDURAL ERRORS, OR OTHER “NON ATTORNEY” MISTAKES? SHOULD THE COURT GRANT LENIENCY CONSIDERING THE RARE CIRCUMSTANCES AND SERIOUSNESS OF THE ALLEGATIONS?
{¶23} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 6 (originally McLemore‘s “Argument No. 1“) states:
IT IS A FACT ACCORDING TO THE SLEW OF EVIDENCE THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE OBTAINED AND CAN PROVIDE TO THE COURT THAT ALL THE DEFENDANTS IN SOME WAY DID HINDER THE PLAINTIFF‘S DISCOVERY EFFORTS AND DID IN FACT CRITICALLY RESTRICT THE PLAINTIFF‘S ABILITY AND CHANCES OF EVER OBTAINING PROPER LEGAL COUNSEL.
{¶24} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 7 (originally McLemore‘s “Argument No. 2“) states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN BAILIFF KELLY HOKINS DENIED THE RIGHT TO FAITH MCLEMORE‘S POWER OF ATTORNEY AGENTS DARRELL PETREY AND TONY THOMAS TO SPEAK ON DISABLED PLAINTIFF FAITH MCLEMORE‘S BEHALF, BEFORE THE COURT.
{¶25} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 8 (originally McLemore‘s “Argument No. 3“) states:
ALL PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND SERVANTS DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE THE PUBLIC.
{¶26} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 9 (originally McLemore‘s “Argument No. 4“) states:
ACCORDING TO THE UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT ORC, THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN DENYING THE RIGHT FOR DISABLED PLAINTIFF MCLEMORE TO USE “BEFORE A COURT” AND FOR HER “OTHER RELIEF” TO ASSIST
WITH HER ORAL ARGUMENT.
{¶27} McLemore‘s Assignment of Error No. 10 (originally McLеmore‘s “Argument No. 5“) states:
ACCORDING TO SEVERAL CASES AROUND THE US SOME COURTS HAVE GRANTED LENIENCY TO PRO SE LITIGANTS AND HAVE HELD THEM TO A LESSER STANDARD THAN ATTORNEYS.
A. Preliminary Issues
{¶28} Before addressing the key procedural issues before us in this appeal, we will address three preliminary issues raised by McLemore.
1. McLemore‘s Request for Appointed Counsel
{¶29} First, McLemore argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for appointment of counsel. Unlike in criminal proceedings, there is no general right to counsel in civil litigation. State, ex rel. Jenkins v. Stern, 33 Ohio St.3d 108, 110 (1987); Mootispaw v. Wenninger, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2015-08-024, 2016-Ohio-1287, ¶ 13. McLemore has not specified any relevant statute or rule entitling her to appointed counsel in a civil case. State ex rel. Burnes v. Athens Cty. Clerk of Courts, 83 Ohio St.3d 523, 524 (1998). Nor has she identified any legal basis for her argument that the trial court should have appointed counsel because she is disabled, and we are aware of none. McLemore cites
2. McLemore‘s Request for Power of Attorney Participation
{¶30} Second, McLemore argues that the trial court erred in not allowing her “Power of Attorney Agent” to participate in the case, on her behalf, at a hearing on the pending motions to dismiss. McLemore attached a notarized Power of Attorney form to her original complaint. In the “special instructions” section of the form, the following language appears:
I, Faith McClemore [sic] as the next of Kin to Marvin “Andy” Napier, give William Darrell Petrey and Co-Agent Tony Thomas, permission to * * * submit any court filings, lawsuits, and any paperwork on my behalf. I give them permission to represent my interests on my behalf in any court proceedings or hearings. I give them permission to legally represent myself, Faith McClemore [sic].
{¶31} In May 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the various motions to dismiss. McLemore appeared pro se. There is nothing in the record to support the assertion, but McLemore suggests that prior to the hearing, the court denied her request to have her “legal Power of Attorney Agents” “participate in litigation.” Specifically, McLemore indicates that she wanted her “Power of Attorney Agents” to assist her with “reading a pre-written 6 page document.” There is no reference in the transcript of the hearing to any request by McLemore to have a power of attorney assist her in the proceedings. Nor is there any indication that the court denied that request.
{¶32} Following the hearing, McLemore filed a document styled “Motion to Move Directly to Discovery and Additional Requests of the Court.” In it, McLemore
{¶33} Ohio courts have consistently held that a power of attorney designation does not allow a person not admitted to the practice of law to represent a principal as an attorney at law. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Coleman, 88 Ohio St.3d 155, 157-58 (2000). A power of attorney document designates an individual as an attorney in fact, a role that is distinct and different from an attorney at law. The Ohio Supreme court has explained:
* * * [P]ersons holding powers of attorney have historically not been considered attorneys who can appear in the courts. When a principal through the execution of a “power of attorney” designates another to transact some business that could have been transacted by the principal, he appoints an agent to act for him as an “attorney in fact” or “private attorney.” 2A Corpus Juris Secundum (1972) 771, Agency, Section 150; 3 American Jurisprudence 2d (1986) 529, Agency, Section 23. An “attorney in fact” has been consistently distinguished from an “attorney at law” or “public attorney” since at least 1402 when certain attorneys in England were examined by Justices and “their names be entered on the roll” of those permitted to practice in the courts. 1 The Oxford English Dictionary (2 Ed. 1989) 772. Thus, a person holding a power of attorney, but whose name is not entered on the roll, is an attorney in fact, but not an attorney at law permitted to practice in the courts.
Id. at 157. The Ohio Supreme Court further explained that the argument that a power of attorney designation enables a person who is not an attorney at law to practice law “would render meaningless the supervisory control of the practice of law” given to the Ohio Supreme Court by Section 2(B)(1)(g), Article IV the Ohio Constitution. Id. That provision of the Ohio Constitution authorizes the Ohio Supreme Court to regulate “[a]dmission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to the practice of law.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g). The court further explained that “[w]hen a person not admitted to the bar attempts to represent another in court on the basis of a power of attorney assigning pro se rights,” that person violates
No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law, or to commence, conduсt, or defend any action or proceeding in which the person is not a party concerned, either by using or subscribing the person‘s own name, or the name of another person, unless the person has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in compliance with its prescribed and published rules.
{¶34} Undaunted by these precedents, McLemore argues that a statute,
{¶35} The portion of
Unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, language in a power of attorney granting general authority with respect to claims and litigation authorizes the agent to do all of the following:
(A) Assert and maintain before a court or administrative agency a claim, claim for relief, cause of action, counterclaim, offset, recoupment, or defense, including an action to recover property or other thing of value, recover damages sustained by the principal, eliminate or modify tax liability, or seek an injunction, specific performance, or other relief;
(B) Bring an action to determine adverse claims or intervene or otherwise participate in litigation * * *.
McLemore misunderstands the meaning of
{¶36} The same is true with regard to
{¶37} Looking even more closely at the language of the statute,
{¶38} Interpreting
{¶39} In other words, nothing in
{¶40} McLemore also specifically argues that Petrey and Thomas, as her powers of attorney, should have been permitted to read a prepared statement at the motion to dismiss hearing on her behalf. We need not consider whether simply reading a statement that McLemore prepared would have constituted the unauthorized practice of law because McLemore has not identified any manner in which she was prejudiced by the trial court‘s decision. The record reflects that McLemore was able to speak and express herself during the hearing without any difficulty. Nor has McLemore identified any possible manner in which the trial court‘s ultimate decision to dismiss the claims or strike her complaint with regard to all parties would have been affected by McLemore‘s powers of attorney reading a prepared statement. Smith v. Flesher, 12 Ohio St.2d 107 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus (“In order to support reversal of a judgment, the record must show affirmatively not only that error intervened but that such error was to the prejudice of the party seeking such reversal“) For all of these reasons, McLemore‘s arguments regarding the individual(s) she allegedly designated as having power of attorney are without merit.
3. McLemore‘s Request for Pro Se Leniency
{¶41} Third, McLemore argues—in the context of her discussion regarding the procedural issues presented to us in this appeal—that we should grant “leniency” to her as a рro se party. McLemore‘s request for leniency as a pro se
{¶42} McLemore argues that we should disregard Ohio law regarding the expectations of pro se litigants. She points to two cases. First, McLemore points to Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987), a decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska. Breck is not controlling in this state and is inconsistent with Ohio controlling authority. It is not applicable here. Second, McLemore points to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). In Haines, a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court stated,
We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Id. at 520-21. Haines is not applicable here because it merely pertains to the standard applied in interpreting a pro se plaintiff‘s pleading. Haines says nothing about pro se plaintiffs being exempt from complying with the rules of civil procedure.
{¶43} McLemore‘s arguments arе without merit. McLemore must “abide by the relevant rules of procedure and substantive laws, regardless of [her] familiarity with the law.” Fontain at ¶ 26. “The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally, and ‘we cannot disregard [the] rules to assist a party who has failed to abide by them.‘” Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-Ohio-3762, ¶ 16, quoting Bell v. Midwestern Educational Servs., Inc., 89 Ohio App.3d 193, 204 (2d Dist.1993).
{¶44} Having addressed the preliminary issues concerning representation and pro se status raised by McLemore, we turn now to the key procedural and jurisdictional issues that were decided by the trial court in the decision and judgment entry from which McLemore appeals.
B. Personal Jurisdiction: Failure of Service of Process
{¶45} “It is rudimentary that in order to render a valid judgment, the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984); Ata Logistics, Inc. v. Empire Container Freight Station, Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-01-006, 2020-Ohio-4183, ¶ 13. “‘Proper service of process is a prerequisite for personal jurisdiction.‘” Fifth Third Bank v. Bolera, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2017-03-039, 2017-Ohio-9091, ¶ 15, quoting Williams v. Gray Guy Group., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-321, 2016-Ohio-8499, ¶ 18. Service of a summons—along with
{¶46} In this case, the record does not reflect that any summons was ever issued with respect to any defendant, and does not reflect that the Plaintiffs ever requested the issuance of any summons. Likewise, the record does not reflect any return of service documenting completion of service of any summons or complaint by any of the methods of service provided for in
{¶47} The only suggestions in the record that Plaintiffs made any attempt at service were the certificates of service attached to the complaint and the amended complaint. Both stated that some unidentified person had attempted to serve 31 of the 37 individual defendants by emailing them a copy of the complaint, and later, the amended complaint. The certificates also stated that someone had served three of the individual defendants in persоn at their places of business. But none of this indicates that the Plaintiffs complied with the applicable rules regarding service. First, the certificates only indicate that someone attempted to serve the complaint and the amended complaint by email or in-person delivery. Even if these methods of service were valid, the Plaintiffs were required to serve the summons as well, and the certificates of service do not indicate that Plaintiffs made any such attempt. Second, email is not a permissible method of service under
{¶48} McLemore argues that we should overlook the procedural and jurisdictional deficiencies in this case because of the “seriousness of the allegations of homicide/murder, public corruption, conspiracy, tampering with evidence, forgery, dereliction of duty, [and] deception” that she raises. But we do not have the power to declare that the rules of civil procedure do not apply in a particular case merely because of the nature of the allegations in
{¶49} In the absence of service of process or the waiver of service by the defendant, a court ordinarily may not exercise jurisdiction over a party the complaint names as a defendant. Williams, 2016-Ohio-8499 at ¶ 18, citing Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). However, a defendant waives any defects in service—and the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant—if the defendant voluntarily appears in the case and fails to move to dismiss for lack of proper service. Hunt v. Arboretum Home Owners Assn., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-02-025, 2020-Ohio-4947, ¶ 11 (“A trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant if effective service of process has not been made on the defendant and the defendant has not voluntarily appeared in the case or waived service“); Lauver v. Ohio Valley Selective Harvesting, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-11-076, 2017-Ohio-5777, ¶ 15 (similar); Williams, 2016-Ohio-8499 at ¶ 19 (holding that a plaintiff‘s failure to perfect service of its original complaint is waived when the defendant appears for any other purpose than to object to jurisdiction); Maryhew, 11 Ohio St.3d at 156 (personal jurisdiction may be obtained by service of process, voluntary appearance, or waiver).
{¶50} The Wilmington Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to
{¶51} The same is not the case with regard to the Clinton County Defendants and the Clinton County Coroner‘s Office Defendants. Those entities, upоn first appearing in this case, did not move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based on failing to serve them with service of a summons and the complaint and did not identify any deficiencies with summons or service. Instead, they moved to strike the complaint for reasons unrelated to personal jurisdiction. Therefore, those defendants waived deficiencies with service. Hunt, 2020-Ohio-4947 at ¶ 11; Lauver, 2017-Ohio-5777 at ¶ 15. As a result, we find that the trial court erred to the extent it
{¶52} Because we have affirmed the trial court‘s dismissal of the complaint and amended complaint with respect to the Wilmington Defendants, the OCVJC Defendants, and the Montgomery County Coroner Defendants, the only remaining defendants whom we must consider are the Clinton County Defendants and the Clinton County Coroner Defendants. We therefore turn to examine the trial court‘s decision granting those defendants’ motions to strike the complaint and amended complaint.
C. Civ.R. 11: Failure to Sign Complaint and Amended Complaint
{¶53}
{¶54} As stated above, neither the complaint nor the amended complaint was signed by any of the Plaintiffs, including McLemore. The names of all four Plaintiffs were typed at the end of the complaint after the closing word, “Respectfully,” and three of their names were typed at thе end of the amended complaint after “Respectfully.” But merely typing one‘s name on a pleading fails to satisfy the signature requirement of
{¶55} The record reflects that, in violation of
{¶56} With no complaints pending before the court, the court was justified in dismissing the action in its entirety as to all defendants.
{¶57} Most of the arguments in McLemore‘s brief concern the merits of her
There are many other examples for each defendant that we the Plaintiffs would love to discuss, go into depth, and share with the court that prove ALL of our allegations true. We can prove the defendants conspired together and or were coerced into whitewashing the heinous crimes committed against our father and with the motive to escape all legal responsibility and accountability.
(Emphasis added.) McLemore appears to have acknowledged that many of the arguments in her brief concern issues that are not currently before this court.
III. Conclusion
{¶58} The trial court properly dismissed all claims against the Wilmington Defendants, the OCVJC Defendants, and the Montgomery County Coroner Defendants pursuant to
{¶59} We have reviewed all of McLemore‘s arguments below and on appeal. Given our resolution of the service of process and
{¶60} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.