15 Tex. 319 | Tex. | 1855
In deciding upon the right of the plaintiff to a mandamus, it becomes necessary for the Court judicially to
The descriptive words used to designate the beneficiaries in the Act, are, “ persons captured by the Mexican army at San Antonio in the year 1842,” who, it is provided, “shall be entitled to receive compensation,” at a sum stated, “ per month, “ from the time of their capture until the final release of the “ main body of said prisoners by the Mexican Government.” The language of the Statute is very general and indefinite. Its allusions to well known historic facts, presuppose such a general acquaintance with them, as to dispense with the necessity, on the part of the Legislature, of being more specific in respect to the persons for whom, on what account, or for what period of actual imprisonment, compensation was provided. To understand its scope and intention, it was necessary to look to facts outside of the provision. For the Act presupposes an acquaintance with those facts, on the part of those who are charged with its execution; and without such acquaintance, it would be impossible to comprehend the meaning and intention of the Legislature. The well known facts, to which reference is had in the Act, are, that, in 1842, the Mexican army made a hostile incursion into this country, took a- number of our citizens prisoners at San Antonio, and carried them away captive into Mexico ; some of whom made their escape by the way, or from their prisons, in Mexico, and others were released, before the final release of the main body of thp prisoners, by the Mexican authorities'. Referring to these facts, the intention of the Act of the Legislature is rendered clear and manifest. It is evident its benefits were intended for those persons who were thus taken and carried away prisoners from San Antonio, and
Neither was the Court, nor the Auditor and Comptroller required to place a construction upon the Act of the Legislature, which would lead to a consequence so repugnant to the common sense understanding of the provisions of the Act, and so derogatory to the wisdom and sense of justice of the Legislature. They were required to look, not only to the words of the Act, but to the notorious facts wnich led to its enactment ; so to construe its provisions, in reference to those facts, as to carry out and give effect to its well known meaning and intention, in the just and true spirit of the enactment. Because, by reason of the generality of the language, its most obvious merely literal construction might be different from its known object and intention, they were not therefore to disregard these and adhere to a merely literal construction, which would do ‘ violence to the manifest design and object of the provision. They were not required to ignore the well known historic facts to which the Act itself makes express reference. But the language and provisions of the .Act are sufficiently suggestive of its true meaning and intention, to place that question beyond
We are of opinion that the Court did not err in adjudging that the appellant was not entitled to the benefits conferred by the Act; and consequently, that the mandamus was rightly refused, and the petition dismissed. The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.