Opinion by
This action of divorce was instituted by libellant against her husband, the respondent, on the grounds of indignities to the person and cruel and barbarous treatment. The libel was filed on July 27, 1945, before the adoption of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The first meeting was held by the master on September 20, 1949, and the hearings were concluded on January 25, 1950. The record contains .505 pages of testimony, most of which is irrelevant; this is due to the fact that little attention was paid to the fundamental rules requiring evidence to be pertinent to the issues involved. . .
The master recommended that a divorce be granted to libellant on the ground of indignities to the person. Respondent’s exceptions to the master’s report were dismissed by the court below, and a decree was entered on that ground.
Our appellate courts have frequently stated that the law does not define indignities, but libellant’s evidence in this case must clearly and satisfactorily establish such a course of conduct or continued treatment as rendered her condition intolerable and her life burdensome. A single act is not sufficient; the evidence must show repeated and measurably continuous acts constituting indignities under the circumstances.
Conrad v.
*518
Conrad,
The parties were married on August 20, 1941, in the City of Philadelphia. They lived together in their own home until May 20, 1945, when libellant left respondent and went to live with her parents in that city. At the time of their marriage libellant was 19 years of age and respondent 28 years of age. One child, a son, was born of the marriage on February 1, 1944,
*519
and lives with libellant. Libellant’s testimony as to their marital life is inconclusive and unconvincing, and fails to establish a course of conduct as a ground for divorce under The Divorce Law, Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1237, 23 PS §10; there is no evidence of cruel and barbarous treatment. Libellant testified- that, on their honeymoon respondent was indifferent and lacking in affection toward her. However, her own .diary, which is in evidence, establishes the contrary. She says this attitude persisted during the entire period of. cohabitation. She further testified that respondent-argued with her and nagged her, and said that she did nothing right; that he was stingy and surly. Such generalizations afford no basis for a divorce and fail to establish indignities to the person. See
Abbott v. Abbott,
*520
Libellant’s principal complaint is that tbeir sexual relations were unsatisfactory. In April, 1943, libellant submitted to a minor operation which permitted her thereafter to have children. Previous to that time her physical condition prevented conception. She became pregnant shortly after the operation. Libellant testified as to a condition of sexual incompatibility or mismating that existed between the parties both before and after such operation, in fact, during the entire time they lived together. She complains of certain conduct of the respondent apparently resulting from this state of sexual incompatibility. We shall not discuss her intimate testimony in this respect which is revealing but not edifying. We are not inclined to give full credence to much of her testimony in this respect, but in any event she was a willing participant in many of the incidents of which she now complains. Neither does respondent’s alleged frequent refusal of intercourse establish a ground for divorce.
Mosher v. Mosher,
Considerable importance has been attached to a letter which respondent wrote to libellant’s mother about a week after their separation, wherein respondent requested his mother-in-law to intercede and assist in bringing about a reconciliation with his wife. In this letter he said, inter alia: “There are two things that cause our trouble. . . . One of our troubles was due to me trying to make things last as long as possible. I did not do this to be mean but so we could have other things we wanted. . . . Our other trouble was me not giving Betty enough love and attention . . .” The letter must be read in the light of the circumstances under which it was written. There was testimony that libellant had said respondent gave her more affection than she expected. In any event, the force of making the admissions can have no greater weight than the facts ad *521 mitted, which, as we have said, were insufficient in this case to constitute legal indignities.
Apart from the specific denials by respondent of libellant’s testimony, we cannot conclude, from our independent review and examination of the record, that there is sufficient basis for the granting of a divorce. In her version of their marital troubles libellant was inclined toward exaggeration. The weakness of libellant’s case goes beyond the question of credibility. There is an absence of evidence showing to our satisfaction a course of conduct from which any manifestation of settled hate and estrangement on the part of respondent toward libellant could be inferred. See
McKrell v. McKrell,
The testimony of both parties was lacking in material corroboration, but such corroborative testimony as there is in the record indicates that respondent treated libellant with consideration and affection. We are obliged to conclude that libellant is not entitled to a divorce on the record before us.
Decree is reversed, and libel is dismissed.