100 Ky. 173 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1896
deitvebed the opinion cp the coubt.
It is alleged in the petition in this action that “the plaintiff is and was on the 8th day of July, 1893, a painter by trade, and followed the same for a livelihood, and was on said 8th day of July, 1893, engaged in painting a house on the east side of Fourth street, in the said city of Louisville, between Market and Main streets, and numbered ■ — ; that on said 8th of July, 1893, and long prior thereto, the defendant, its agents and servants had erected and maintained one of its electric wires, charged with electricity, on the side of said house facing Fourth street; that the said wire on the said Sth day of July, 1893, and long prior thereto, was insufficiently, carelessly and negligently insulated, and that defendant, its agents and servants were well aware of said want of insulation, or could have been aware of same by the exercise of proper diligence; that plaintiff on said 8th day of July, 1893,while in the discharge of his duties as painter aforesaid and without fault on his part, came in contact with said wire which at the said time was heavily charged with electricity by the defendant, its agents and servants whereby he was severely shocked and rendered insensible, and that he remained insensible and unconscious for twenty minutes and more; that he
The defendant filed a demurrer to the petition which was overruled by the court.
The first paragraph of the answer substantially denies all the averments in the petition which show any right to recover.
The second paragraph of the answer is as follows: “Further answering this defendant says that the injuries received by the plaintiff, and set forth in the petition, were received wholly and entirely because of his want of proper care and caution in looking out for his ■ own safety, and by reason of his carelessness in coming . in contact with an electric light wire which he knew, or
The reply of plaintiff traversed the allegations of the answer. The jury found for the defendant, and his petition was dismissed.
Appellant relied on these grounds for new trial, viz:
1st. That the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by plaintiff in instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9.
2d. That the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
3d. That the court erred in not excusing a juror, William Pryott, for cause, he being a stockholder in the Louisville Gas Co., and it being the owner of the stock in the defendant company.
The motion for new trial was overruled, and plaintiff has appealed.
On cross-examination said S. T. McLaughlin testified that “no one warned him at any time about those wires; that he did not know Squire Green, but did know Mr. Green, proprietor of the hotel; that Squire Green did not tell him to keep away from those wires; did not see Squire Green around the building the day before the accident; Squire Green did not offer to cut the wires if he wanted it done, nor did he tell Squire Green he could get along without the wires being cut; that no one told him that the wires were alive or dangerous; that he knew electric wires were dangerous, but that he had been working around the wires all the week and all seemed to be insulated, and yet he was not hurt; that he did not know electricity was turned on; that it was about’noon of the 8th day of July, 1893, that he was hurt; that he saw no lights about the building; that he came up to the office of the defendant one Sunday night,
Wm. J. Cody testified: “Was working there on the 8th day of July, 1893, the day on which Sam McLaughlin was hurt; that he was standing on the first window inside of same stirring some paint; the work of painting the building was finished, with the exception of a little space below the second window sill and one of the ears of the iron box on the side of the house between the first and second windows; that McLaughlin got his brush full of paint and was going out to paint this ear, and while I was at the first window he started to get out of the second window with his brush in his right hand; had nothing left in his left; he had hardly gotten into the window opening when I heard a groan, followed immediately by a second one, and then I leaned out of the window and looked in the direction of the groans and saw McLaughlin have hold of the electric wire between this iron box and a bracket, right on the joint
Other witnesses testified as to the injury.
John M. Bunseomb testified as follows: “John M. HI Bunseomb testified that he is an electrician; have run similar plants to that of defendant; knows the defendant’s plant well and its power; formerly an employe when the defendant was on Third street several years ago. Electric wires are always insulated — that is, covered with a material that is a non-conductor. This is done to prevent a waste of power and for safety. There are different grades of insulation. The insulation is put on at the factory. Whenever it is desired to join two ends of different wires the ends are scraped of all insulation. The clean ends are then twisted around each' other closely in order to make close connection. After the joint is then soldered together, this makes a perfect connection. Then to protect this joint it is wrapped usually with a rubber tape about an inch wide,
At the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury to .find for defendant, which motion was overruled by the court.
The testimony of defendant conduced to show that defendant had used reasonable care, and that plaintiff was not severely injured. It also contends that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
The following are the instructions offered by plaintiff' and refused by the court:
“1st. The court instructs the jury that it is the duty*186 of the defendant, the Louisville Electric Light Co., to so insulate or protect its wires as to make them free from danger to those who may be brought in contact with them; and if they shall believe from the evidence that the said company failed to so insulate or protect the wire with which S. T. McLaughlin came in contact, and that his injuries were caused by the reason of such failure, then the law is for the plaintiff, and they should so find, unless they shall further believe from the evidence that the said S. T. McLaughlin, by his own negligence, contributed to cause his injuries, and that he would not have been injured but for his contributory negligence, if any there was.
“2d. If the jury shall believe from the evidence that S. T. McLaughlin came in contact with said wire while in the act of climbing out of the window, and that the said wire was not so insulated or protected as to be free from danger to him, and that his injuries were caused thereby, they ought not to find him guilty of contributory negligence unless, in so doing, he failed to exercise that degree of care which ordinarily careful and prudent persons usually exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
“3d. That the injury to the plaintiff is conclusive proof of the defective insulation of the said wire and of negligence of the defendant.
“5th. Contributory negligence means the failure to observe that degree of care which ordinarily careful and prudent persons usually observe under the same or similar circumstances to protect themselves from in*187 jury, and, by reason of such failure, help to cause or bring about the injury complained of.
“8th. That if they believe from the evidencé that the said wire had all the appearances of having been properly insulated at the time plaintiff received his injuries, this was then an invitation or inducement to plaintiff to risk the consequences of contact with same in the performance of his work in painting the house to which said wire was attached.
“9th. That if the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was not cautioned especially as to the dangerous condition of said wire before the accident occurred, then they are not to find him guilty of contributory negligence.”
The instructions given are as follows:
“1st. The court instructs the jury that it is the duty of the defendant, the Louisville Electric Light Co., to so insulate or protect its wires at places where they may be dangerous to human life as to make them reasonably free from danger to persons who may come in contact with them; and if they shall believe from the evidence that the wire with which the plaintiff came in contact was not insulated or protected at the point where he caught it, and that he received the injuries of which he complains because thereof, then the law is for the plaintiff, and they shall so find unless they shall further believe from the evidence that he contributed to cause his injury by his own negligence, and that he would not have been injured but for his contributory negligence if any there was.
*188 “2d. But unless they shall believe from the evidence that the defendant’s wire at that point, mentioned in instruction No. 1, was not so insulated or protected as to make it reasonably free from danger, and that the plaintiff was injured thereby, the law is for the defendant, and they should so find.
“3d. Or if they shall believe from the evidence that, the plaintiff was negligent, and thereby contributed to cause the injury of which he complains, and that he-would not have been injured but for his contributory negligence, if any there was, then the law is for the defendant, and they should so find.
“4th. If the jury find for the plaintiff they should award him such a sum in damages as they may believe from the evidence would fairly compensate him for the mental and physical suffering endured by him by reason of his injuries, and for the loss of time and capacity to earn money at his trade and occupation. If they shall find from the evidence that the injuries of S. T.. McLaughlin were caused by the negligence of the defendant, and shall further believe from the evidence that the negligence, if any there was, was gross, then they may, in their discretion, award him such a further or additional sum as punitive damages as they may deem right and proper under the evidence and these instructions, not exceeding in all the sum claimed in the petition.”
Gross negligence meajas the absence of slight care.
“5th. Ordinary care means that degree of care which ordinarily careful and panident persons usually observe under the same or similar circumstances.’
“6th. Contributory negligence means the failure to observe that degree of care which ordinarily careful and prudent persons usually observe under the same or similar circumstances to protect themselves from harm, and by reason of such failure helped to cause or bring about the injury complained of.”
To the giving of instructions Nos. 1 and 2 the plaintiff excepted.
The demurrer to the petition was properly overruled, as was also the motion for instruction to the jury to find for the defendant It also seems to us that William Pryott had a disqualifying interest in the action, and should have been excused for cause. But by far the most important question involved is the law applicable to the case.
Electricity is a powerful and subtle force, and its nature and manner of use not well understood by the public, nor is its presence easily determined or ascertained. Its use for private gain is very extensive, and becoming more and more so. The daily avocation of many thousands of necessity bring them near to this subtle force, and it seems clear that the electric companies should be held to the use of the utmost care to avoid injuring those whose business or pleasure requires them to come near such a death-dealing force.
In the case of Clements and wife v. Electric Light Co., 44 La., 695, et seq., the court said: “The deceased Clements was lawfully on the gallery roof. He was en
“He exercised reasonable care in going under the wire in the performance of his duty, as he had a right to believe, from external appearances, that the wire was safe. His action was such as not to tend to expose himself directly to the danger which resulted in the injury. In fact there was no apparent danger. * * *
“Even in the presence of known danger to constitute contributory negligence it must be shown that the plaintiff voluntarily and unnecessarily exposed himself to it, unless it is of that character that the plaintiff must assume the risk from the very nature of the danger to which he is exposed. Prom the appearance of the wire, its wrappings with insulated tape, and the known dnty of the defendant to protect the insulation at this particular splice or joint, Clements had no reason to anticipate danger, except from the fault of the defendant company. This fault was tne cause of his death, and his act in passing under or over the wires was too remote to give it the character of contributory negligence.”
The case of Haynes v. Gas Co., 114 N. C., 211, was an
The evidence in this case conduces to show that appellant was at work at his regular trade, and was where he had a right to be, and the joint of the wire being apparently insulated was to some extent at least'a guaranty that there was no danger. But independent of that fact the situation of appellant, his work in hand and the proximity of the wire were such that he might without negligence have unthoughtedly taken hold of' the wire, béeause he seemed to need support, and be-sides it was hardly to be expected that the current was on the wire at about noon, the wire being used wholly to supply incandescent lights or lamps.
It seems clear to us that appellee should have been required to have had perfect protection on its wire at the point and place where appellant was injured. The fact that it was very expensive or inconvenient is no excuse for such failure. Yery great care might be sufficient as to the wires at points remote from public pass-ways, buildings or places where persons need not go for work or business, but the rule should be different as to points where people have a right to go for work, business or pleasure. At the latter points or places the insulation or protection should be made perfect, and the1 utmost cape used to keep it so.
Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 8, asked by appellant,, should have been given. The others refused were not important, and tended to draw attention to particular facts or evidence. Such instructions are not favored, in law.
For the errors indicated the judgment of the court below is reversed and cause remanded, with directions to set aside the verdict and judgment, and for a new trial upon principles consistent with this opinion.