McLAIN et al. v. LANCE et al.
No. 11118.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 20, 1944.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1945.
146 F.2d 341
Appellant should be granted a discharge from all debts except those involved in the earlier bankruptcy proceedings.
Reversed.
Russel H. Markwell and Charles J. Stubbs, both of Galveston, Tex., for appellees.
Before HUTCHESON, WALLER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
WALLER, Circuit Judge.
A group of Texas residents, known as the “Houston Pilots,” filed a libel in personam, seeking a declaratory judgment against another group of residents known as the “Galveston Pilots.” Libelees moved to dismiss on the grounds: (a) That courts of admiralty are not authorized to render declaratory judgments; (b) that the controversy here is not maritime and hence a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction to determine same; (c) that libelants and respondents are all duly commissioned officers of the United States Coast Guard and the proceeding is one to delineate, restrict, and control the authority of the Coast Guard over its commissioned officers, and that such is beyond the authority of a court of admiralty; (d) that a proceeding between the same parties, over the same subject matter, and for the adjudication of the same controversy was filed in, and the law of the case settled by, the state courts of Texas prior to the institution of the libel in the present case in which the decision was adverse to the contentions of the libelants. See Houston Pilots v. Goodwin et al., Tex.Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 308, writ of error denied and libelants’ (appellants‘) motion for leave to file a petition for mandamus denied by Supreme Court of Texas, all prior to the bringing of the present suit.
Sometime after the present war began the Galvestоn and Houston Pilots were taken into the Coast Guard and commissioned as officers; however, they were not placed on a salary but continued to be remunerated entirely from pilotage fees as provided by state law. The authority of the pilots for the Galveston Harbor and of port pilots generally is found in
As a precaution against the menace of submarines, merchant vessels not destined for Houston or Galveston were required by the Navy to anchor in waters of Galveston Bay and particularly at or near a portion thereof known as “Bolivar Roads,” while awaiting a safe and appropriate time to proceed, either alone or in convoy. Thus many vessels did not enter either the Port of Houston or the Port оf Galveston for the purposes of trade and commerce, but only took refuge in the waters of Galveston Bay. The Houston Pilots, both here and in the state suit, have insisted that they have the right to pilot these “refuge vessels” into and out of Bolivar Roads. The Galveston Pilots, both here and in the state suit, have insisted that under Texas statutes Bolivar Roads is within the pilotage area of the Galveston Pilots, within which they and they alone are entitled to pilot vessels coming into or out of Galveston Harbor for Bolivar Roads and to collect the fees therefor, and that the Houston Pilots are entitled to pilotage fees only for vessels entering the waters within the Harris County-Houston Ship Channel Navigation District.
The controversy is one solely between groups of rival pilots and is wholly be-
That this controversy between rival pilots, which involves no vessel, no cargo, no contract, no tort, no owner, claimant, master, or seaman, and calls for no declaration of the law of the sea but for a construction of statutes of Texas relating to the jurisdiction of Gulf, and Navigation district, pilots, is cognizable in admiralty is gravely doubted. Definitely it is not one over which admiralty would have exclusive jurisdictiоn. Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185, 78 U.S. 185, 20 L.Ed. 74, 1 Am.Jr. 556, Sec. 18.
Likewise there is much uncertainty as to whether or not a court of admiralty is authorized to render a declaratory judgment.3
The lower Court was of the opinion that since
It is not necessary, however, that we decide either of those questions, for even though the controversy were one cognizable in admiralty, and even though courts of admiralty were authorized to render declaratory judgments in such a controversy, the exercise of that power rеsted in the sound discretion of the lower Court4 and it could have and doubtless should have, refused to render a declaratory judgment in a case where the state courts of Texas, having concurrent—and mayhap exclusive—jurisdiction of the same subject matter and of the same parties, had theretofore declared the rights of the parties to pilotage over the waters involved.
Moreover, the rights of the contending parties stem from local statutes of the State of Texas, rather than from maritime contracts of vessels to pay for pilotage services, or because, forsooth, the Navy or Coast Guard might, or might not, in the future make some order or regulation that would affect the parties. Courts do not concern themselves to decide abstract questions.5
“The first contention in effect is that the statе was without power to legislate concerning pilotage, because any enactment on that subject is necessarily a regulation of commerce within the provision of the Constitution of the United States. The unsoundness of this contention is demonstrated by the previous decisions of this court, since it has long since been settled that even although state laws concerning pilotage are regulations of commerce ‘they fall within that class of powers which may be exercised by the states until Congress has seen fit to act upon the subject.’ Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 20 L.Ed. 624; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 26 L.Ed. 234.”
“Until further provision is made by Congress, all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the States respectively wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the States may respectively enact for the purpose.”
It will be observed that Congress has made no provision in
Any contention that the exclusive jurisdiction to settle the controversy here is, by the Constitution and laws, vested in a court of admiralty is untenable. Leon v. Galceran, supra. Subdivisions (3) of
Since the federal courts would be bound by the construction of state statutes by state courts, they are encouraged to remit the construction of state statutes to state courts whenever there is a discretion in the federal court so to do, and the immediacy of an authoritative state court decision is obvious. In City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168, 62 S.Ct. 986, 987, 86 L.Ed. 1355, the complainant prayed for a declaratory judgment as to the meaning and effect of certain local laws. The Court said:
“We granted the petition for certiorari * * * because of the doubtful propriety of the District Court and of the Circuit Court of Appeals in undertaking to decide such an important question of Illinois law instead of remitting the parties to the state courts for litigation of the state questions involved in the case. Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971.
“We are of the opinion that the procedure which we followed in the Pullman case should be followed here. Illinois has the final say as to the meaning of the ordinance in question. It also has the final word on the alleged conflict between the ordinance and the state Act. The determination which the District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals or we might make could not be anything more than a foreсast—a prediction as to the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Here as in the Pullman case ‘a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication.’ 312 U.S. at page 500, 61 S.Ct. at page 645, 85 L.Ed. 971.”
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“The desirability of the course which we have suggested is not embarrassed by any question as to whether ready recourse may be had to the state courts. The availability of the state tribunal is obvious, since a case involving substantially identical issues and brought by respondent‘s parent
corporation is pending in the state court.” (Italics supplied.)
And in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, text 236, 64 S.Ct. 7, 12, this language was used:
“It is the court‘s duty to do so when a suit is pending in the state courts, where the state questions can be conveniently and authoritatively answered, at least where the parties to the federal court action are not strangers to the state action. City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168, 62 S.Ct. 986, 86 L.Ed. 1355.”
In these cases the mere pendency оf an action in the state court was considered as sufficient grounds for justifying the federal court, in the exercise of its discretion, to remit the parties to the state court for a declaration, or determination, of rights under state statutes. In the present case not only is a case pending, but it is one in which the state courts, by an opinion in 178 S.W.2d 308, 312, had already declared what the pilotage rights of the parties were.6
Where a State Court, having jurisdiction in a suit between the same рarties over the same subject matter, has defined and declared the rights of the parties, the federal District Court, acting as a court of
Moreover, the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Statute is to adjudicate rights of parties who have not otherwise been given an opportunity to have those rights determined, for in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463, 81 L.Ed. 617, 108 A.L.R. 1000, this significant statement is found:
“Defendants have not instituted any action wherein the plaintiff would have an opportunity to prove the absence of the alleged disability * * *.”
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 3 Cir., 102 F.2d 288, text 294, the Third Circuit said:
“An obvious and principal reason for the exercise of such discretion is found in the existence of a suit whose determination in another court will ultimately decide the liability of the party petitioning for a declaration. If the petition for a declaration is filed after the commencement of such suit, it should be dismissed, 16 American Jurisprudence sec. 14.”
In Aetna Casualty & Insurance Co. v. Quarles, 4 Cir., 92 F.2d 321, 324, Judge Parker, in speaking of the discretion of the Court in matters relating to declaratory judgments, said:
“* * * but it should not be exercised for the purpose of trying issues involved in cases already pending, especially where they can be tried with equal facility in such cases, or for the purpose of anticipating the trial оf an issue in a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The object of the statute is to afford a new form of relief where needed, not to furnish a new choice of tribunals or to draw into the federal courts the adjudication of causes properly cognizable by courts of the state. See Associated Indemnity Co. v. Manning, D.C., 16 F.Supp. 430.”
It appears here that what the libelants need is not so much a declaration of their rights as a different declaration thereof.
Even though a court of admiralty had jurisdiction оf the subject matter, its jurisdiction is not exclusive in a personam action such as this,7 and even though it were authorized to render a declaratory judgment, which we leave undecided, such a court would not exercise such power to overturn a prior judgment of a state court of concurrent and competent jurisdiction between the same parties and involving the same questions. No litigant is entitled to two declarations of the same right.
There is no language in the statute that excludes the jurisdiction of said pilot commissioners over the pilotage of boats which are piloted into the Roads which merely anchor there and return to sea, or proceed to Galveston. It would be unjust to exclude said commissioners from exercising jurisdiction over the pilotage of boats from the Roads to docks within Galveston Harbor, and of no benefit to commerce moving between Houston and the open sea, and such pilotage, within the language of
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“From what has been said, it follows that appellants were by law charged with knowledge that appellees had the exclusive right or license to pilotage of ships which were brought into Galveston Harbor solely for the purpose of the anchorage therein, and return to open sea. The evidence fully established that the Houston pilots intentionally and willfully boarded such ships and piloted them in, though the rights to such pilotage belonged to the Galveston pilots. Therefore the Houston pilots intentionally trespassed upon appellees’ said right of pilotage, so as to render themselves liable in an action of trespass upon the case.
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“We overrule appellants’ contention that the pleadings and the evidence were insufficient to sustain venue facts necessary to be pled and proved in order to maintain the action against the ‘Houston Pilots’ in Galveston County, under Subdivision 23 of
Since it would have been a proper exercise of the lower Court‘s discretion to have dismissed the cause for the reasons set forth herein, the judgment will not be reversed even if the reasons assigned by the lower Court were by us held to be unsound.
Affirmed.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
As the majority opinion well says, this is a “controversy between rival pilots which involves no vessel, no cargo, no contract, no tort, no owner, claimant, master, or seaman, and calls for no declaration of the law of the seas but for a construction of statutes of Texas relating to the jurisdiction of Gulf, and navigation district, pilots.” This being so, the court below was without jurisdiction of the libel and should havе dismissed it on that ground. If I am correct in this, this court, on a review of the lower court‘s judgment, would be confined to reversing the judgment and ordering the libel dismissed for want of jurisdiction. I, therefore, dissent from the decision of the appeal on the assumption that there was jurisdiction in the Court below.
Petition of KOHL.
No. 164.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Jan. 3, 1945.
Notes
“Such navigation district shall have exclusive jurisdiction as hereinafter defined over the pilotage of boats between the Gulf of Mexico and their respective ports, as well as of intermediate stops or landing places for such boats upon navigable streams wholly or partly within such navigation districts.”
“That act is expressed to be an amendment of the Judicial Code by adding the new legislation (section 274d, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400, and note) after section 274c (28 U.S.C.A. § 399). The mentioned section and those preceding it have no reference to courts of admiralty, but only to suits at law and in equity, and it is at least doubtful whether courts of admiralty are within the new act.”
“There was nothing unlawful in such an arrangement. If a ship was bound for Houston, her pilotage fell under the jurisdiction of the pilot commissioners for Harris County Houston Ship Channel Navigation District. But if it was not so bound, the pilotage of her did not fall within such jurisdiction, as will hereafter appear. The arrangement between the two sets of pilots therefore merely provided for a retroactive correction to conform to the destination of the shiр when it became known. The pilots of either port were licensed to perform the mere act of pilotage into the Roads, dependent upon the ship‘s destination. But by
“Now the harbor lines of Galveston Harbor begin in the Gulf a mile south of and beyond the sea end of the jetties. Olsen v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 68 S.W. 320 (error denied), 195 U.S. 332, 25 S.Ct. 52, 49 L.Ed. 224. They extend north to the south line of Harris County Houston Ship Channel Navigation District, which crosses the Houston Ship Channel between Cedar Bayou and Morgan‘s Point. Included within the lines of Galveston Harbor are the Galveston docks, the Texas City Docks and Bolivar Roads. Bolivar Roads is as much within the residuary jurisdiction over pilotage which is vested the pilot commissioners of the Port of Galveston-Texas City as are the docks at Galveston and at Texas City.