365 Pa. 422 | Pa. | 1950
Opinion by
Thomas A. MeKnight, and others, appellants, members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, instituted this action
The complaint avers that appellants are Jehovah’s Witnesses; that they had planned a series of regular public talks on national and international conditions from a Bible standpoint by chosen speakers in the public school auditorium of Schenley High School in the City of Pittsburgh; that by letter dated September 27, 1948, they requested use of said auditorium for a series of public lectures on four Sunday afternoons, October 10, 17, 24 and 31 from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. each afternoon; that they offered to pay the prevailing rental charges; that on September 30, 1948, they were advised by H. W. Cramblet, assistant secretary of appellee school board, that it was impossible to grant the request in view of a rule adopted by the school board which provided: “Permits shall not be granted to anyone for any religious or sectarian purpose”; that denial to them and permission to others to have use of the same auditorium for public meetings constituted arbitrary discrimination, denying to appellants the right of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as well as under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; that the laws of Pennsylvania provide for use
A writ of alternative mandamus issued forthwith, returnable November 15, 1948. Subsequent thereto, on November 10, the return day of the writ of alternative mandamus was extended to November 22, 1948. Appellees, on November 19, 1948, filed “Preliminary Objections by Way of Demurrer” averring that appellants are a religious cult or sect; that the desired use of the school auditorium facilities was for religious or sectarian purposes; that there is no averment in the complaint that others were permitted to use the school auditorium for the purpose of holding religious or sectarian meetings; that appellants did not challenge the legality or the reasonableness of the rule of the board prohibiting the granting of permits for use of public school buildings for religious or sectarian purposes; that the laws of Pennsylvania provide, with regard to the use of school auditoriums as public meeting and assembly places, that the board of school directors may permit the use thereof for “social, recreation, and other purposes, under such rules and regulations as the Board may adopt”; and, that the complaint clearly discloses that appellees acted in a legal manner, in compliance with the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and without violating any constitutional rights of appellants.
Appellees contend that (1) religious and sectarian purposes are not within the scope of the words “social, recreation, and other proper purposes”; and (2) the rule represents a proper exercise of discretion.
The Act of May 18, 1911, P.L. 309, Section 627, as amended by the Act of March 31, 1927, P.L. 87,*
Pursuant to the above provisions of the School Code, appellees adopted Section 416 of its rules and regulations quoted above. The legislature has delegated to the board of school directors of any school district the power to permit use of the school grounds and buildings for certain proper purposes under such rules and regulations as the board may adopt. Judicial review of the actions of a board must be restricted to the reasonableness thereof: Regan, et al. v. Stoddard, et al., 361 Pa. 469, 65 A. 2d 240; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Sunbury School District, 335 Pa. 6, 6 A. 2d 279; Wilson v. School District of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90. It cannot encompass consideration of the wisdom of the action taken.
Whether the school property shall be used by any group at all is a matter resting within the discretion of each board of school directors. This court is not a superboard of school directors in performance of an official duty. The legislature has delegated this power to the school boards, not to the courts. In the absence of any proof of unreasonableness or an arbitrary or capricious exercise of the power, the judgment of the board must stand.
Appellants do not deny the existence of the discretion in the use of the power. They contend, however, that permission must be given to all or none, and that exercise of the power cannot be partial, but must be complete. There is nothing in the statute, nor do we know of any rule of statutory construction which supports such a contention. To the contrary, the principle is so well established as to need no citation of author
Appellants, in their complaint, have failed to sustain this burden. The complaint does not contain any averment that any group has been accorded use of the premises for religious and sectarian purposes. A finding that any other person or persons similarly situated has been permitted the use which has been denied to appellants could not properly be made. There is nothing in the complaint which would warrant a finding that the exercise of the power by the school board was unreasonable or arbitrary.
In holding that no facts have been averred in the complaint establishing abuse of discretion by the board, it becomes unnecessary to determine at this time the scope of the words “and other proper purposes”, and “other proper educational purposes”.
Judgment affirmed.
This Act was specifically repealed by the Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, Art. XXVII, Section 2701. It has been reenacted almost verbatim by Art. VII, Section 775 of that Act, and further amended by the Acts of April 14, 1949, P.L. 460, Section 2, April 21, 1949, P.L. 702, Section 1, and May 12, 1949, P.L. 1278, Section 1, 24 PS Section 7-775.