OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Henry E. McKinnon, an employee of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), filed this action against the United States Department of Justice and then-Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, alleging that Defendants discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq. (“Title VII”). Specifically, Plaintiff complains that he was discriminated against on account of his sex (male), subjected to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against for having engaged in activity protected by Title VII. 1 Defendants have moved for summary judgment [Docket Item 21], arguing that Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence sufficient to raise a material factual dispute as to any of these claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts 2
1. Unit Manager Position
Plaintiff Henry E. McKinnon, a forty-six-year-old African-American man, is an employee of the BOP who, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, has worked as a Unit Manager at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey (“FCI Fort Dix”). (Compl. ¶¶ 2-4.) As a Unit Manager at FCI Fort Dix, Plaintiff was responsible for the administration of one of the institution’s housing units, which included “responsibility for the program operations and security of the assigned unit,” as well as supervision of the assigned unit’s staff. (Blaine Cert. Ex. A at 3.)
2. AW Nichols Becomes Plaintiff’s Supervisor
Between August 2004 and March 2006, Plaintiffs immediate supervisor was Jacqueline Nichols, who has served as an Associate Warden at FCI Fort Dix since March 2002. (Nichols Dep. at 5, 18.) Plaintiff and Associate Warden Nichols (“AW Nichols”) enjoyed a “cordial” relationship when AW Nichols first arrived at *415 FCI Fort Dix. (McKinnon Dep. at 221.) According to Plaintiff, before AW Nichols became his supervisor, he and AW Nichols would occasionally confide in each other; for instance, Plaintiff had filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint in 2001 asserting that he had been the victim of sex discrimination, and AW Nichols had “counseled McKinnon and suggested that he settle the case.” (Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts (“SUMF”) ¶ 19; McKinnon Dep. at 222.) Plaintiff settled his 2001 EEO complaint with the BOP in November 2003. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.)
The relationship between Plaintiff and AW Nichols began to deteriorate around the time that AW Nichols became Plaintiffs supervisor. The initial discord in Plaintiffs and AW Nichols’ relationship appears to trace back to June 2004, when the then-Warden of the prison, Charles DeRosa, did not select AW Nichols for an Executive Staff position. (McKinnon Dep. at 22.) According to Plaintiff, AW Nichols was angry over having been passed over for the position, and she stated to Plaintiff, apparently in reference to her prior advice that Plaintiff settle his 2001 EEO complaint, “I told you [Warden DeRosa] wasn’t going to help you.” (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff felt that AW Nichols’ comment was “derogatory” and he refused to join AW Nichols in “bad mouth[ing]” Warden DeRosa. (Blaine Cert. Ex. D-l ¶ 4; McKinnon Dep. at 21-22.) Instead, Plaintiff informed Warden DeRosa of what AW Nichols had said about him, which, according to Plaintiff, made AW Nichols “extremely angry,” and “set [her] off on a path to ruin the reputation of Plaintiff.” (Blaine Cert. Ex. D-l ¶ 4.)
Shortly after AW Nichols became Plaintiffs supervisor in August 2004, the two began to have disagreements over AW Nichols’ management style. In October 2004, AW Nichols berated one of Plaintiffs staff, Mr. Sanchez, for the manner in which Mr. Sanchez and Plaintiff had handled an incident report that had been generated for a disciplinary code violation committed by an inmate in Plaintiffs unit. (McKinnon Dep. at 25.) Plaintiff felt that AW Nichols “undermined [his] authority” by speaking directly with Mr. Sanchez about the matter rather than speaking to Plaintiff himself and believed that it was not appropriate for AW Nichols to have “gone out of channel.” (Id.)
Also in October 2004, a probationary employee holding a secretarial position in Plaintiffs unit at FCI Fort Dix, Daisy Rodriguez, was terminated for having left work fifteen minutes early without requesting Plaintiffs permission. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff believed that because he raised and investigated the issue of Ms. Rodriguez’s early departure from work, (Nichols Dep. at 30), he would be targeted by institutional staff who disagreed with the decision to terminate Ms. Rodriguez, and on October 15, 2004, Plaintiff wrote a memorandum to AW Nichols “to ensure supporting documentation is [in] place in my personal file prior to any potential staff misconduct toward me.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. Ex. H at 1.) The memorandum stated in relevant part:
[Sjeveral institutional staff members made inquiries in regard to Daisy Rodriguez[’s] termination. Specifically, some asked why was she terminated. My response to all was, “No comment.” It should be noted, several of my long time colleagues advised me to, “Watch My Back” and Watch out for the, “Set-UP”
It is very unfortunate one have to take these types of precautionary steps in order to do their job. It is my sincere hope I will be able to continue to carry out my responsibilities here at FCI Fort Dix without the fear of reprisal, retribu *416 tion or retaliation from the Union or any one else for that matter ....
(Id.) 3
After Ms. Rodriguez was terminated, the unit that Plaintiff supervised, Unit Six, as well as a different unit, Unit One, each had only one secretary; normally, residential units at FCI Fort Dix have two secretaries. (McKinnon Dep. at 15-16.) In early 2005, interviews were conducted for secretarial staff, and one secretary, Tana Janokowski, was hired. (Id. at 14, 16.) Plaintiff believed that Ms. Janokowski should have filled the vacancy in his unit, but AW Nichols instead determined that Ms. Janokowski would fill the vacancy in Unit One, (id. at 14); the Unit Manager for Unit One at the time, Allia Lewis, was a woman, (id.), and Plaintiff believes that AW Nichols gave preferential treatment regarding Ms. Janokowski’s assignment to Ms. Lewis based upon Ms. Lewis’ gender. Warden John Nash 4 later told Plaintiff that the decision to assign Ms. Janokowski to Unit One was based upon “cost initiatives.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that at approximately the same time, AW Nichols left vacant the position of Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) counselor in his unit. 5 (IcL at 17.) According to Plaintiff, AW Nichols failed to fill the position because she “didn’t understand the importance of having that position filled ... [and] thought that an RDAP case manager was the same as a regular case manager.” (Id. at 17-18.)
3. April 11, 2005 Communications
The interpersonal dispute between Plaintiff and AW Nichols continued into the spring of 2005. 6 On April 11, 2005, AW Nichols left a voicemail for Plaintiff in which she expressed “concerns about some unprojected leave that [Plaintiff] took” in March when his mother had passed away. 7 (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff felt that AW Nichols’ voice message expressing concerns about the leave he had taken was “threatening,” “harassing,” (McKinnon Dep. at 23), and “insensitive,” (id. at 226), and he called AW Nichols to address her voicemail.
Plaintiff was unable to reach AW Nichols, who was in a meeting when he called, and he instead spoke with her secretary, Tonya Wallace. (Blaine Cert. Ex. G-l at 1.) The parties dispute the contents of Plaintiffs conversation with Ms. Wallace. According to Defendants, Plaintiff informed Ms. Wallace that he had attempted *417 to reach AW Nichols two or three times and stated that “she needs to call me right away. I am not the one. I’m not the one (person) to play with.” (Id. at 1.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff then stated to Ms. Wallace that he would “string her [AW Nichols] up,” (id.), or “string [AW Nichols] up the flag pole.” (Blaine Cert. Ex. G at 2.) Ms. Wallace recalled that Plaintiff was “angry and frustrated” and “loud as if to vent.” (Blaine Cert. Ex. G-3 at 2.) According to Plaintiff, while he “felt that Ms. Nichols was playing games with [him],” he did not threaten AW Nichols or make any remarks about stringing her up the flagpole. (Blaine Cert. Ex. G-4 at 2.) Plaintiff does not dispute that he stated to Ms. Wallace that he “was not the one to play with.” (Id.)
Ms. Wallace spoke with Associate Warden David Huerta (“AW Huerta”) about Plaintiffs call, and when AW Nichols returned from her meeting, Ms. Wallace informed her of the call. (Blaine Cert. Ex. G at 2.) AW Nichols and AW Huerta then called Plaintiff together on the speaker phone. (Id.) According to Defendants, during this telephone call, Plaintiff admitted to having stated that he would string AW Nichols up, (id.; Blaine Cert Ex. G-3 at 2); Plaintiff maintains that he did not make any such admission to AW Nichols and AW Huerta. (Blaine Cert. Ex. G-4 at 2.)
4. Plaintiffs EEO Complaint and the SIS Investigation
While it is clear that an investigation into Plaintiffs April 11, 2005 statements was subsequently initiated, the timing of the investigation, as well as the relationship between the investigation and other events that transpired during the summer of 2005, are the subject of dispute between the parties. It is undisputed that Plaintiff met with Warden Nash on three occasions in May 2005 to complain that he felt that he was being harassed by AW Nichols. (Nash Dep. at 27.) AW Nash did not consider separating Plaintiff and AW Nichols because he “felt she was treating him the same as she treated everybody else” and because he did not believe Nichols was harassing Plaintiff. (Id. at 32.) Plaintiff asserts that at some point during the month of May 2005, he complained to Warden Nash about AW Nichols, and Warden Nash warned Plaintiff not to do anything that Plaintiff would regret. (McKinnon Dep. at 55.) Warden Nash denies having made any such comment to Plaintiff. (Nash Dep. at 37.)
It is undisputed that during this time, Plaintiff and AW Nichols repeatedly clashed over his time and attendance sheets and other administrative matters, with Plaintiff complaining that AW Nichols was “picking on him” or micro-managing him, and with AW Nichols asserting that she simply was being “meticulous” about time and attendance matters. 8 (Nichols Dep. at 35.) On June 6, 2005, following an exchange of emails between Plaintiff and AW Nichols concerning such scheduling matters, Plaintiff wrote to AW Nichols asking her to “acknowledge this response as my official filing of an EEO Complaint against you for Harassment, Retaliation/Reprisal, Threats, Interfering With An On-going EEO Investigation, etc.” (Blaine Cert. Ex. G-5 at 1.) Plaintiff filed his EEO complaint that day, complaining that he had been harassed. (Blaine Cert. Ex. B.)
*418 Plaintiff alleges that the investigation into his April 11, 2005 remark to Ms. Wallace did not commence until just three days after he filed his EEO complaint, on June 9, 2005, when he and the other witnesses to the events of April 11, 2005 were interviewed by John Pittman, FCI Fort Dix’s Special Investigative Agent (“SIA Pittman”), (Blaine Cert. Ex. G-5 at 3); the timing, Plaintiff maintains, is suggestive of the retaliatory nature of the investigation. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs April 11, 2005 telephone call “was referred for investigation shortly after the incident occurred on April 11, 2005 ...[,] well before McKinnon’s initial EEO contact on June 6, 2005,” (Defs.’ Reply Br. at 11), although there appears to be no evidence in the record that establishes that the investigation was launched immediately after the April 11, 2005 telephone call. 9 At the conclusion of the investigation, and following a hearing before Warden Nash at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Plaintiff was suspended for three days for having committed unprofessional conduct. (Blaine Cert. Ex. G-7 at 1.)
5. Unit Transfers
On August 22, 2005, all unit managers for the six units at FCI Fort Dix were reassigned to different units from those which they had been managing. (Blaine Cert. Ex. H at 1.) Such unit reassignments occurred regularly at the institution “when management decides that the units are ready for a change.” (McKinnon Dep. at 153.) During his years as a unit manager at FCI Fort Dix, reassignments of the unit managers occurred eight times, and Plaintiff has managed each of the six units at one time or another. (Id. at 152-53.)
Plaintiff was transferred from Unit Six to Unit Three, while Allia Lewis, whom Plaintiff asserts received favorable treatment from AW Nichols, was transferred to Unit Four. 10 (McKinnon Dep. at 156.) According to Plaintiff, none of the unit managers “wanted to go to Unit 3 ... because that’s the hostile unit.” (Id. at 161.) Plaintiff concluded that the unit managers’ concerns over the state of Unit Three were well-founded, in that he determined shortly after becoming Unit Manager that Unit Three was “out of control.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. Ex. I at 1) (capitalization omitted). Two days after he was transferred to Unit Three, Plaintiff wrote an email to AW Nichols with the subject line “snapshot unit 3, (hostile working environment).” (Id.) (capitalization omitted). In his email, Plaintiff detailed a list of problems: “staff not speaking to one another, one diming out the other, one calling the other staff a rat, snitch, inmate lover,” as well as operational concerns, such as “[ijncident reports not being logged in and accounted for.” (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff also informed AW *419 Nichols that inmates were threatening staff members. 11 (Nichols Dep. at 84.)
AW Nichols responded to Plaintiffs email with a lengthy email, in which she commended Plaintiff for having “laid the groundwork to build your team,” instructed Plaintiff to report “violations that are perceived to have occurred” in order for such matters to be investigated, and advised Plaintiff to hold his staff “accountable for the work they do or don’t do.” (Id. at 1.) Warden Nash, to whom Plaintiffs email was forwarded, wrote to AW Nichols, asking her to “call Mr. McKinnon in and explain to him his responsibility to stop this type of behavior.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff continued to correspond with Warden Nash and AW Nichols about problems with Unit Three, expressing his concern that someone in the unit could “get[ ] hurt either from inmates or from their fellow staff members.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. Ex. J at 1.) Plaintiff believes that Warden Nash and AW Nichols failed to respond appropriately, and he wrote to the BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs (“OIA”) to complain of “gross negligence on the part of the Executive Staff,” stating that “staff feel their lives are in jeopardy from inmates & unit staff are going at each other’s throat.” (PL’s Opp’n Br. Ex. K at 1.) The OIA’s response to Plaintiffs complaint, if any, is not evident from the record. At some point “[a]t the height of the hostility in Unit 3,” Plaintiff submitted a written request to be transferred out of the unit, which was not granted. (McKinnon Dep. at 60.)
In September 2006, Plaintiff attended a Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) meeting in the office of Charles Samuels, who had become the warden of FCI Fort Dix at the beginning of 2006. Plaintiff was the Unit Manager of one of the inmates being held in the SHU, and, as such, he was expected to provide Warden Samuels with information pertaining to the inmate. (Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 50; PL’s SUMF ¶50; Blaine Cert. Ex. K at 1.) Warden Samuels became upset when Plaintiff was unable to provide such information at the meeting, and wrote an email to Plaintiff and Associate Warden Claude Maye (“AW Maye”) stating that Plaintiff was “not authorized to attend the SHU meeting or [the] Department Head meeting until [Warden Samuels] receive[d] certification from [AW Maye] he knows his case load as the assigned Unit Manager.” (Blaine Cert. Ex. K at 1.) Plaintiff missed one SHU meeting and was not able conduct one round through the SHU as a result of this incident, and after Plaintiff met with AW Maye, Plaintiff was able to return to SHU meetings and rounds “ASAP.” (McKinnon Dep. at 109-12.) Plaintiff believes Warden Samuels’ response to his failure to prepare for the meeting was unnecessary and related to his June 6, 2005 EEO complaint. 12
In November 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to the Unit Manager position in Unit Four. 13 (Id. at 50.) In March 2007, four months after Plaintiff became the Unit Manager of Unit Four, Warden Samuels ordered that Unit Four, as well as two *420 additional buildings on the west side of FCI Fort Dix, be temporarily closed as a result of the reduction of 1,200 inmates in the prison population. (Blaine Cert. Exs. N, N-l, N-2, N-3; McKinnon Dep. at 182-85.) According to Warden Samuels, “closing the west side would allow for better resource management, a reduction in overtime usage by correctional officers due to staffing shortages, and repair and renovation of certain west side buildings while they were unoccupied.” (Samuels Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff believed that Warden Samuels should have closed the east side of the institution rather than the west side, and felt that Warden Samuels closed the west side of the institution in order to “harass[ ] [and] retaliate]” against Plaintiff for having filed his June 2005 EEO complaint. (McKinnon Dep. at 188.)
Unit Four was closed down by May 9, 2007; Plaintiff remained the Unit Manager of Unit Four until it closed, and on May 2, 2007, he became Unit Manager of Unit Two, which remained open. (Id. at 193— 94.) Plaintiff has since served as Unit Manager for Unit Two, where his responsibilities are no different than they were when he managed Unit Four. (Id. at 194, 197.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff first contacted an EEO counsel- or regarding his complaint of discrimination by AW Nichols on June 6, 2005, and on July 5, 2005, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the BOP, complaining of sex discrimination and retaliation. (Blaine Cert. Ex. B at 1.) Plaintiff amended his EEO complaint in September 2005 to assert that he had been transferred to a hostile working environment (Unit Three), (Blaine Cert. Ex. B-l at 1), and amended it again in November 2005 after he was disciplined for his April 11, 2005 telephone conversation with Tonya Wallace. (Blaine Cert. Ex. B-2 at 1.)
Plaintiff filed the civil Complaint in this action on April 9, 2007 [Docket Item 1]. He alleges that he was retaliated against for engaging in Title VII-protected activity (Count I), that he was discriminated against on account of his sex (Count II), and that he was exposed to a hostile work environment (Count III). Plaintiffs wife, Tami McKinnon, also asserted a claim for loss of consortium (Count IV)- Upon Defendants’ motion, the Court dismissed Mrs. McKinnon’s claim and terminated Mrs. McKinnon as a party to this action [Docket Items 10 and ll]. 14 Following a period of discovery, Defendants filed the motion for summary judgment presently under consideration [Docket Item 21], to the merits of which the Court now turns.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the materials of record “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party; in other words, “the nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor.’ ”
Hunt v. Cromartie,
526
*421
U.S. 541, 552,
Although entitled to the benefit of all justifiable inferences from • the evidence, “the nonmoving party may not, in the face of a showing of a lack of a genuine issue, withstand summary judgment by resting on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings; rather, that party must set forth ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’ else summary judgment, ‘if appropriate,’ will be entered.”
United States v. Premises Known as 717 South Woodward Street, Allentown, Pa.,
B. Hostile Work Environment Claim
The Court first addresses Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs hostile work environment claim in Count III. In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to suggest that he was subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees, and will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs hostile work environment claim.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual’s ... sex[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). “It is well established that a plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of Title VII by proving that ... harassment [based upon a Title VII-protected characteristic] created a hostile or abusive work environment.”
Kunin v. Sears Roebuck and Co.,
(1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.
Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Corp.,
As the first four of these elements make clear, the
sine qua non
of a hostile work environment claim is a “workplace ... permeated with
discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment[.]”
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
It is clear that Plaintiff has not put forth sufficient evidence to sustain his hostile work environment claim based on gender discrimination or retaliation. The primary focus of Plaintiffs hostile work environment claim is his contention that the entirety of Unit Three, for which he served as Unit Manager between August 2005 and November 2006, was a hostile and abusive environment. As Plaintiff argues, “[t]he unit was replete with threats between staff, threats between staff and inmates and a bounty being placed on the head of one of the employees [by an inmate],” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 30), and because these factors made Unit Three such an unpleasant and potentially dangerous place to work, Plaintiff believes that the unit amounted to a hostile work environment.
Plaintiffs argument misconstrues the basic premise of a hostile work environment claim. While Plaintiffs evidence certainly suggests that Unit Three was, like most correctional facilities, a challenging and at times unpleasant place to work, it is well-settled that “[d]ifficult or stressful working conditions are not tantamount to a ‘hostile’ work environment caused by acts of discrimination.”
Murphy,
The remainder of Plaintiffs evidence likewise fails to support his hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff complains that AW Nichols’ close supervision of him, her efforts to contact him through his secretary rather than via radio, and her alleged micro-management of his time and attendance matters amounted to harassment, but it is well-settled that “being closely supervised or ‘watched’ does not constitute an adverse employment action that can support a claim under Title VII,”
Lester v. Natsios,
Nor does the brief collection of unfriendly comments uttered to Plaintiff over the course of the time at issue in this lawsuit begin to approximate the level of pervasive, discriminatory hostility necessary to ground a hostile work environment claim. First, in light of the fact that even “ ‘the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’ do not support a hostile work environment claim,”
Perry v. Harvey,
No. 08-3339,
In short, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence sufficient
*424
to suggest that his “workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment.”
National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
C. Retaliation Claim
Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to the entirety of Plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim in Count I. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs retaliation claim.
1. McDonnell Douglas Framework
Plaintiffs retaliation claim is brought pursuant to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this sub-chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). When addressing a motion for summary judgment on a retaliation claim brought pursuant to Title VII, the Court employs the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
The establishment of a prima facie case gives rise to a presumption that the employer unlawfully retaliated against the plaintiff. Id. at 342.
Once the plaintiff establishes ... [his] prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate one or more legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decision. If one or more such reasons are proffered, the presumption of discrimination created by establishment of the prima facie case is dispelled, and the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s proffered reason or reasons were pretextual — that is, that they are false and that the real reason for the employment decision was discriminatory.
Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc.,
As
the preceding discussion indicates, “[u]nder the
McDonnell Douglas
approach, the burden of persuasion re
*425
mains on the plaintiff, but the burden of going forward shifts.”
Johnson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co.,
2. Prima Facie Case
a. Title VII-Protected Activity
With regard to the first element of Plaintiffs prima facie case, the Court of Appeals has explained that “the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII protects those who participate in certain Title VII proceedings (the ‘participation clause’) and those who oppose discrimination made unlawful by Title VII (the ‘opposition clause’).”
Moore,
b. Materially Adverse Action
Regarding the second element of Plaintiffs prima facie case, a materially adverse action, the Court of Appeals recently explained the impact of
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
[The Supreme Court explained that] “the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the *426 terms and conditions of employment.” [Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct.] at 2412-13. Because the discrimination and retaliation provisions “are not coterminous,” the Court concluded that “[t]he scope of the anti-retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.” Id. at 2414. Consistent with this view, the Court held that a plaintiff claiming retaliation under Title VII must show that a reasonable employee would have found the alleged retaliatory actions “materially adverse” in that they “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 2415.
Moore,
The standard a plaintiff must meet in establishing a materially adverse action is widely recognized to be “lower for a retaliation claim than for a disparate treatment claim.”
Flynn v. New York State Div. of Parole,
Nevertheless, “[i]n evaluating whether actions are materially adverse, [the Court] must remain mindful that ‘it is important to separate significant from trivial harms’ because ‘[a]n employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience.’ ”
Moore,
i. Actions Which Rise to the Level of Material Adversity
Applying this authority to the facts presented, the Court finds that a limited number of the actions Plaintiff complains of were “materially adverse,”
Burlington Northern,
Likewise, should a factfinder credit Plaintiffs testimony that he never made the “string her up” comment to Ms. Wallace and that the investigation into this alleged statement was not launched until nearly two months after that incident oecurred and just three days after Plaintiff filed his June 6, 2005 EEO complaint, it could find that the investigation and the three-day suspension ultimately imposed upon Plaintiff amounted to materially adverse actions.
See Moore,
Plaintiff further contends that he was retaliated against in that, after he filed his 2005 EEO complaint, AW Nichols tapped Plaintiff less frequently than other unit managers to serve as acting associate warden when AW Nichols was absent. (McKinnon Dep. at 104.) The evidence on this claim is not especially compelling: Plaintiff served as acting associate warden twice after filing his EEO complaint, and he alleges that he observed that Allia Lewis served in the position more than twice as many times as he did (that is, on more than four occasions).
(Id.)
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that a fact-finder could conclude that being selected to serve in a position of authority on a less
*428
frequent basis, if the basis for such selection was retaliatory,
see infra,
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,”
Burlington Northern,
ii. Actions Which Do Not Rise to the Level of Material Adversity or for Which There is No Admissible Evidence
The Court agrees with Defendants, however, that a significant number of the disagreeable experiences Plaintiff complains of do not rise to the level of materially adverse actions and are not actionable under Title VII, and that Plaintiff lacks admissible evidence regarding other allegedly retaliatory acts. Foremost among the negative experiences that do not amount to materially adverse actions are Plaintiffs allegations that AW Nichols “intensif[ied] her supervision of Plaintiff ... [and] micro-manag[ed] his whereabouts,” (Compl. ¶ 51(d)), “accosted,”
(id.
at ¶ 51(c)), and “harassed” him about time and attendance matters, (PL’s Opp’n Br. at 12), and “questioned Plaintiffs work schedule.” (Compl. ¶ 51(i).) In recognition of the fact that “[a]n employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience,”
Moore,
As to Plaintiffs allegation that “[a]fter the filing of the second EEO Complaint,
*429
Plaintiff was not permitted to attend regular staff meetings,” (Compl. ¶ 51(q)), the evidence reveals that Plaintiff was not, in fact, excluded from “regular staff meetings,”
(id.),
but instead missed one single meeting in order to meet with AW Maye about his case load. (McKinnon Dep. at 109-12.) Plaintiff has identified no negative consequences that flowed from having missed this single meeting: there is no suggestion that having attended the meeting could have “contribute[d] significantly to the employee’s professional advancement,”
Burlington Northern,
Finally, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not adduced evidence to support his allegation that “Ms. Nichols ... falsely identified Plaintiff as the proposing official of disciplinary actions against certain other employees at FCI Ft. Dix.” (Compl. ¶ 51(r).) Plaintiffs allegation is based upon the fact that at the time he was transferred from Unit Six to Unit Three, a disciplinary matter was pending for an employee in Unit Three, the unit for which Plaintiff was newly responsible. (McKinnon Dep. at 118.) Plaintiff was called upon to sign the letter proposing discipline for the employee pursuant to BOP Program Statement 3000.3, § 750.1, which explains that “Department Heads are the proposing officials for subordinate staff in their departments.” (Blaine Cert. Ex. M at 1.) Plaintiff did not think that he should have to sign the letter, since he was not the department head at the time the disciplinary infraction occurred, and he expressed his objection to AW Nichols. (Blaine Cert. Ex. M-l at 1.) AW Nichols wrote an email to Plaintiff explaining that she “would not force [him] to sign anything if [he] had concerns,” and asking Plaintiff to put his concerns in writing “so that they could be reviewed.” (Id.) Plaintiff responded:
I have conveyed my concerns to all concerned. There will be no need for any written response on my behalf. I will report to Denise Northrop this afternoon 11/15/05 to retrieve and sign this proposal letter.
(Id.)
The Court agrees with Defendants that no factfinder could reasonably conclude
*430
from this exchange that “Ms. Nichols ... falsely identified Plaintiff as the proposing official of disciplinary actions against certain other employees at FCI Ft. Dix.” (Compl. ¶ 51(r).) Plaintiff may have disagreed with the policy AW Nichols enforced, but AW Nibhols did not falsify anything, and Plaintiff himself agreed to sign the letter. Plaintiffs disagreement with AW Nichols’ enforcement of the policy, or with the policy itself, does not rise to the level of “material adversity,”
Burlington Northern,
iii. Summary
In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence of three materially adverse acts, which, if causally linked to his protected conduct, see infra, are actionable under Title VII:(1) his allegation that he was unfairly investigated and disciplined for the “string her up” statement, (2) his allegedly retaliatory transfer from Unit Six to Unit Three, and (3) the allegedly retaliatory refusal to permit Plaintiff to serve as acting associate warden as often as other unit managers. As to the remainder of Plaintiffs allegations of retaliation, the Court finds that the allegations lack record support or do not rise to the level of material adversity, and summary judgment will be entered.
c. Causal Connection
The final element of Plaintiffs prima facie case for his retaliation claim is the showing of “a causal connection between [Plaintiffs] participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
Moore,
Alternatively, where the timing itself is not unduly suggestive, a plaintiff can satisfy the causation element by producing evidence of “antagonism or retaliatory animus toward plaintiff.”
Rogers v. Delaware,
*431
Dept. of Public Safety/DMV,
i. Investigation/Discipline
Applying this authority to Plaintiffs claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of establishing, at the prima facie case stage, a causal connection between the filing of his 2005 EEO complaint and both the investigation/discipline of his April 2005 telephone call and his transfer from Unit Six to Unit Three. As to the allegedly retaliatory investigation, the Court concludes that the timing of this event is so closely tied to the filing of Plaintiffs EEO complaint that the temporal relationship alone is sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection.
See Cardenas,
ii. Unit Transfer
Although it presents a closer question, the Court likewise finds that a factfinder could trace a causal link between Plaintiffs EEO activity and the transfer of Plaintiff from Unit Six to Unit Three. The timing between these events — Plaintiff filed his EEO complaint in June 2005 and was transferred two months later in August 2005 — -likely would not, without more, give rise to an inference of causation.
Compare Farrell,
However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all inferences in his favor, the Court finds that a factfinder could conclude that Warden Nash, the ultimate decisionmaker responsible for the August 22, 2005 transfer,
24
had warned Plaintiff not to file an EEO complaint, and had thereby exhibited animus toward Plaintiffs prior and proposed future Title VII-protected conduct.
See Marra v. Philadelphia Housing Authority,
iii. Acting Associate Warden Assignments
By contrast, Plaintiff has adduced no evidence to suggest that there is a causal connection between his Title VII-protected conduct and AW Nichols’ failure to assign Plaintiff to serve as acting associate warden as often as other unit managers. First, Plaintiff cannot rely on the temporal proximity between his EEO filing and any action on AW Nichols’ part. Plaintiff has not identified a specific date on which he believes he should have been called upon to serve as acting associate warden. Rather, he refers generally to the months-long span following his EEO filing, during which time he believes he was, on the whole, tapped for the acting associate warden position too infrequently.
See Cardenas,
Nor does the Court find that Plaintiff has adduced evidence that AW Nichols exhibited retaliatory animus toward Plaintiff.
25
While the relationship between Plaintiff and AW Nichols was clearly strained, it is well-established that a “difficult work relationship” alone does not demonstrate retaliatory animus on the part of a supervisor.
Hixson v. County of Alameda Sheriffs Dept.,
No. 97-0589,
In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made out a prima facie claim for retaliation as to two of the adverse actions alleged in his Complaint: (1) his allegation that he was unfairly investigated and disciplined for the “string her up” statement, and (2) his allegedly retaliatory transfer from Unit Six to Unit Three. Summary judgment will be entered as to the remainder of the allegations underlying Plaintiffs retaliation claim.
3. Defendants’ Explanation and Pretext
As to the allegedly retaliatory investigation of Plaintiff and unit transfer, under
McDonnell Douglas,
the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a non-retaliatory explanation for its employment decisions, and, upon Defendants’ articulation of such an explanation, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to discredit the proffered reasons.
See Waldron,
a. Investigation/Discipline
With regard to the initiation of the SIS investigation into Plaintiffs April 11, 2005 telephone call, Defendants reiterate their position that the investigation was launched in the immediate wake of the call itself, and not upon Plaintiffs June 6, 2005 filing of his EEO complaint. For similar reasons to those discussed above, the Court finds, based upon the evidence adduced by Plaintiff, that a reasonable factfinder could discredit Defendants’ explanation for the initiation of the investigation.
See, e.g., Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
The Court accordingly concludes that a material factual dispute exists as to the *434 timing of the SIS investigation and whether the investigation was commenced for retaliatory purposes. Summary judgment as to this aspect of Plaintiffs retaliation claim will thus be denied.
b. Unit Transfer
With regard to the transfer of Plaintiff from Unit Six to Unit Three, Defendant adduces evidence in favor of its non-retaliatory explanation. According to AW Nichols’ deposition testimony, Plaintiff was transferred to Unit Three because no other unit was an option: Plaintiff was already managing Unit Six and could not stay, Plaintiffs wife worked in Unit One and was being transferred to Unit Five, Plaintiff had “expressed concern about going to Unit 4,” and Unit Two, as the most stable unit, was reserved for a new, inexperienced unit manager. (Nichols Dep. at 65.)
The difficulty with this explanation is that it is, in part, contradicted by Plaintiffs deposition testimony that he never expressed concerns to AW Nichols about working in Unit Four. (McKinnon Dep. at 164.) Indeed, as compared to Unit Three, which “nobody wanted to go to,” (McKinnon Dep. at 161), McKinnon testified that Unit Four was an especially desirable placement because “you had the most senior staff there who knew exactly what they was doing” and the unit manager could “just cruise right on through.” (Id. at 171.) Plaintiff testified that he had expressed “no concern” about being transferred to Unit Four. (Id. at 164.)
Defendants’ non-retaliatory explanation and Plaintiffs evidence thus present factual dispute that the Court cannot resolve upon summary judgment. Should the jury credit Plaintiffs, rather than AW Nichols’, testimony on the issue of whether Plaintiff had requested not to be transferred to Unit Four, then it could find that Defendants’ explanation for the transfer — that no other unit was an option — “did not actually motivate the employment action.”
Fuentes,
D. Disparate Treatment Claim
Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiffs disparate treatment claim, in which Plaintiff alleges that he was treated less favorably than Allia Lewis, a female unit manager, on account of his sex. Under Title VII, claims for disparate treatment are analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework discussed above.
See Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey,
As the Court noted,
supra,
there is a critical distinction between the “materially adverse action” element of a retaliation claim and the “adverse employment action” element of a disparate treatment claim.
See, e.g., Hill v. Kempthorne,
*435 [I]n the retaliation context, an employment action that is “materially adverse” is considered more broadly as one that is “likely” to “dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,548 U.S. 53 , 68,126 S.Ct. 2405 ,165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); Ginger v. Dist. of Columbia,527 F.3d 1340 , 1346 (D.C.Cir.2008). The threshold is lower than the standard for “adverse” action for discrimination claims (which requires a tangible impact on the terms, conditions or privileges of employment) because the statute is intended to provide broad protection to encourage disclosure of discrimination. White,548 U.S. at 63-67 ,126 S.Ct. 2405 .
Johnson v. District of Columbia,
As to the more demanding “adverse employment action” element of a disparate treatment claim, the Court of Appeals has explained that the term means “an action by an employer that is serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
28
Storey v. Burns Intern. Security Services,
An adverse employment action must be one that produces a material employment disadvantage. Termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee’s future career prospects are significant enough to meet the standard, as would circumstances amounting to a constmctive discharge. Minor changes in duties or working conditions, even unpalatable or unwelcome ones, which cause no materially significant disadvantage do not satisfy the prong.
Higgins v. Gonzales,
Applying this authority to the facts presented here, the Court concludes that while some of the conduct at issue herein meets the lower “material adversity” threshold for his retaliation claim, Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence sufficient to suggest that he suffered an adverse employment action for purposes of his disparate treatment claim. First, while being transferred to the most challenging unit could conceivably “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,”
Burlington Northern,
Plaintiff further complains that AW Nichols accorded Ms. Lewis favorable treatment by advising her of “staff movements and unit projects of which Plaintiff was not advised.” (Compl. ¶ 56.) Plaintiffs deposition testimony makes plain that this allegation is rooted in two instances of Plaintiff learning of information pertaining to administrative matters at the institution later than Ms. Lewis, which he concedes did not impact his ability to do his job. (McKinnon Dep. at 85.) There is absolutely no suggestion from the evidence that the timing AW Nichols’ disclosure of this information to Plaintiff negatively impacted his “future career prospects,”
Higgins,
Of Plaintiffs remaining allegations in support of his disparate treatment claim, the Court agrees with Defendants that the allegations are either undermined or otherwise unsupported by the record.
29
While Plaintiff complains that Ms. Lewis “receive[d] higher performance evaluations” than Plaintiff, (Compl. ¶ 59), the evidence in the record in fact reveals that Plaintiffs evaluations were (slightly) better than those of Ms. Lewis. (Blaine Cert. Ex. Q at 1-22.) While Plaintiff refers in his brief to unspecified professional benefits associated with serving in the acting associate warden position, he has adduced no
evidence
to suggest that serving in the acting associate warden position one or two times less than Ms. Lewis did impacted his pay, benefits, or career prospects.
See Higgins,
In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for disparate treatment. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs disparate treatment claim will accordingly be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs retaliation claim, to the extent that the claim is premised upon (1) Defendants’ allegedly retaliatory investigation and discipline of Plaintiff for the April 11, 2005 telephone call, and (2) the allegedly retaliatory transfer of Plaintiff to Unit Three. The remainder of Defendants’ motion for sum *437 mary judgment, including the motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs hostile work environment and disparate treatment claims, will be granted. The accompanying Order is entered.
. Ms. Rodriguez filed an EEO complaint concerning the events surrounding her termination, although the outcome of her complaint is not evident from the record. (McKinnon Dep. at 9.)
Notes
. Plaintiff's wife, Tami McKinnon, originally asserted a claim for loss of consortium. As the Court reviews, infra, this claim was dismissed and Mrs. McKinnon was terminated as a party to this action.
. The Court has endeavored to set forth the facts underlying this dispute in clear, chronological order. Its capacity to do so was not facilitated by the parties' L. Civ. R. 56.1 statements, which, over the course of hundreds of paragraphs, leap from topic to topic without regard for the chronology of the underlying events.
See Petinga v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
No. 05-5166,
. John Nash served as the Warden of FCI Fort Dix between June 2004 and December 2005. (Nash Dep. at 9.)
. The RDAP counselor position was unique to Unit Six, for which Plaintiff was the Unit Manager in 2004 and 2005, because Unit Six was the Residential Drug Abuse Program unit. (McKinnon Dep. at 16.)
. During this time, Plaintiff believed that AW Nichols was "preoccupied with [his] whereabouts,” in that she would contact his secretary to find out where he was. (McKinnon Dep. at 69.) Plaintiff believes that AW Nichols should have contacted him via radio or telephone rather than speaking with his secretary. (Id. at 71.)
. At the time when Plaintiff had taken the leave in question, AW Nichols had been out of the institution, and upon her return to FCI Fort Dix, she sought to follow up with Plaintiff about the leave on account of the fact that Plaintiff had informed the Acting Associate Warden that the leave had been pre-approved. (Nichols Dep. at 55.) According to her deposition testimony, AW Nichols "didn’t mind leave being taken, but [she] had concern with him telling somebody that [she] had preapproved the leave when [she] didn’t.” (Id. at 55.)
. During one such conflict, Plaintiff asserts, AW Nichols stated to Plaintiff, "[n]ow you know how Daisy Rodriguez feels”; AW Nichols denies having made this statement, and recalls instead having said “I have held you accountable for your time just like you held Daisy accountable for her time.” (Nichols Dep. at 32.)
. Warden Nash's deposition testimony on this point was as follows:
Q: Was the filing of the EEO complaint, and then the institution of the SIS investigation pretty close in time, to the best of your knowledge?
A: Wow, you know, without the documents in front of me, I cannot give you dates, times, places, things like that. I don’t recall specifics .... When the actual investigation was initiated, I do not recall.
(Nash Dep. at 47-48.) Defendants have identified no documentary evidence that sheds any greater light on the timing of these events.
. As another example of the favorable treatment Ms. Lewis allegedly received, Plaintiff asserts that AW Nichols tapped Ms. Lewis to serve as acting associate warden more often than she tapped Plaintiff to serve in that position after he filed his EEO complaint against her. (McKinnon Dep. at 104.) According to Plaintiff, Ms. Lewis served as acting associate warden on more than four occasions following the filing of his EEO complaint, whereas Plaintiff only served twice in that capacity. (Id.)
. There is no suggestion from the evidence in the record that the difficulties in Unit Three resulted from discrimination by any of the unit’s staff on the basis of a protected characteristic.
. At an earlier meeting in 2006, Warden Samuels had ”berat[ed]” Plaintiff, (McKinnon Dep. at 188), by informing Plaintiff that he was "skating on thin ice” and that he was either with the executive staff or against them. (Id. at 44.)
.As with Plaintiff’s transfer to Unit Three, this transfer was the result of a unit reassignment during which four unit managers at thé institution were reassigned. (McKinnon Dep. at 61.) Ms. Lewis was also reassigned at the time of this transfer. (Id.)
. The Court explained, in dismissing Mrs. McKinnon's claim, that "[a] claimant’s right to recover under an employment discrimination statute does not support a loss of consortium claim by the claimant’s spouse.” (Docket Item 10 at 4) (quoting
Acevedo v. Monsignor Donovan High School,
.
See also Connell v. Nicholson,
. The remarks in question include Warden Nash’s advice that Plaintiff not do anything that he would regret, (McKinnon Dep. at 55), and Warden Samuels’ statement that Plaintiff was "skating on thin ice” and that he was either with the executive staff or against them. {Id. at 44.) By no stretch can these remarks be characterized as gender-based.
. In his deposition, (McKinnon Dep. at 10), and in his brief, Plaintiff appears to rest his retaliation claim in part upon the premise that he was retaliated against for having launched the investigation that resulted in Daisy Rodriguez’s termination. A supervisor’s investigation into employee misconduct which results in the employee’s termination is not "participatfing] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under Title VII," Robinson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority,
. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that numerous actions Plaintiff complains of fall "outside the statutory time period” and are not actionable herein.
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
In general, before filing a Title VII suit, an aggrieved federal employee must meet informally with an EEOC counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discriminatory event. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).... If the employee files suit in the district court, only those claims that are "fairly within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint, or the investigation arising therefrom,” are considered to have been exhausted. Waiters v. Parsons,729 F.2d 233 , 237 (3d Cir.1984).
*427
Moss v. Potter,
No. 07-2779, - Fed.Appx. -, -,
. To reiterate the Court's conclusion,
supra,
this does not mean that Unit Three was, as Plaintiff argues, a hostile work environment under Title VII. An employer who “insistís] that [an employee] spend more time performing the more arduous duties,”
Burlington Northern,
. To the extent that Plaintiffs retaliation claim is premised upon his allegation that AW Nichols made negative comments about Plaintiff to other FCI Fort Dix staff, (Compl. ¶ 51 (o)), the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not adduced admissible evidence in support of this allegation and that summary judgment must be entered. In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff stated that several FCI Fort Dix employees told him that AW Nichols had said negative things to them about Plaintiff. This testimony included Plaintiff’s statement that Kisha Hebbon stated to Plaintiff that AW Nichols had told her that Plaintiff should not expect favorable treatment from AW Nichols on account of his having filed an EEO complaint in 2001, (McKinnon Dep. at 29), and Plaintiff’s testimony that Kelly Ann Williams and Raja Gil-yard stated to him that AW Nichols had made nonspecific negative comments about Plaintiff. (Id. at 33-34; 38.)
Plaintiff’s testimony as to what Hebbon, Williams, and Gilyard stated that they had heard from AW Nichols is clearly being offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,”
(i.e.,
that these three individuals in fact had the conversations with AW Nichols that they purportedly described to Plaintiff), Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), and is inadmissible hearsay. While Hebbon, Williams, and Gilyard were employees of FCI Fort Dix, "there is no indication that the statements] [were] made concerning a matter within the scope of [Hebbon’s, Williams’, or Gilyard’s] agency or
*429
employment with [the BOP],”
Blackburn v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
. To the extent that Plaintiff considers Warden Samuels' statements that Plaintiff was skating on thin ice and that he was either with management or against them to have been materially adverse acts, courts have consistently held that similar reprimands not to rise to the level of material adversity and are not actionable as part of a Title VII retaliation claim.
See Nagle,
. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he believed that Unit Four was closed down as a retaliatory act against him, (McKinnon Dep. at 188), although he does not so argue in his Opposition Brief. The record makes clear that Plaintiff began managing Unit Two as soon as Unit Four closed down, and that his responsibilities in Unit Two are no different than they were in Unit Four. {Id. at 194, 197.) Being asked to perform the same duties in a different unit — particularly in the absence of any suggestion that Unit Two was an undesirable unit like Unit Three — is not a materially adverse action.
. A two-day interval between the protected activity and the adverse conduct has been recognized as “unduly suggestive,”
Cardenas,
. Warden Nash was ultimately responsible for the decision regarding the unit reassignments, although he testified that he relied heavily upon AW Nichols' input. (Nash Dep. at 59-60.)
. In assessing whether an adverse employment decision was impacted by animus, the Court focuses upon the decisionmaker and those who have been shown to have influenced the decision.
See Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey,
. As the Court explained in Note 17,
supra,
to the extent that Plaintiff believes that AW Nichols “retaliated” against him because he was the supervisor responsible for proposing that Daisy Rodriguez be terminated, his actions in disciplining Ms. Rodriguez did not constitute "participating] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII,”
Robinson,
. Plaintiff's testimony concerning statements other FCI Fort Dix staff made to him is inadmissible hearsay,
see
Note 20,
supra,
and cannot be considered upon summary judgment.
See Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv.,
. The Court of Appeals further explained:
That definition stems from the language of Title VII itself. The statute provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added).
Storey,
. To the extent that Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim is based upon his allegation that he was denied secretarial and administrative staff, the Court explained in Note 18,
supra,
that this claim falls “outside the statutory time period” and is not actionable herein.
National R.R. Passenger Corp.,