J. Donald McKINNEY, Samuel Land Company, Wilco Corporation, John Ricciuti, Inc., Appellants, v. The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Pennsylvania, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 12, 1979. Decided Feb. 1, 1980.
410 A.2d 1238
Alexander J. Jaffurs, County Sol., Thomas M. Rutter, Jr., Second Asst. Co. Sol., Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, MANDERINO, NIX and LARSEN, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT
EAGEN, Chief Justice.*
Pursuant to the “Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,” Act of June 18, 1923, P.L. 840, § 1, as amended,
* This case was reassigned to the writer on November 16, 1979.
tions2 were consolidated for hearing, and later the Court of Common Pleas, per a judge from another judicial district specially presiding, entered an adjudication and order declaring that Act 100 applies to Allegheny County and precluding the levying of taxes for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979 based on a 1976 revised assessment of real property in the northern triennial assessment district of Allegheny County until the assessment of real property in the entire county was completed. Appeals were filed in the Commonwealth Court and, subsequently, that court entered an unanimous order and opinion reversing the order of the Court of Common Pleas.3 Because the issue is one of first impression and of great importance, this Court granted allocatur.
Prior to June 24, 1976, section 402 of the General County Assessment Law,
“(a) It shall be the duty of the several elected and appointed assessors, and, in townships of the first class, of the assessors, assistant township assessors and assistant triennial assessors, to assess, rate and value all objects of taxation, whether for county, city, township, town, school, institution district, poor or borough purposes, according to the actual value thereof, and at such rates and prices for which the same would separately bona fide sell. In arriving at such value the price at which any property may actually have been sold shall be considered but shall not be controlling. Instead such selling price, estimated or actual, shall be subject to revision by increase or decrease to accomplish equalization with other similar property within the taxing district. Except in counties of the first class, no political subdivision shall levy real estate taxes on a county-wide revised assessment of real property until it has been completed for the entire county.” [Emphasis added to indicate Act 100, the 1976 amendment.]
During 1976, real property in the northern district of Allegheny County was assessed in accordance with the previously established schedule for making triennial district assessments. On June 17, 1977, acting pursuant to the Second Class County Assessment Law,
Allegheny County is the only county now authorized by statute to assess property on a district-wide, triennial assessment basis.7 All other counties, including counties of the first class,8 are required to assess property on an annual basis. Although first class and third class counties are required by statute to divide such counties into assessment districts, see Act of June 27, 1939, P.L. 1199, § 5,
Act 100, by its terms, applies to county-wide reassessments. It directs that taxes may only be levied on such assessments when the assessments have been completed for the entire county. By its terms, Act 100 applies to all counties except “counties of the first class.” The Commonwealth Court did not consider this introductory phrase when it held that Act 100 did not apply to Allegheny County. See Statutory Construction Act of 1972,
Initially, we are supported in this conclusion because to apply Act 100 to Allegheny County, under the district-wide, triennial assessment system, would lead to a result not intended by the legislature. In ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly, we are to presume that it does not intend a result that “is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” Statutory Construction Act of 1972,
Our conclusion is further supported by the resolution of an inconsistency between the General County Assessment Law and the Second Class County Assessment Law. Section 105 of the General County Assessment Law,
“All local acts of Assembly applying to particular counties or political subdivisions thereof, and not heretofore repealed, shall continue in force, and any provisions of this act inconsistent therewith shall not apply to the counties or political subdivisions thereof affected by such local laws.
“Whenever the provisions of this act are inconsistent with any law relating to or administered by any board of revision of taxes, or board for the assessment and revision of taxes, in counties of the first, second or third class, the laws relating to and administered by such boards, and not included in this act, shall apply, and the inconsistent provisions of this act shall not apply to such classes of counties, but shall be in full force as to all other classes of counties, except as affected by local laws.”
Thus, a provision of the Second Class County Assessment Law supersedes an inconsistent provision of the General County Assessment Law.
As noted earlier, sections 7 and 10 of the Second Class County Assessment Law,
“Act No. 100 as applied by the court below would prohibit the certification of revised assessments for any single District and would require that all three Districts be certified two years later. This is clearly inconsistent with the practice allowed by the ‘Second Class County Assessment Law.‘”
McKinney v. Board of Commissioners, 35 Pa.Cmwlth. 91, 99, 385 A.2d 596, 600 (1978). We agree; however, we wish to
Furthermore, whenever general and specific provisions are in conflict, the provisions should be construed, if possible, to give effect to both. Statutory Construction Act of 1972,
Order affirmed.
MANDERINO, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting.
Today the majority holds that the Legislature did not intend to apply Act 100, Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, art. IV, § 402, as amended,
Since 1933, counties of the second class have been authorized by the Legislature to use triennial assessments.
The majority sets forth three unpersuasive reasons for disregarding the express language of the statute. First it states that application of Act 100 to a county using triennial assessments “would produce a grossly unfair situation” in the present inflationary economy. This conclusion is premised upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the operation of triennial assessments. If we assume, as does the majority, that property values are continually increasing, then triennial assessments (with or without Act 100) could result in higher tax burdens for similarly situated property owners who are assessed in different years. Such a result would, of course, violate the constitutional requirement of uniform taxation. See
The majority next suggests that Act 100, by its own terms, applies only to “county-wide” assessments. Triennial assessments are “district-wide,” suggests the majority, and therefore beyond the ambit of Act 100. I cannot agree. A county using triennial assessments assesses all taxable property in the county. Though the period of assessment is three years, rather than one, there is no dispute that the assessment is county-wide.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court and reinstate the order of the trial court holding that Act 100 applies.
EAGEN
CHIEF JUSTICE
