D. R. MсKINLEY et al., Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
Sac. No. 5941
In Bank
Sept. 14, 1949
209 P.2d 602 | 34 Cal.2d 239
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Charles W. Johnson, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents.
Charles P. Scully as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.—Seven employers, members of the Sacramento Wholesale Bakers Association, petition for a writ of mandate directing the Insurance Appeals Board to vacate and set aside certain of its decisions granting benefits to claimants, and to compel the director of employment to strike out all charges made to the accounts of the petitioners bеcause of such payments. As a result of the rather unique administrative procedure which was followed, the petitioners now concede that the awards cannot be vacated; however, the charges against the employers’ accounts may be stricken from the records if the determination of the board was erroneous. The case is presented upon an agreed statement of facts, and the only question for decision is whether the board correctly determined that the petitioners’ employees are not excluded from benefits under
The association, comprising all of the Sacramento “machine shop baking industry,” was organized in 1935 for the purpose of representing its members in labor relations. Prior to the formation of the association, either individually or jointly, the employers had entered into contracts with the Bakery and Confectionery Workers’ International Union of America, Local 85. Since 1935, a master contract upon an industry-wide basis was utilized, and on behalf of the employers, executed by the executive secretary of the association. Prior to 1946, each employer indiсated his concurrence by signing the master contract; since that year the employers have declined to do so, taking the position that each of them is bound by the action of the secretary of the association.
According to the agreed statement, “[t]he members of the Association understood among themselves that they would act as a unit in collective bargaining matters, and that a strike against any one or more members would be treated by them as a strike against all. This position had been known to the union by statements, letters and prior action (p. 37, l. 25, p. 38,
By the master contract made in January, 1946, uniform wages, hours and working conditions were established for the employees of all member employers. Early in 1947, less than 30 days prior to the expiration date of the contract and in accordance with its terms, the union advised the executive secretary of the association that it desired to amend the contract generally as to wages, hours and working conditions.
During the negotiations which followed, the members of the union employed in the petitioners’ plants authorized the negotiating committee, in its discretion, to call a strike against any one or more of the employers. When negotiations broke down, the union declared a strike against the Butter Cream Baking Company, one of the members of the association. Pickets were stationed at the Butter Cream plant and remained until a month later, when an agreement was reached between the union and the association for a new master contract.
On the day that the picket line was established, a representative of the employers stated to a union representative at the scene that the strike against one employer would be treated as a strike against all. The union representative replied that he had expected such a result. Thereupon, and within the following few days, the other employers closed their plants. The employees in these bakeries continued to work until the plants were closed.
Throughout the entire period of the dispute and until its settlement, the union‘s sole demand was for changes in the
The petitioners contend that the employees who have claimed and received benefits are within the exclusionary provisions of the act in that (1) the employers had “good cause” to close their plants under the rule laid down in Bunny‘s Waffle Shop v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 735 [151 P.2d 224]; (2) the employees made the strike at Butter Cream their own and voluntarily participated in it; and (3)
Provisions disqualifying from benefits an employee whose unemployment is the result of a labor dispute are to be found in the unemployment compensation statutes of all of the 48 states. In most jurisdictions, however, the Legislature has made сertain exceptions to the general disqualification provision. (49 Columb.L.Rev. 550 [1949].) Lack of such express statutory exception in the California act led this court in Bodinson Mfg. Corp. v. California Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321, 328 [109 P.2d 935], to state that disqualification “depends upon the fact of voluntary action” by the claimant. That decision recognized the obvious legislative intent that persons who are involuntarily and innocently out of work as the result of a labor dispute should not suffer by loss of unemploy
The disagreement between the parties to the present controversy arises from the difference in their respective views as to the cause of the claimants’ unemployment. The employers contend that it was the union action of striking the Butter Cream plant which caused the shutdown; the respondents argue that the employees were willing to work in the petitioners’ plants and did so until they were locked out.
In Bunny‘s Waffle Shop v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 735 [151 P.2d 224], certain restaurant owners sought to compel their employees, through their union, to deal with a newly organized San Francisco Employers’ Council in obtaining a collective bargaining agreement. The union refused to bаrgain except with the individual employers as had been the custom. To compel joint negotiations, the restaurant owners made a reduction of 25 per cent in wages, and a six-day week with split shifts was established instead of the existing five-day week and straight shift. When the employees were paid at the lower rate, they left their jobs. Subsequently the restaurants were closed down. Later, the employers sued to obtain the relief demanded in the present case and the question presented for decision was whether the employees were disqualified from receiving benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act because they left their work.
The commission contended that, in effect, the employers’ action constituted a lockout. This position was upheld because the court determined, after reviewing the employers’ acts, that they were disassociated from any bona fide proposal in connection with the dispute, hence, “when claimants left their work, they left because of this economic weapon and not because of the trade dispute then in existence.” In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized that, in reality, the form of the cessation of employment is not сontrolling and the determinative factor is the volitional cause of the work stoppage. In other words, although the employees left work of their own choice, that choice was not freely made but was compelled by the economic weapon which the employers used. This is the only sound and fair way to apply the subjective volitional test stated in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935].
Either the union or an individual employer, at any time, could have broken off joint negotiations and bargained with its employees on an individual basis. But that course was not taken. At no time did the union purport to be directing any action solely against the Butter Cream plant; instead, the union continued throughout to deal directly with the association for the purpose of obtaining a new master contract. To say, therefore, that the act of striking the one plant did not shut down work in other plants of the association which were subject to the labor negotiations for the purpose of obtaining a master contract is wholly unrealistic. Industry-wide negotiations had been established by these employers and consistently carried on for over 10 years.
The volitional test established in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935], was based upon the principle that innocent victims of a trade dispute should not suffer loss of their unemployment insurance rights. But the unemployment of the bakery workers was caused by their own action taken with full knowledge of its consequences. In the waffle shop case, the unemployment was due to a lock
The respondents rely heavily upon the following language of the waffle shop opinion: “A strike against a single member of an employers’ collective bargaining unit involves economic action against that employer only and subjects to disqualification under the Unemployment Insurance Act those employees only who leave their work because of the dispute. If the other employers thereupon choose to close their establishments and lock out their employees, such employees cannot be charged with leaving their work because of a trade dispute.” (24 Cal.2d 741.) But an important fact which must be considered in this connection is that the employer group involved in the waffle shop case was newly formed and had never been a bargaining agent for the restaurants; instead, the question of whether it should be the bargaining agent was one of the major issues in the dispute. The quoted language, therefore, is not applicable to a situation such as the present one where the evidence shows a long-standing practice of contracting between the union and a group of employers as a unit; if it may be said to have that effect it was dictum and, in either event, it is not here controlling.
A peremptory writ of mandate will therefore issue, requiring the director of the Department of Employment to remove from the official records the charges against the petitioners’ accounts which are the subject of this proceeding.
Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.—I concur both in the judgment and in the opinion of Justice Edmonds. Were it not for the majority
In Bunny‘s case there was no literal shutdown or lockout. A trade dispute had arisen; the employers, who theretofore had not, as among themselves, bargained collectively with the union (see p. 736 of 24 Cal.2d), demanded collective bargaining with their newly formed association (as stated аt p. 737, they “wished to negotiate a single contract”) and, as an alternative, announced that upon continued refusal to negotiate with their association wages would be reduced and certain working conditions changed. The employes refused to accede to either alternative and walked out.2 But their walkout was
As shown more completely in the footnote quotation the commission held that “The economic weapon . . . was created by the employers . . . and it alone, rather than the trade dispute that occasioned it, was the cause of the leaving of work,” and concerning that finding of the commission this court held that “[I]t rejects the trade dispute as the cause of such leaving and is sufficient to support the award of benefits.”
Certainly in Bunny‘s case we should have been required to hold (on that phase of the case) that the employes had left their work voluntarily because of a trade dispute and, hence, were disqualified from benefits, unless we held, as the majority did, that it was proper to relate responsibility for the work stoppage to the party who created its actual and directly impelling cause. To that end the court looked behind the fact that literally there was no lockout or shutdown and that the employes could have continued at work either at reduced pay and different hours or, by agreeing to collective bargaining, at the old rates and conditions. In literality, the walkout there was, of course, due to a trade dispute, a sparring contest in which employers and employes were exchanging blows. The employers led with the collective bargaining or wage reduction-hour increase blow and the employes retaliated with the walkout punch. The court held that it was proper to examine into the trade dispute and necessary “to distinguish between leaving in the course of a trade dispute and leaving because of a trade dispute . . . There must . . . be a direct causal connection between the trade dispute and the leaving of work”; that there the leaving of work, while occurring during a trade dispute was directly caused by the
Here the similarity to Bunny‘s case is patent, but reversed as to parties. In this case, the employes struck the first, the impelling blow. The retaliation by the employers was exactly what the employes expected when they struck and was directly responsive to their action. In Bunny‘s case it was, of course, true, in literality, that the employes had a choice in the solution of which they exercised discretion. But it was not a free choice; they had to yield something in either alternative submitted by the employers. Hence, their walkout was not voluntary; the situation requiring the choice and necessitating some concession was created by the employers and their attempt was to force that choice on the employes. Here, it is rationally inescapable, we have exactly the same situation but in reverse.
The employes and the employers, in the case before us, were, and long had been, parties to one master contract which set forth the terms and conditions binding on all employes and all employers. Although only the employes оf Butter Cream Baking Company literally walked out, that strike in principle and in its object was directed against all of the employers who were members of the association as much as against Butter Cream. The vote of the employes did not merely authorize a strike against Butter Cream; it authorized the strike against any or all of the employers as the union strategists might from time to time determine was expedient to the end of attaining the master contract modifications demanded by the union and which, if made, would be applicable to all employers; the union knew that a strike against one would be treated as a strike against all and they intended that the strike should be effective in obtaining concessions from all the employers, not just from Butter Cream.
Certainly here the employers (as did the employes in Bunny‘s case) had a choice which involved the exercise of discretion. They could accede to the demand of the union for the changes in the master contract or they could relinquish the joint participation in collective bargaining which the master contract obviously called for, and permit their plants to be struck one by one or in groups, until separate
It is asserted in support of respondents’ position that “[A]lthough the union knew that the employers had an understanding among themselves that ‘they would act as a unit in collective bargaining matters . . .,’ the understanding was entirely unilateral upon the part of the employers, and the union never indicated that it would accept or be bound by it.” It is as difficult for me to square that factual statement with any rational view of the facts depicted by the record as it is to reconcile the legal position of the dissenters with the holding in Bunny‘s case. The record shows unequivocally that the employers’ association was organized in 1935 for the express purpose of representing its members and acting as a unit for them in collective bargaining with the employes, that continuously from that time on the association has represented its members in such collective bargaining with the union and that, quite to the contrary of being “entirely unilateral upon the part of the employers” and never recognized by the union, the fact is that from 1935 on the union did accept the employers’ association as the bargaining unit and its contracts were made with that association. In fact the very master contract in question, to secure changes in which the strike was authorized and called, is a collective bargaining contract to which the union and the association were the contracting parties and in which contract the members of the association (likewise the members of the union) acted as a unit.
The position of the dissent of the Chief Justice appears to be grounded upon a few sentences selected from the record and construed as disassociated from their context. If these selected sentences could be said to create а material conflict in evidence then we would have a different situation. But no such case is here. Since we have stipulated facts before us
Apparently on the strength of the last quoted language it is asserted that “the understanding [of the employers that “they would act as a unit in collective bargaining matters, and that a strike against any one or more members would be treated by them as a strike against all”] was entirely unilateral upon the part of the employers.” But it seems to me that a fair representation of the record requires that the foregoing sentences be read and understood in the light of the fact that the stipulation of facts also states that “the individual members of the union . . . authorized its negotiating committee to call a strike against any one or more of the employers in the committee‘s discretion . . . and this committee was authorized by the membership to conduct negotiations and do whatever was necessary to advance the progress of negotiations as that committee deemed best, and to call a strike, if that was necessary, at any plant or plants of the employers decided upon by the committee . . .” (Italics added.) Furthermore, it seems to me to be established beyond question on this record that the strike was directed against all the employers because admittedly there was but one contract by which all employes and all employers wеre bound; the demand of the union was for amendments to that one master contract affecting all employers; the strike vote authorized the union‘s committee to “do whatever was necessary to advance the progress of negotiations” for the amendments demanded and, to that end, to shut down “any plant
In my view the designation of the statement, “the members of the Association understood among themselves that they would act as a unit in collective bargaining” etc., as a “unilateral agreement” is, in the light of the other stipulated facts, unfair and inaccurate. Certainly the members of the association understood “among themselves” that “they would act as a unit in collective bargaining.” But so did the union understand that fact. In truth the union‘s negotiations were conducted with the employers’ association as a unit and it was concerning a contract which had been executed by the association as a bargaining unit and by the union as a bargaining unit that the negotiations were conducted; and, as stated in the stipulation, “The union‘s sole demand was for changes in the contract with the Association. At no time during negotiations were demands made upon the individual employers either before or after the picket line was established.”
Lastly, it is noted that the dissent of the Chief Justice places reliance on a quotation from Bunny‘s case (p. 741 of 24 Cal.2d): “A strike against a single member of an employers’ collective bargaining unit involves economic action against that employer only and subjects to disqualification under the Unemployment Insurance Act those employees only who leave their work because of the dispute. If the other employers thereupon choose to close their establishments and lock out their employees, such employees cannot be charged with leaving their work because of a trade dispute. The threat of possible economic action involved in a strike upon one of a group of employers . . . bears no analogy to the employers’ act in the present case, for the latter culminated in actual economic action against the employees that caused them to leave their work.”
The fallacy of such reliance is obvious. The statement quoted must be either a dictum which is grossly contrary to the actual holding of Bunny‘s case, or it is distinguishable and, in implication, supportive of Justice Edmonds’ conclusions. Surely, it was not intended to suggest a “heads I win-tails you lose” application of the rule dependent on an interchange of the positions of the parties to the dispute. Examining the quotation for its true significance I think this appears: At the very outset its language is that “A strike against a single member of an employers’ collective bargaining unit,” etc. But here we do not have a strike against a
Secondly, the quotation reads, “The threat of possible economic action involved in a strike upon one of a group of employers . . . bears no analogy to the employers’ act in the present [Bunny‘s] case, for the latter culminated in actual economic action against the employees that caused them to leave their work.” Here it was the “actual economic action” of the employes against the employеrs which “caused them” (the employers) to shut down the plants.
Since we have in Bodinson, and as expanded in Bunny‘s case, declared the volitional-direct cause test, and since the undisputed facts here do not disclose any material distinguishing feature, adherence to sound judicial process requires that we apply that test. If in Bunny‘s case the walkout was involuntary and directly caused by the concerted act of the employers it is at least equally clear that here the shutdown by the employers was involuntary and the work stoppage was directly caused by the strike vote and action of the employes. Their strike vote and call were voluntary and directly resulted, as was expected, in the shutdown. The free choice here was that of the employes, not of the employers. The writ must issue, as directed.
Shenk, J., concurred.
GIBSON, C. J.—I dissent. The record in this case clearly shows that petitioners locked out their employees, and it is impossible for me to understand how it can be said that the employees left their work within the meaning of
Here it clearly appears from the agreed statement of facts that after the strike was called against one member of the employers’ association, the bakery workers employed by petitioners remained at their jobs until petitioners closed down their plants and that petitioners’ employees were willing to continue working throughout the course of the strike. Ordinarily it would be expected that this would end the matter, establishing that the employees had not voluntarily left but, rather, had been forced to leave their work.
The majority opinion, however, concludes that the employees “left their work voluntarily and, therefore, should have been excluded from receiving unemployment benefits.” The theory seems to be that because the union and the employers’ association were negotiating with regard to proposed changes in the master contract, and because the union had been informed of an understanding or agreement solely among the employers that a strike against one of them would be treated as a strike against all, the members of the union, by permitting a strike against one employer, thereby “placed themselves outside the class of persons who are properly protected by the subjective volitional exception to
Before considering the questions of law raised herein, it
It is also stated as a fact in the majority opinion that “In this case the union members knew from letters and statements as well as from prior strike action that any strike during negotiations would result in stoppage of all work.” [Italics added.] The italicized portion goes beyond the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, which shows only that the union knew that a strike against one “would be treаted by [the employers] as a strike against all.” It does not follow that the union was aware that the understanding necessarily included an agreement to invoke a lockout or shutdown, since there is other conduct, short of a lockout, which might constitute treating the strike against one as a strike against all. For example, it might have been intended that the remaining employers would publish statements in the newspapers declaring that there was in effect a strike against all, or the employers might have contemplated financial aid to the one struck establishment or assistance in obtaining nonunion labor to reopen that plant or to meet any need for additional workers in their own plants. The understanding might also mean that the employers considered that a strike against all of them, although without a lockout or shutdown, would be a talking point or special matter for discussion during the collective bargaining negotiations.
Although it might be possible to infer that the notification to the union of the understanding among the employers included a threat to close the plants, it does not seem proper to draw such an inference under the circumstances of this
Even if it be assumed that the union knew of an understanding among the employers that, upon a strike against one, the remaining employers would close their plants, this fact is not controlling. The understanding, as we have seen, was not in any way acceded to or binding upon the employees, but was entirely unilateral, among the employers only, and it seems erroneous to rely upon the fact that the union had been informed of the understanding and of the employers’ intended course of action. It would broaden the disqualification provisions of the statute to permit employers to escape liability for unemployment due to what would otherwise be classed as a lockout merely by adopting the device of entering into such a unilateral agreement in anticipation of a strike against one employer and then notifying their employees of the agreement. If petitioners would have been chargeable with a lockout had the agreement to close down their plants not been made until after the strike was called against Butter Cream Baking Company, they should likewise be held responsible here. We need not determine whether the understanding would be of importance if it had been made part of the collective bargaining contract, because the union never agreed to be bound by it and, therefore, should not be charged with having improperly disregarded it. Clearly the employers should not be able to defeat any right of the union to act as it did merely by giving notice of the agreement made among
Although the employees authorized the negotiating committee of the union to call a strike against “any one or more of the employers in the committee‘s discretion,” the agreed statement of facts clearly shows that the “union declared a strike against . . . one of the members of the Association.” The fact that the authorization first given was broader than the strike eventually declared is, of course, immaterial, since it did not, of itself, constitute action directed against the employers.
The only real issue in this case, therefore, is whether, regardless of knowledge of the unilateral understanding, petitioners’ employees were chargeable with having voluntarily left their work in petitioners’ establishments by virtue of the fact that, during the course of negotiations for changes in the industry-wide contract, they, as union members, authorized a strike which was called against only one of several employers as a means of publicizing the dispute. The majority of the court, however, do not make it clear whether thеy would reach the same result if the factor of knowledge of the understanding were not regarded as a ground for their holding. In my opinion the activity in which petitioners’ employees engaged did not constitute conduct which should be treated as such a direct cause of the shutdown that it was tantamount to a voluntary leaving of work. Although the strike at Butter Cream Baking Company may have induced petitioners to close their plants, there is no contention that operation of the plants actually became impossible because of the strike, and there is nothing to show that any property or business would have been injured by continuation of operations. The only reason given by petitioners for the shutdown is that it was put into effect as an economic weapon on the part of the employers to counteract the tendency that the strike against one bakery might have to break up the united stand adopted by the members of the association.
Even if we assume that petitioners are correct in attributing the strike against the Butter Cream Baking Company to a plan or scheme to force the employers to yield one at a time to the demands made in the labor dispute,* the strike did not
The majority opinion apparently concedes that the members of the union could call a strike against only one employer without being subject to a charge of having voluntarily left work in petitioners’ establishments by merely going through the formality of withdrawing from negotiations with the association and, instead, bargaining with each employer separately. It is stated that “either the union or an individual employer, at any time, could have broken off jоint negotiations and bargained with its employees on an individual basis. But that course was not taken.” If this is all that is required of a union as a prerequisite to conducting a strike against only one employer without disqualification under
Moreover, the conclusion reached by the majority is contrary to Bunny‘s Waffle Shop v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 735 [151 P.2d 224]. In that case restaurant employees, during the course of a labor dispute, refused to bargain collectively with an employers’ association and insisted upon dealing individually with each employer. The employers made
The argument that the result reached by the majority is required, or even suggested, by the Bunny‘s Waffle Shop case is without foundation, for at least two major reasons. The majority apparently assume that the Bunny‘s case held that the employees there involved did not voluntarily leave work and that the wage cut and the change in work shifts were tantamount to a lockout and in effect compelled the employees to leave work. They say, speaking of the Bunny‘s case, that “although the employees left work of their own choice, that choice was not freely made but was compelled by the economic weapon which the employers used.” [Italics added.] Although not made entirely clear, the majority opinion then seems to reason that under this rule, applied by analogy to the present case, the strike against Butter Cream Baking
First, the assumption that the Bunny‘s case treated the employees as not having voluntarily left work is erroneous. The opinion in that case makes it perfectly clear that, although the commission had relied upon the theory that the wage cut amounted to a lockout, compelling the employees to leave, the court adopted an entirely different ground for concluding that the disqualification of
The opinion in the Bunny‘s case indicates that the court really treated the employees as having voluntarily left work. At page 742-743 of 24 Cal.2d the court found it necessary to determine whether, “if they left their work voluntarily, they are subject to the temporary disqualification imposed by
Second, even assuming that the Bunny‘s case held thаt a 25 per cent wage cut is tantamount to a lockout and therefore compels the employees to leave, and, further, that the case, by analogy, would support a rule that employees will be
Finally, the determination that the accounts of petitioners should not be chargeable with benefits paid to their employees amounts to disregarding the differences between the California statute and those adopted elsewhere. The California law is unique, since the labor dispute qualification found in
Statutes in a large majority of the other states were modeled after the English unemployment insurance laws and the fеderal Social Security Board Draft Bill, and they provide that an employee is disqualified from receiving benefits if his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work existing because of a trade dispute and he either participates in or is interested in the dispute or belongs to a class of workers who are participating in the dispute.†
Such statutes operate not only to disqualify employees who would be ineligible under the California law but, in addition, bar many individuals who do not voluntarily leave their work.‡
It is clear that at the time the California Unemployment Insurance Act was adopted, the Legislature was familiar with both the type of labor dispute disqualification based upon the voluntary act of the individual worker and the type of provision now enacted in most other states. When the Cali
The only case we have been able to find which dealt with a situation similar to that involved here held that the employees, comparable to petitioners’ employees, were in fact locked out and were therefore entitled to unemployment insurance. (Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., Minn.Supr.Ct., June 24, 1949, 18 U.S. Law Week 2011.) The statute there considered is different from ours in that it disqualifies an employee who has left or lost his employment because of a strike or other labor dispute and then provides that nothing in the provision “shall be deemed to deny benefits to any employee who becomes unemployed because of a lockout.” The court stated that under this statute the “fault which governs is the ultimate and final act causing the unemployment rather than any preliminary act which might furnish a motive for a lockout causing the unemployment.” It also said that by so construing the statute it gives “meaning to the present statutory provision excepting from disqualification unemployment due to a lockout, without doing violence to the legislative
It is not the province of this court to consider either the merits of the trade dispute underlying the stoppage of work or the social desirability of paying benefits to petitioners’ employees. (See W. R. Grace & Co. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 720, 731 [151 P.2d 215]; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321, 325 [109 P.2d 935].) There is nothing in
The alternative writ of mandate should be discharged and the application for a peremptory writ denied.
Traynor, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Dissenting.—As I understand the position taken by the majority in this case, it is to the effect that where an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement exists between employers and a labor union and there is an understanding between the employers that if a strike is called against one of their group the others will close their plants, the employees who are locked out as a result of such closing cannot obtain unemployment compensation benefits, and that if in such a situation one employer closes his plant, the union may declare a strike against all of the other employers, and all of the employees thrown out of employment as a result of such action are entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. I do not believe that it was the intention of the Legislature that the Unemployment Insurance Act should be so construed. Neither do I believe that anything said in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935], or in Bunny‘s Waffle Shop v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 735 [151 P.2d 224], requires such an interpretation of the Unemployment Insurance Act. It strikes me that the interpretation placed on this act by the majority in this case is just a step toward the ultimate holding that an over-all employers’ association which unites industry of the community or state for the purpose of dealing with labor problems could make it impossible for any employee who belongs to a union to obtain unemployment insurance benefits
I cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature, in enacting
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied October 13, 1949. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.