Defendant Charles McKibbons, a/k/a Charles McKibbens, was charged via indictment with a single violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, in that he “did unlawfully possess . . . Cocaine, . . . with intent to distribute. ...” The evidence adduced at his jury trial showed that police obtained a no-knock search warrant for “117 Pine [Street,] # 9,” in Atlanta, Georgia. Before executing this search warrant, police observed the premises and discovered that a person leaving this apаrtment had crack cocaine in his possession. By use of a decoy, defendant was lured out of the apartment whereupon the search warrant was executed. Defendant was detained during the premises search. A sеarch of his person revealed a “plastic pill bottle containing [114] hits of crack cocaine . . .” hidden in defendant’s groin.
The jury found him guilty as charged. After the denial of his motion for new trial, defendant appealed directly tо the Supreme Court of Georgia, which transferred this appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Held:
1. In his first enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s challenge to defense counsel’s use of peremptory challenges, arguing that he was denied his right to a “fair and impartial jury. . . .”
The transcript indicates that the qualified venire was composed of 21 white potential jurors and 14 black potential jurors, a ratio of 60 percent to 40 percent whereas the petit jury as originally selected contained four white jurors and eight black jurors, a ratio of 33 Ms percent to 66% percent. Defendant, who is black, “exercised all [twelve] of his peremptory strikes, . . . ten of which were against white [potential] jurors. . . .” The trial court heard defense counsel’s reasons for striking these ten white potential jurors and ultimately ordered that five of them be seated as jurors after dеtermining the proffered reasons were not “sufficientfly] racially neutral. ...” The seating of these five white venire resulted in a petit jury of “seven white jurors, [and] *390 five black jurors, which [the trial court] deemed to be sufficiently close to the sixty-forty percent of the entire venire, with one black alternate juror.” Defendant then moved for a mistrial, questioning whether “jurors who know they have been struck by the defense [can] be placed on a jury and [be] fair and impartial. . . .”
“ ‘(T)hе Constitution (of the United States) prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.’ . . . [B]oth the [S]tate and defendants in criminal actions are constrained to exercise their peremptory challenges in a racially neutral fashion.”
State v. Mayweather,
An explanation for the use of a peremptory strike, “even if it is based upon mistake or ignorance, may be sufficient to rebut a prima facie
Batson
showing, so long as it is not whimsical or fanciful but is neutral, relаted to the case to be tried, and a clear and reasonably specific explanation of the legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Smith v. State,
In the case sub judice, the trial court was authorized to disbelieve the facially race-neutral reasons for striking certain jurors, or to conclude that the stated grounds were not neutrally applied. Fоr example, the explanation for striking a Waffle House employee on the ground that “Waffle House was a Republican stronghold” is whimsical or fanciful, as is the notion that real estate agents “[go] along with the majority.” Another peremptory challenge was employed because the potential juror “avoided eye contact. . . .” However, the trial court was authorized to conclude that this explanation “reflect[s] certain [imрermissible] stereotypical attitudes as to particular groups.”
Tharpe v. State,
2. Next, defendant enumerates the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that he was arrested without probable cause and that any consent to search his person was coerced. It appears that this issue was raised only by an oral motion after voir dire and memorialized by the subsequent filing of a written motion. In colloquy, the trial court reasoned that the police had reasonable grounds to stop defendant based upon their оbservations, that he consented to a search of his person, and the discovery of the pill bottle with 114 hits of cocaine established probable cause for a warrantless arrest. The record contains no request for a hearing on the written motion. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress because it was untimely filed.
Baseler v. State,
3. In his third enumeration, defendant contends his “right to cross examination was constitutionally impaired such as to deprivе him of his right to a fair trial. . . .” He first argues that he was not afforded confrontation “due to the [S]tate’s failure to call the other arresting officer, and the two eye witnesses to the incidents leading to arrest.” Secondly, he complains that “[testimony by [Officer Stanley Green] . . . regarding the statements of the two other parties to the transactions leading to [defendant’s] arrest constituted impermissible hearsay in violation of [his] right of cross examination.”
These two grounds “оf error fail to specify any error alleged to have been committed by the trial court. See OCGA § 5-6-51 (4).”
Robinson v. State,
As to defendant’s сontention that the arresting officer was impermissibly permitted to offer hearsay testimony, the citation to the record offered in support of this enumeration demonstrates that the statement objected to on apрeal came in reply to question's posed by defense counsel during cross-examination. The officer witness was explaining why he could
not
relate out-of-court statements made by persons who were present at defendаnt’s arrest but not present at trial. “Thus, error, if any, was self-induced and provides no basis for reversal.
Bess v. State,
4. Defendant’s fourth enumeration contends the “prosecutor made improper and prejudicial comments in closing argument . . .” which dеprived him of due process. However, defendant interposed a timely objection in only two of the many instances of allegedly improper argument cited in support of this enumeration, such that all other instances have been waived because they were not properly preserved for appellate review.
Moore v. State,
The first objection raised by defendant to closing argument by the State’s attorney asserted “there is no evidence of a hallway conversation.” This assertion was contradicted by the State’s attorney. The trial court observed that the “jury will remember the evidence,” and the State’s attorney continued with closing argument. Defendant raised no additional objection and invoked no additional ruling. “ ‘Acquiescence completely deprives [defendant] of the right to complain further.’
Thompson v. State,
As to the second objection to allegedly improper closing argument, the record shows the following transpired: “[STATE’S ATTORNEY:] ... We know that drugs are ravaging our community. We know that many people are being failed by the system. That was brought out on voir dire questioning of some of the prospective jurors on this panel. I would submit. . . that you would do a disservice and would victimize the people of Techwood Homes. . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Your Honor, I am going to object to that line of argument, claiming the passion of the jury. It’s not in evidence. [THE *393 COURT:] Overruled. Go ahead.” Defendant did not thereаfter move for a mistrial, a rebuke, or for curative instructions.
We find no error in overruling defendant’s objection in this instance. “A statement by the prosecutor thаt drugs are ‘killing our society’ and pointing out that [defendant] committed a serious offense was merely pointing out to the jury its interest in law enforcement. This statement did not in any way prejudice [defendant’s] right to a fair trial.”
Hester v. State,
Finally, repeated references by the State’s attorney in closing argument to that intimate portion of defendant’s anatomy wherein he had concealed 114 doses of crack cocaine were not improper argument, calculated to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury by the impermissible introduction of facts not in evidence. Compare
Bell v. State,
Judgment affirmed.