146 P. 286 | Utah | 1915
This case involves the title and right of possession to lots 3 and 4, block 1, town of Milford, Beaver County. Both parties claim them. Both concede that in 1897-- Thomas Bradfield owned them, as well as lots one and two in the same block. In that year a deed was made by Bradfield and his wife to the plaintiff. There is a controversy as to what was conveyed and intended to be conveyed by that deed. The deed which was recorded on its face shows a conveyance of the four lots. It is claimed by the defendant that the plaintiff purchased from the Bradfields only lots one and two, and that, when the deed was signed, it contained a description of only those lots, but that the additional description of lots three and, four was inserted in the deed by some one unauthorized, after the deed was executed and delivered and before it was recorded, or, when the deed was read to the Bradfields for their signature, the description of only lots one and two was read to them, and hence they had no knowledge that it contained a description of lots three and four, if at that time it contained such a description, and that they at no time sold lots three and four to the plaintiff, did not receive anything from him for them, and did not in fact convey, nor had they intended to convey, them to him. This was denied by the plaintiff, who contended that he in 1897 had purchased the four lots as described in the deed, and that all of them were conveyed to him. Further defenses of estoppel and adverse possession were pleaded; also a counterclaim to quiet title in the defendant.
The ease was tried to the court, who> made, among others, findings to this effect: That the plaintiff acquired a deed of conveyance of the four lots from the Bradfields, but the intention of the grantors, when they executed the deed, was to convey only lots one and two. The deed, however, without their knowledge, included a description of lots three and four, and they thus executed the deed, believing that it was only a conveyance of lots one and twoq that the plaintiff at no' time had possession of lots three and four, nor any part thereof, and that the defendant and his predecessors were in the possession of the whole thereof, and made valuable improvements .thereon, consisting of a substantial fence, a dwelling house,
Upon that the court stated conclusions that the defendant was the owner of lots three and four, was entitled to the possession of them; that the plaintiff was estopped from setting up or claiming any right, title, or interest in or to them; and that the defendant, under his counterclaim, was entitled to a judgment quieting the title in him. Such a judgment was entered, from which the plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal. The findings are assailed. We think they are supported by the evidence.
The Bradfields testified that they, in 1897, sold the plaintiff only lots one and two; that when the deed was rdad to them the description of only lots one and two was read; that they had no knowledge that the deed contained a description also of lots three and four; that the plaintiff purchased only lots one and two, and not three and four; and that only the former and not the latter, were conveyed. In 1898 the Brad-
“I explained that I only wanted this cleared up — the record title — to make it so I 'could handle them. I asked him if he would sign a quit-claim deed to them, and he said he would. That was before I bought the lots.”
The defendant thereupon purchased the lots from Plummer, paying $400 for them, and received a deed of conveyance from the Plummers, and went into possession of the lots. Thereafter he presented a quit-claim deed to> the plaintiff, who
It was further shown by the testimony of the defendant, and his witnesses, his predecessors, that they had been in the exclusive possession of lots three and four, and with the personal knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiff, who resided on the adjoining lots, made permanent improvements thereon to the value of $1,500 or more, and that during all of that time the plaintiff made no claim whatever as to any right, title, or interest in or to those lots, or to any part thereof. For the years 1901 and 1909, inclusive, except 1903 and 1904, lots three and four were assessed to the defendant and his predecessors, and all the taxes for those years were paid by them. Kirk testified that he, upon a claim made by the plaintiff that he had paid the taxes- for the year 1903, repaid him those taxes. The taxes for the year 1904 were paid by one J. S. Barrett. What he had to do with them, or on whose behalf he paid them, is not made to appear. There were no assessments for taxes on the lots prior to 1901.
Thus it is seen there is ample evidence to support the findings and judgment of the court below. About all there is against that evidence is the testimony of the plaintiff himself. He testified that he purchased not only lots one and two, but three and four as well, but that he did not see his deed until 1908, and until then, as he testified, did not know just what lots were described in it. He denied making the disclaimers testified to, denied the conversations with the parties, except ■with Bradfield and the defendant. He testified that Bradfield, after the deed to the plaintiff, stated to- him:
*387 “There was something about the lots he- did not understand; said somebody said I was claiming lots three and four; and I said I would investigate it as soon as I could. I said, ‘If I don’t own the lots I will deed them back to you;’ but I says, ‘I don’t remember anything about the deal just now.’ He went away satisfied, because I said if the lots were not mine I would not want them, and, as soon as I could, I would investigate it.”
“Hedges wanted me to sign a quit-claim deed, and I told Hedges from what I had learned about the deeds my expenses would be about seventy-five dollars, and that if he paid me half of seventy-five dollars I would give him a deed to the'lots. I did not sign it because Hedges would not pay me anything.”
The plaintiff did not dispute the possession of the defendant and of his predecessors, but in a way claimed that he, part of the time, was in possession of a part of lot three. He did not dispute that the defendant and his predecessors had paid the taxes on lots three and four, made no claim that he had paid them, or that he had asserted any claim to lots three and four upon seeing the improvements placed upon them.
The appellant contends that neither the findings nor the evidence bring the case within the principles of an estoppel, and as stated in 16 Cye., 722. The reason given for this is that' the defendant, when he purchased, had both actual and constructive notice that on the record the plaintiff had acquired title to lots three and four by the conveyance from the Brad-fields to the plaintiff; and that the defendant purchased upon the reliance that the plaintiff would give him a quit-claim deed That but looks to a part and not to the whole of what was proved and found, and ignores the further proof of plaintiff’s disclaimers, his admissions that there was a mistake in his deed, that he only purchased -lots one and two, claimed
"We think the case was correctly decided, and therefore the judgment is affirmed, with costs.