520 P.2d 791 | Alaska | 1974
OPINION
Following a trial in District Court before Judge John Mason, Douglas D. McKenzie, the appellant, was found guilty of negligent driving.
The court was informed prior to the imposition of sentence that since 1951 appellant had been convicted 11 times of various violations of the traffic statutes or regulations. Of the eleven convictions, six were equipment violations and the remaining five were moving offenses. The moving offenses included a conviction for driving too fast under existing conditions, a conviction for failure to maintain a safe distance, a conviction for failure to heed a stop sign, and on two occasions convictions involving excessive speed.
During the sentencing proceedings, the district attorney asked the court to impose a $100 fine and either to restrict McKenzie’s driving privilege for 90 days or to suspend it entirely for 30 days. Appellant’s counsel objected to any restriction or loss of McKenzie’s driving privilege and suggested to the court that a fine of $75 would be appropriate.
We discussed in Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1971) the criteria leading to resolution of retroactivity issues. The criteria include :
. (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards; (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.2
Although in the present case substantial impact upon the administration of justice might result if we were to apply Alexander retroactively to prior traffic offenses,
Affirmed.
. AS 28.35.040(b).
. Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d at 952, quoting, Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273, 278 (Alaska 1971) (footnote omitted).
. In a similar case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Marston v. Oliver, 485 F.2d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1973) refused to apply Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) retroactively to collateral consequences of a civil character, such as the loss of a driver’s license, as a result of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction:
But if Argersinger applied retroactively, is to open up traffic convictions terminated by service of sentence — which is the situation here — to attack for the sole, collateral purpose of providing a basis for invalidating a revocation or suspension of a driver’s license, then the entire administrative procedure . . . will be caught up in an impossible net of repetitive prosecutions, imposing an intolerable burden on traffic courts, if offending drivers are not to be turned loose upon the highways.
. Burford v. State, 515 P.2d 382 (Alaska 1973).