208 Mo. 46 | Mo. | 1907
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Jackson county for an accounting and to enforce the decree of this court rendered on the 12th of July, 1899, wherein the plaintiffs herein were plaintiffs in error and the defendants herein were appellants in a cross appeal.
The petition sets forth at length the bringing of the bill in equity by the plaintiffs, as the children and heirs at law of Jedediah E. McKenzie, to recover certain lands and set aside a deed of trust thereon and for an accounting on the ground that a certain deed of conveyance, to-wit, a deed of trust made by the said Jedediah McKenzie on March 15, 1875, to Charles H. Vincent, trustee for Patterson Stewart for $3,000, was invalid, because of the insanity of the said Jedediah McKenzie at the date of its execution, and that a certain trustee’s deed, made by the sheriff of Jackson county, under and by virtue of the power of sale contained in
To this petition the Citizens’ National Bank filed its .answer and admitted that the plaintiffs had commenced and prosecuted their suit against the said Donnells and that the decree as set forth in the petition was duly rendered and was affirmed in the Supreme Court. It admits that Kansas City by eminent domain took that portion of the real estate in controversy in said action,' leaving the balance thereof as set forth in plaintiffs’ petition, and that in said proceedings there was awarded to the plaintiffs the sum of $16,-150, and the said lands were charged with a benefit of $2,000. Said defendant bank further admitted that it was paid the amount due it as provided by the. said decree, and that it retained the $341.29', according to the said stipulation referred to in the petition, and admitted that it had not brought suit to determine the ownership of the said $341.29, because of litigation between the said bank and the said Donnells, which was then pending, and alleged that it had made divers attempts to reach an adjustment with the said Donnells, and alleged that it should not be charged with any interest on the said sum as it had been ready at all times and is now willing to pay said sum in accordance with the decree of this or any other court which might lawfully adjudge the ownership thereof, and asks to be protected by the decree of the court.
The defendants Donnell demurred to said petition,
‘ The plaintiffs filed a reply wherein they denied all the new matter alleged in the answer and again show to the court that by reason of the condemnation proceedings an agreement was entered into between the plaintiffs and the bank that the said bank should and would take out of the moneys awarded to plaintiffs in said condemnation proceedings, the amount due it by said decree, and would refrain from issuing an execution as allowed by the decree, and allege that under the terms of the decree the plaintiffs were required to deal entirely with the bank in the matter of paying off the
. The cause was heard at the October term, 1904, of the circuit court of Jackson county and a decree rendered that plaintiffs have and recover of and from the defendants Catherine E. and M. S. C. Donnell $482.-85 on account of rent collected and appropriated by said defendants of and from the house and premises described in plaintiffs’ petition, and interest thereon, the said sum being the balance due the plaintiffs after giving the defendants credit for all taxes paid by them on the land described in the petition and all repairs on said house and all other credits to which defendants are entitled, said rents having accrued after the decree which had been rendered by the circuit court and affirmed by the Supreme Court up to the first day of July, 1903. And also that plaintiffs have and recover of the said defendants $262.76, on account of moneys collected by the defendants and appropriated by them for rock quarried by the defendants out of plaintiff’s land described in the petition, together with the interest thereon from the first day of May, 1897, making a total of $382.-97, and it was also ordered and decreed that plaintiffs have and recover the $341.29 referred to in the petition as being in the custody of the Citizens’ National Bank under the stipulation set forth in the petition, and it is further ordered and decreéd that under the decree of the circuit court affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri the said Catherine E. and M. S. C. Donnell
I. As to the objection that the judgment is erroneous because there is no finding of facts, we think it is without merit. Special finding of facts are not necessary unless requested and there were no requests in this case. When reference is had to the pleadings in the
II. As to the insistence that there is another suit pending for a part of the same subject-matter, which suit had been commenced prior to this, we take it that this assignment of error must refer to the ejectment suit against Ising, the tenant of the Donnells. It is plain, we think, that the ejectment suit against Ising constituted no bar whatever for the bill in this case which calls for an accounting for the rents in accordance with the decree of the circuit court, which was affirmed by this court in 151 Mo. 431 to 472. It was specifically alleged in the petition that plaintiffs did not sue for the rents in the Ising case because those rents had been adjudged to the plaintiffs as against these defendants, and defendants required to enter into an accounting with the plaintiffs therefor, and for the further reason that the said Ising was absolutely insolvent and hence the action of ejectment afforded plaintiffs no> adequate remedy at law for those rents. In no sense could the judgment in the ejectment suit be regarded under all the facts pleaded in the petition as a bar to the plaintiffs’ right to an accounting for the rents by the defendants in accordance with the decree of the circuit court and this court. In order that any matter can be said to have passed in rem judicatam it must have been tried and adjudicated by the court; it is clear that no such issue was tendered to the circuit court in the ejectment case and consequently could not have been adjudicated by that court in that case. Moreover, defendants are in error as to the allegation of the petition. The petition does not allege that there is an appeal pending from the judgment in the ejectment case; it simply alleges that the defendants threatened an appeal, which is a very different proposition. The ejectment suit and the judgment therein present no bar to this suit, and besides in no event could plaintiffs
Under this head, we take it there is no contention that so much of this suit as seeks an accounting of and from defendants Donnell for the rents receivedhy them pending their appeal to this court from the judgment of the circuit court of July 15,1895, which was affirmed by this court July 12,1899, and for the rock taken from the quarry on said land after said appeal was taken and before it was affirmed,-was and is res judicata, inasmuch as in the very nature of things said rents had not then accrued and said rock quarried, and therefore could not have been the subject of an accounting, or ascertained so that a judgment could have been rendered therefor. Only the rents accrued and the value of the rock quarried up> to the 'date of that judgment ceuld be and were included in that judgment, and had defendants not appealed and superseded that decree, so much of the present suit as seeks an accounting for the rents subsequent to that decree and the rock quarried since then would have no foundation. In Garland v. Smith, 164 Mo. l. c. 22, it was ruled by this court in Banc that, “Where the subsequent action is upon a different claim, the former judgment only bars those things which were in issue or included in the issue in the former action or suit, nor will the judgment bar another cause which might have been joined with the former cause of action but was not, and if different proofs are required to sustain two actions, the judgment in one is no bar to the other. ’ ’ [Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351.]
But the defendants insist plaintiffs have split up their action and upon the familiar doctrine that this will not be tolerated they say plaintiffs upon their own petition have no standing in court. As we have already said, plaintiffs included in their first action all
As was said by this court in Baumhoff v. Railroad, 205 Mo. l. c. 262, “the present proceeding is in the nature of an equitable execution issued on the judgment, already determining plaintiff’s right.” Plaintiffs had obtained a decree quieting their title to the lands in suit and the circuit court had stated and settled an account up to the date of the decree, including rents and rock quarried to that date, but' defendants appealed and gave bond and remained in possession. Obviously plaintiffs recovered nothing for these subsequent rents and' for the rock afterwards quarried. When plaintiffs asked for an accounting as to these and for possession of their lands they were met by defendants Donnells ’ refusal to account, and claim that plaintiffs had forfeited all the benefits of their decree by their failure to pay the balance which the court had decreed as a lien on the land to the bank in the time fixed by this court. The contention of defendants that plaintiffs show no equity in their bill because they did not pay the bank the amount fixed in the decree can avail them nothing, because the revesting of the title to their lands in plaintiffs was absolute and not conditional upon their raising the balance. The bank was simply given the right to issue an execution if not paid in the time specified, and defendants had nothing to do with that pay
The decree finds ample basis in the pleadings and the bill brings the case within the jurisdiction of a court of chancery. The decree of the circuit court is in all things affirmed.