*1
purposes, usage and whether the had a sufficient causal relation- Ass’n v Auto Club Ins support ship an award of benefits. The pur- camper/trailer its was used for one of intended this case and, sheltering sleeping campers, thus, poses, as a motor used injured by plaintiff outside force or was not some vehicle. The *2 Rather, injury the malfunction of the vehi- was caused actor. injury, merely not the locale of the but itself. The vehicle was cle tenuous, part integral it. The connection not was an causal hence, integral nature; obtain. should but one of an 659; (1995) App NW2d reversed. Mich for E. Goren, (by Goren), & P.C. Steven Goren plaintiff. Taylor Lanctot, McCutcheon, Schoolmaster,
Becker, & Gross, A. J. Nemeth (by Galsterer); & Horn Gross), James G. Silverman, P.L.C., (by of counsel for the defendant. whether presents the issue J. This case
Taylor, injury protection (PIP) personal is entitled to plaintiff act, seq.-, MCL 500.3101 et under the no-fault benefits sustained when he seq., et MSA 24.13101 in a sleeping while nonfatally asphyxiated We con- pickup attached to his truck. camper/trailer injury not the no- covered plaintiffs clude the use of a it did arise out of fault act because required by “as a motor vehicle” motor vehicle iryury Whether an 24.13105(1). MSA 500.3105(1); MCL a motor of a motor vehicle “as out of the use arises closely related turns on whether the vehicle” We function automobiles. to the of the Court judgment reverse the accordingly summary entry disposition remand for Appeals and of defendant. favor Mich I undisputed.1 The basic facts are a hunting While on trip, plaintiff and Hughie slept in a camper/trailer plaintiffs attached to the back of pickup camper/trailer truck. The was equipped with a propane-fueled, forced-air Ostensibly, heater. because poor of either ventilation improper or exhaust in the unit itself, carbon monoxide fumes from the heater leaked into camper/trailer and overcame the two men. Fortunately, they day were found the following hospitalized. recovered after being present
Plaintiff filed the
suit for PIP benefits under
his no-fault
insurance
contract with defendant.
summary
Defendant moved for
disposition, contend
ing that
there was no coverage
because
camper/trailer was not
“as
being used
a motor vehi
cle” at the
time the
required by
occurred as
*3
§ 3105. The trial
granted summary
court
disposition
for plaintiff, finding Koole v Michigan
Co,
Mut Ins
App
126 Mich
483;
n
This case turns on
plaintiffs
whether
injury,
incurred
sleeping
parked
while
in a
camper/trailer,
arose
of
out
the use of a motor vehicle
“as motor
dispute
facts,
there is no
“[W]here
about
the
the issue
whether
injury
legal
arose out of the use
a of
vehicle is a
issue for a
to
court
jury.”
not
v
decide and
a factual
for a
Putkamer
Ins
one
Transamerica
Corp America,
626, 630;
(1997).
It is well
statutory construction:
oms of
statutory
are
established.
construction
well
The rules of
Legislature’s
foremost,
give
to the
we must
effect
First and
unambigu-
language of
is clear and
a statute
intent. If the
legislative
ous,
plain meaning of
statute reflects the
the
permitted. Further,
judicial
construction
intent and
ordinary
generally
statutory
give
language its
and
arewe
Facility,
meaning.
Michigan
accepted
[Tryc v
Veterans’
(1996)
(citations
129, 135-136;
The “use its in the origins had coverage4 on no-fault limitation Act. Reparations Motor Vehicle Accident Uniform three-step Putkamer, 635-636, supra at Court set forth n parked analysis injuries relating regarding motor vehicle: (1) fits his conduct one must demonstrate [A claimant] exceptions (2) 3106(1); out arose three of subsection parked ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of vehicle; (3) had a and causal motor vehicle as motor parked relationship than vehicle that more inciden- tal, fortuitous, or but for. occupied parked However, here, defendant concedes that the exceptions injury, i.e., of the three of subsec- time of the that one test, consisting 3106(1) Accordingly, two-part factors met. tion Putkamer, applies (2) (3) here. *4 provides: personal protec 24.13105(1) 500.3105(1); “Under MCL MSA bodily pay for accidental an insurer is liable to benefits tion insurance injury ownership, operation, a or use of arising maintenance out of the subject provisions vehicle, to the of vehicle as motor chapter.” 458 Mich Opinion Court Co, Thornton v Allstate Ins 643, 657; 425 Mich Thornton, NW2d As noted in (1986). commentary to the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident [T]he Reparations 55-56, 1, explains Act 14 ULA § (umvara), injuries by 1(a)(2), (6) covered the act are limited § arising out those or maintenance use of motor vehi- cle as a motor vehicle:
“[Tjhe requirement that use of the motor vehicle be ‘as a qualifies motor vehicle’ term so that both the tort exemption availability reparation and the of basic benefits nearly are more limited to activities whose costs should be motoring part allocated to of an automobile insurance package. example, application For it has no to an person slips which occurs when and falls inside a travel parked camp trailer has which been at a site.” commentary While acknowledges remaining ambi guity of possibility the definition and the resultant some accidents far general activity “too removed from the motoring” might being covered, be construed as the com specific missioners left more definition in borderline cases to the 657-658.]t5) courts. at [Id. As a English matter of syntax, phrase “use of a ”
motor vehicle ‘as a motor vehicle’
appear
would
invite contrasts with situations in which a motor vehi-
cle is not used “as a motor vehicle.” This is simply to
say that
the modifier
“as motor vehicle” assumes
possible
existence
other
requires
uses and
dis-
tinguishing use
“as motor vehicle”
any
other
uses.
easily
While it is
understood
all
exper-
from our
asphyxiation
parked
We note that
at
in a
issue —
camper/trailer
remarkably
example
slip
similar to the
a and fall in a
—is
parked
qualify
travel trailer that the umvara commentators
stated
did
coverage. Similarly,
commentary
the umvara
indicates that the
Koole, supra (explosion
Engwis
parked
camper),
issue in
in a
Michigan
Co,
Mut
App 16;
Ins
(asphyxia
(1989)
Lending support logical of the statu- to this tory language states in the Motor Vehicle Code “ upon, every pertinent part, in, ‘Vehicle’means device may any person property or is or be which or upon highway transported . . .” . MCL or drawn Similarly, dictionary defini- the 257.79; MSA 9.1879. “any or for car- tion “vehicle”is device contrivance of esp. objects, conveying persons rying land or over or Dictionary space .” . . . Webster’sNew World or in College Ed). (3d indicates, moving course, not be § 3106 vehicle need Of ii\juiy use of motor vehicle for the arise out time of See, transportational e.g., vehicle, i.e., of its function. as a motor out
Putkamer,
supra
(the plaintiffs injury,
when she
incurred
n 1
at 636-637
traveling
slipped
entering
intention of
ice while
her vehicle
on
home,
of a motor
to have arisen out of
her brother’s
held
vehicle).
as a
motor
Accordingly, convinced that the clear mean- ing part no-fault act is that Legisla- ture intended resulting closely use of vehicles when related to their transportational only function and when engaged that function.7
Moreover, requiring that an closely be associ- ated with function of a vehicle *6 before coverage triggered is has support much of our prior case law. We acknowledge expressed of rationale these cases was not articulated in terms of transportational function, and, indeed, some cannot be reconciled with approach, this but many are consistent transportational focus on function to determine whether the at issue in those cases arose out of the of use a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle.”
In Turner v Ass’n, Auto Club Ins 22; 448 Mich 681 (1995), NW2d a truck involved in a multiple vehi- cle accident a building smashed into and started a fire when the truck’s gas exploded. tank This Court held that the damage to the building arose out of the use judicial always gratifying The dissent accuses of us It activism. to judiciary judicial hear members of the concern themselves with restraint proper fully Legislature. and agree princi to deference We with these ples. misplaced But dissent’s concern is here. We have acted in accord statutory with guage focusing venerable norms of construction on the lan syntax painstakingly endeavoring then statute and to be pain having faithful it on previous opin to even of to overrule our some of repudiation easily any judicial ions. This of earlier efforts never comes to body and legislative that is the here. case We have then not taken on a Rather, paradoxically attempts role. it is the dissent that to rewrite the by effectively omitting portions position statute of it. It is the dissent’s injury arising any that an triggers out of intended of a use motor vehicle coverage. meaning phrase This would accord no to the “as a motor vehi do, give cle.” This a meaning court cannot we must read to statute every portion. separates That is what we have done and what fromus dissent. Ins Ass’n Auto Club
Opinion of Court This hold- vehicle.” Id. 32. “as a motor the truck of that no-fault it indicated surprising in that ing directly resulting damage covers generally insurance moving motor vehicles. involving an accident approach that with the course, is consistent This, moving because function transportational on focuses in a trans- obviously quite engaged vehicles are function. portational America, Corp Ins v Transamerica
In Putkamer (1997), 563 NW2d 626, 636-637; entering while injuries incurred held that Court travel arose out intent vehicle with the Because enter- as a motor vehicle. of motor closely related travel in it in order to a vehicle ing Putkamer also com- function, approach. with this ports Michigan, 433 v Automobile Club
In Winter no- denied this Court 446; (1989), 446 NW2d Mich held when it fault insurance fell from crane a cement slab when resulting arise out of parked truck did not tow attached *7 The “as a motor vehicle.” use a vehicle of motor on the fact holding turned Winter Court’s exceptions set none of the parked was and truck was unneces- applied. Accordingly, it in § forth injury arose sary explicitly consider whether vehicle,” “as motor use of a motor vehicle out However, holding this other use. opposed to some as posited approach with the consistent is nonetheless the use of injury arose out of here because equip- construction a foundation for vehicle as trans- with the closely associated and ment function. portational 458 Mich supra
In Thornton,
660-661,
at
and
Bourne Farm-
Exchange,
193, 203;
ers Ins
Additionally, analysis supports in Thornton approach. In Thornton, the Court held that by taxi sustained driver in the course of an armed robbery did not arise out of the use a motor vehi- clearly only cle as a motor It vehicle. concluded that injuries arising out of the “functional use of a motor triggered vehicle as a motor vehicle” no-fault cover- age. merely Id. at It 661. found that the taxi was robbery. situs of the Id. at It 660. held that, while rob- “ bery-related injuries arguably ‘foreseeably were occupational identifiable’ with the or commercial a of motor vehicle a taxicab, the relation of the gunshot wound the functional use of a motor vehi- merely cle as a motor vehicle was at most, for,’ ‘but incidental, and fortuitous.” Id. 661. It focused on alleged injury causally whether the related to the “vehicular use,” “functional or character,” “functional 8 Thornton Bourne focused on causation. We note analyti it is cally helpful separately question to consider “causation” from the whether a motor vehicle is used as motor vehicle as Putkamer did. How ever, what constitutes use of a motor vehicle “as motor vehicle” also figures analysis, i.e., injury’s in a causation whether an relation the use “ aas motor vehicle more for,’ incidental, of motor vehicle than ‘but Thornton, supra Thus, and fortuitous.” Thornton and Bourne bear at 661. on what constitutes use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. *8 v Ins Ass’n Auto Club These terms Id. at 660-661. motor vehicle. use” of a distinguish vehicle” “as motor use intended to were approach possible of a vehicle. Our uses other from transportational focusing function, makes here, on specific provides def- a more the same distinction for these terms. inition by supra, and dissent, Koole,
Two cases cited App Michigan Engwis 16;448 181Mich Co, Mut Ins approach (1989), an are with inconsistent NW2d transportational both function. In focuses on that vehicles while the incurred in vehicles cases, sleeping were accommodations used as were act. of a motor the no-fault Use to be covered held sleeping from is distinct accommodation vehicle as closely func to the and not related erroneously failed to of a vehicle. These cases tion sleeping distinguish accommodation use as required § 3105.We are “as a motor vehicle” as they wrongly accordingly were convinced that decided. heavily v Cross on Bialochowski
The dissent relies
Pumping
219;
Co, 428 Mich
of the intended uses of this motor vehicle motor vehicle pump act) under the no-fault is to cement. The accident being occurred while this vehicle was used for its intended purpose. phrase We hold that “use a of motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” includes this use. utterly holding
We find this antithetical to the lan- guage require- § § of 3105. As above, discussed 3105’s ment that arise out of the use of motor clearly distinguishes vehicle “as motor vehicle” use possible “as motor vehicle” from other uses. by holding Bialochowski eviscerates this distinction pump that the use of the vehicle at issue to cement Obviously, constitutes use “as a motor vehicle.” motor designed purposes vehicles are for used various only as the Bialochowski fact, Court noted. In in the possible context of various uses would a limitation to necessary. Leg- “as use a motor vehicle” be Where the explicitly coverage § islature limited under 3105 to injuries arising particular out use of motor vehi- finding cles—use “as a motor vehicle”—a decision coverage injuries arising any e.g., out use, other pump contrary language is cement, to of the Accordingly, statute. we are convinced that wrongly Bialochowski was decided.
Entirely apart from this direct criticism of adequate Bialochowski, do we not think it constitutes support proposed any for the dissent’s rule that multipurpose intended use of a vehicle constitutes “as a use motor vehicle.” subsequent
First, this Court’s decision in Winter, supra explicitly 455, at limited Bialochowski:
Insofar it as related to “as language, a motor vehicle” Bialochowski decided a narrow issue: whether a dual- purpose necessarily vehicle is not aas motor vehicle Club Auto Ins Ass’n
Opinion the Court purpose. when it used for nonlocomotive necessarily pre- held Bialochowski is not solely because cluded there no “vehicular movement” injury. the time This all means that Winter Court read only Bialochowski establish that vehicular move- necessary ment of a to constitute use Here, vehicle “as motor vehicle.” the dissent’s read- ing any meaning Bialochowski intended use multipurpose of a use “as a motor vehicle” effectively overrules the Winter Court’s limitation of Bialochowski. *10 reading
Second, the dissent’s broad of Bialochow- damage, unacknowledged, ski does similar albeit Thornton, where, as above, noted this Court held that only injuries arising out of the use “functional of a triggered recovery. motor as a vehicle motor vehicle” by proposed Id. at 661. The rule the dissent here any turns on whether the arise out of of the apparent, of a intended uses motor vehicle. As is this rule is inconsistent with Thornton. resuscitating have,
What the then, we is dissent reading doffing broad of Bialochowski without even cap controlling its the later and thus limitation by thereof Moreover, Winter. the dissent fails to explicitly give meaning language consider and to the apply of the appropriately or to statute cases Thornton like that analysis. pecu- made such an is a This judicial liar, and unfortunate, exercise of our tasks. summary, language we think that the of the stat- ought ute to control and that Bialochowski is inade- quate support for the rule advocated the dissent.
Accordingly, injury we hold that whether an arises out of the use of a motor “as a motor vehicle” closely injury § on whether the is under 3105 turns transportational function motor related the vehicles. requi- apply here, that test it is clear the
If we this transportational injury and the site nexus between the lacking. At time motor vehicle is the function the parked camper/trailer occurred, sleeping used accommodations. This use as function to too far removed from camper/trailer “as a motor vehi- constitute use of the injury. Thus, we at the time of the conclude cle” coverage triggered in the no-fault act this no under instance.
m briefly requires this us Our conclusion on issue by plaintiff. issue Plaintiff address second raised argues that, if this did not arise even out required vehicle, as a use of motor vehicle policy issue act, the no-fault of insurance at requirement. argu- Plaintiffs does contain is, in under insur- effect, ment policy required by no- ance is broader than that policy disagree. act. fault We While the exclusion parked regarding does “as a cars not contain requirement, preceding paragraphs motor vehicle” *11 page, policy plainly coverage on the same the limits generally: agree pay only as set in the Code
We to forth [defined Michigan following the Benefits to or for the no-fault law] bodily person an insured who suffers aris- accidental ing ownership, operation, out of maintenance or use of [Emphasis a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. added.] v Auto Club Ins Ass’n Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, J. insuring agreement Thus, limited even applicable. before the exclusion became See Heniser Co, v Frankenmuth Mut 155, 172; Ins (1995). NW2d
conclusion judgment reasons, For these we reverse the Appeals entry Court of and remand for of an order granting summary disposition. defendant’s motion for JJ., Beickley, Boyle, and Weaver, concurred J. Taylor, (dissenting). J. This us case calls on Cavanagh, plaintiff personal determine whether the is entitled to protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act1 injuries resulting asphyxiation from a nonfatal sleeping camper/ that occurred while he in a pickup trailer attached his truck. I Because find past that, under the tests enunciated in decisions, our plaintiff requirements meets the of the act and is enti- majority’s holding. tled to I benefits, dissent appears majority’s today It adds a effort transportational use limitation to the statute where Legislature has inserted no such term. Accord- ingly, judgment I would affirm the of the Court of Appeals, plaintiff summary finding entitled dis- position in his favor on his claim for no-fault benefits.
i dispute “[W]here there is facts, no about the issue whether an arose out of use of vehi- legal cle ais issue for a a fac- court decide MCL 500.3101 et seq.; et MSA 24.13101 seq. *12 228 458 Mich Dissenting Cavanagh, Opinion J. jury.” Ins v Transamerica a Putkamer
tual one Corp 626, 630; NW2d 683 America, of dispute, (1997). and, are not in on the facts Here solely pur- appeal, on the claims error defendant ported vehi- “as a motor of of the vehicle lack only presented with the need therefore, are, cle.”2We here was the motor vehicle whether determine required by vehicle,” subsection a motor as used “as precursor coverage. 3105(1) question, inor the not a new either here This is Appeals. past Indeed, of the decisions of our Court predicated ruling its on a belief that Koole trial court App Michigan Co, 483; Mut 126Mich 337 NW2d v Ins controlling. (1983), case, however, was This does ques- has addressed the mark the first time this Court camper/trailer. that context of a Given the tion in the camper/trailer meets the defendant concedes that the statutory we vehicle, definition of motor should provide past a framework to turn to our decisions to analyze question whether motor vehicle was being at “as a motor vehicle” the time used injury. analysis past
An of our decisions reveals there steps required to determine if a are two distinct injury, at time of used as motor vehicle initially step first arises vehicle. The Pumping Co, Bialochowski Cross Concrete (1987). 219; Mich 407 NW2d355 camper/trailer was a motor vehicle as Defendant concedes that 24.13101(2)(e). 500.3101(2)(e); will be in MCL MSA As discussed defined below, requirement defendant also concedes MCL further applicability 500.3106; 24.13106, limitations on the MSA which concerns occupied met, parked vehicles, because 24.13106(l)(c). injury, satisfying 500.3106(l)(c); MCL MSA the time of McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, J. we Bialochowski, addressed situation where parked
pump exploded, attached to a concrete truck plaintiff. on the injuring Focusing remedial nature act, balancing no-fault and the undertaken *13 Legislature enacting statute, the in the we found that it was clear that use “as a motor “is vehicle” not lim- ited to highway.”3 normal vehicular movement on a we case, also determined that when a multipur- pose vehicle was used for one of its intended pur- poses it was used “as a motor vehicle.”4 This estab- lishes of parameters step my the first in analysis.5 3 then, previously Id. at As we 228. noted has Court addressed the purposes of the no-fault act: Michigan Act, The No-Fault Insurance which became law on 1973, 1, legal October was offered as an innovative and social response long payment delays, inequitable payment struc- ture, high legal (or “fault”) liability and costs inherent in tort system. goal system provide The of the no-fault insurance was to assured, adequate, prompt
victims of motor vehicle accidents reparation Attorney for certain economic losses. v [Shavers Gen- eral, 554, 578-579; (1978).] 402 Mich 267 72 NW2d exchange system assuring “prompt” We also that in repara- noted for this tion, injured party’s right negligent opera- to recover from a owner or 500.3135; tor of a vehicle faced new limits. MCL See MSA 24.13135. Bialochowski at 228. at Bialochowski 228. Michigan, 446; In Winter v Club Automobile 433 Mich 446 NW2d of (1989), that, dealing parked vehicles, this Court held when with in making being addition to a a determination that vehicle is used “as a vehicle,” motor the Court must determine whether a criterion sub under 3106(1) differently, section is met. Put that a determination motor vehi vehicle, is cle used as a motor and hence is “otherwise 3105(1) qualified by provisions 3106(1).” § § available under is Id. 457. 3106(1) bodily Subsection states accidental does not arise parked out the use of motor vehicle as motor vehicle unless one of specific statutory 3105(1) several criteria met. Subsection where general requirement of use of motor vehicle “as a vehicle” arises. Winter, requirements we Under must determine whether of both sec- Here, however, tions are tomet reach a final conclusion. because the presence statutory (occupied defendant has conceded to the aof criterion Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, J. respect yet spoken has not While this Court point exactly case, such with this on a situation hardly Michigan. Our Court of new in are occurrences Appeals in three decisions. this area has addressed App Michigan Engwis Co, 181 Mich Mut Ins One, (1989), an identical situa- involved 16; 448 NW2d fatal) leaking asphyxiation (this time tion, an summary Appeals propane Court of found tank. The inappro- disposition insurer to be for the no-fault priate. camper/ malfunctioning cases,
In the other two stove) appliances (a in heater and a resulted trailer previously supra, explosions. Koole, was discussed vapors ignition gas margin and involved the parties brought also have our from heater. The unpub Ass’n, attention v Auto Club Ins Krolikowski Appeals, issued lished decision of the Court 136457), *14 (Docket 133558, Nos. which 8, March malfunctioning cases, stove. both concerned applied, Appeals coverage Court of held that no-fault appeal. cases leave to both this Court denied appellate published years, For at least fifteen clearly pointed this have toward the decisions of state I reach in this case. Besides com- resolution would my analysis, points porting toward this trend benefits have another consideration. Because no-fault clearly involving camper/trailers, applied to situations that, I am confident us, such as the one before my analysis vehicle) 3106(1), I limit subsection would subsection under analysis 3105, and, concession, engage given in an have need to no under Winter. unpublished case, precedential Krolikowski, I not for its mention value, first this the instant case is not the time but rather note that has of situation. Court been asked review sort v Auto Club Ins Ass’n Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, J. Koole, least since insurers have been on notice that they were liable for in these instances. Accordingly, capable insurers have been at least determining insuring their rates for such vehicles in liability. light of such To the extent that insurers may charged have, could have, and in fact for insur- ing policy support risk, such considerations do not acceptance argu- the windfall that of the defendant’s ments would entail. requirements
In view of the clear of Bialochowski, light policy and in considerations discussed above, our task should not be I difficult. would find camper/trailer to have been used one of its purposes, sheltering sleeping campers. intended Hence, Bialochowski, under I would find that the camper/trailer was used “as a motor vehicle.”
n My analysis, yet complete. past however, is not Our decisions that, indicate in addition ato determination 3105(1) usage under subsection aof motor I vehicle,” “as motor must also determine whether there was usage sufficient causal connection between this plaintiff’s injury. as a motor vehicle and the Co, Thornton Allstate Ins Mich 643; 391 NW2d (1986). having While Thornton is often cited as discussed the use of a motor vehicle,” vehicle “as a motor as it parties analysis here, has been a close of our clearly decision reveals that we decided that case on previously basis causation. As we have noted, *15 question “[i]n Thornton there was no but that the taxi a used ‘as motor However, vehicle.’ Court found a lack of causal connection between that 458 Mich Opinion
Dissenting Cavanagh, J. involving injury.”7 plaintiff’s than Rather use and the my step question, 3105(1) this second subsection inquiry Where causation lack- causation. concerns despite usage ing, found, will be important The vehicle.”8 motor vehicle “as motor emphasized given the must be here, which distinction arguments some of evidenced confusion presented, Thornton one our decision in that presence concerning or use causation, not one “as a motor vehicle.” of a motor vehicle availability of no-fault ben- concerned the Thornton during an armed driver was shot efits when robbery taxi We benefits to be unavaila- of his cab. found relationship owing driver’s to a ble, strained As as a motor vehicle. we use of the motor vehicle gunshot wound to the func- noted, “the relation of the vehicle was of a motor vehicle a motor tional use merely for,’ incidental, fortuitous.”9 at most ‘but robber’s bullet was Thornton, we found that the use of a motor vehicle to far removed from the too recovery Indeed, the fact no-fault benefits. allow operating vehicle at that time Mr. Thornton was injury. agreed While we to do with his had little might or connection be an incidental fortuitous there might (i.e., operating somewhat a taxicab make one likely robbery), of an armed more to be the victim merely injury. locale of his What vehicle was injured his vehi- Mr. Thornton had no connection to gunman him, and the Rather, chose shoot cle. driving happened be his Mr. fact that Thornton supra Winter, 455, (citation omitted). n 7 n 5 at Thornton 660-661. 9 Id. at 661. *16 v Auto Club Ins Ass’n Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, J. vehicle at the time was an insufficient basis for allowing benefits.10
Conversely, plaintiff injured by here was not some Rather, outside force or actor. it was the mal- function of the vehicle itself. The vehicle was not merely injury, the locale of the but rather was an inte- gral part of Therefore, it. the causal connection was not the Thornton, “tenuous” one of but rather one of integral nature, and, hence, should obtain.
m
majority,
The
of course, seems to believe that
§
Bialochowski “eviscerates” the distinction of
regarding use
aas motor vehicle, and, furthermore,
apparently
that
Winter v Automobile Club Michi
gan,
(1989),
446;
Bialochowski be cannot read conclusion herein. view, fails, this effort for several reasons. First, regard to the idea that Winter somehow “limited” Bialochowski totally litigated therein, on issues unrelated to the issues I note quoted by language 455, majority (ante 224-225), of Winter at Mich 214 Dissenting Cavanagh, Opinion by J. 3105, of the distinction § “evisceration” As to the vehi- of use of motor course, speaks section, of this has cer- provision vehicle.” While “as a motor cle controversy, I cannot led a fair amount tainly what to undertake accept this as rationale replace motor vehicle” “as a purports to do: majority my function.” As brethren “for a frequently pointed out in other majority have in the *17 Legis- we where the contexts, agree, and as should all clear, we that is less than language has used lature call, interpret but we have no it, on may be called to merely replace Legislature’s language to the or right, past I turn to our choosing. of our own language with to inter- approach apply a consistent decisions I While tend pretation this difficult section. clarify section, needs to agree Legislature that the it statute, the change such a in awaiting rather than simply to make it.12 majority the elects appears terms, agrees, most that vehicular movement albeit in the cumbersome required usage “as a vehicle” to be found. of motor vehicle motor not itself, Certainly, quotation, a limi- no trace of like the statute contains function,” implic- “transportational and those that involve a tation to uses may requiring itly as, part, rejecting in at least same not even be read vehicular movement. Next, purported damage regarding Bialochow- to Thornton done view, majority apples oranges. ski, In to reach this mixes order (ante analysis majority transportational 222) forces a function first noticeably course, case, (and, yet it another where was absent into that point actually grounds). The case decided on causation where the was transportational in use of had little to do with functions Thornton driving vehicle, (indeed, his and it vehicles Mr. Thornton transportational arguably than vehicles in a far more function involved herein). Rather, any a rela- Thornton dealt with of the other cases cited requirement injury and func- between a claimed tional relationship significant to his lacked a tion. Because Mr. Thornton’s vehicle, operation prevail. he could today fact, majority to admit the state of the law that it is fails say today finally long- upsetting. best, might corrects a At the Court it worst, engages simply neglected in result- area law. the Court At v Auto Ass’n Club Ins Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, J.
IV past A review of our decisions indicates that an analysis 3105(1) under subsection to determine whether an insurer is liable for on the basis of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle” steps. involves two First, discrete we must determine whether the vehicle was purpose used for its intended multipurpose or, in the case aof vehicle, for purposes. one of its intended Second, we must deter- usage mine whether this had a sufficient causal rela- tionship support to the an award of benefits. For the reasons above, stated I find answers to questions both in this case to be affirmative. clearly existing This case is answered under our realign- law, I case and would decline to undertake precedent ment of our to find otherwise. I would Appeals, finding affirm the result of the Court of plaintiff summary disposition entitled on his claim for no-fault benefits. C.J., and Kelly, J.,
Mallett, concurred J. Cavanagh, *18 judicial encourages litigants steadfastly oriented activism and insist on litigation law, continually to enforce matters settled and to resist settle- pursue Court, regardless
ment claims and review before this of the fail- past attempts, hope majority simply ure in will Court my colleagues noted, judicial favor their view this time. As one has any particular result, activism can occur toward and the Court’s decision today, fear, encourages litigants I hope to seek out such activism and find prospect occurring join in the of it I their favor. decline to such action.