63 Me. 74 | Me. | 1873
On June 5, 1869, the defendant borrowed of the plaintiff twenty shares of bank stock, conveyed to him certain land as security and contracted to pay him all dividends on the stock, and return the same number of shares on demand upon receiving a reconveyance of the land.
The general rule of damages for the refusal of a vendor to deliver goods according to the terms of sale is well settled everywhere — to wit; — the market value of the goods, at the time the contract was broken, allowing the jury to add the interest for the delay. This rule has frequently been recognized by this court. Smith v. Berry, 18 Maine, 122 ; Warren v. Wheeler, 21 Maine, 484; Furlong v. Folleys, 30 Maine, 491; Berry v. Dwinel, 44 Maine, 255 ; Bush v. Holmes, 53 Maine, 417.
But to this general rule an exception has been made in the courts of some States and countries; and so far as the exception is concerned there has long been a conflict of authority. Thus in England, in cases of contracts for the transfer of stocks, and in some jurisdictions in cases of the sale of goods paid for in advance, vendees have recovered the value of the stocks or goods on the day when by the terms of the contract they ought to have been delivered, or, on the day of trial, at the option of the plaintiff. “The true measure of damages” in such cases being held to be “that which will completely indemnify the plaintiff for the breach of the engagement.” Shepherd v. Johnson, 2 East, 210 ; McArthur v. Lord Seaforth, 2 Taunt., 257; Downes v. Back, 1 Stark., N. P. C., 318 ; Harrison v. Harrison, 1 C. & P., 412; West v. Pritchard, 19 Conn., 212, and cases there cited.
In New York, this rule is carried out to its logical result; for there the measure of damages is declared to be the highest market price of the chattels up to the last trial. Lobdell v. Stowell, 51 N. Y., 70, and cases there cited.
In Yermont it is held unqualifiedly that the market value or price on the day of the breach of the contract controls the meas-
Such is also the rule in Massachusetts. Wyman v. Am. Powd. Co., 8 Cush., 168, and eases there cited.
The question underwent a very elaborate examination in New Hampshire, in Pinkerton v. Manch. & Law. Railroad, 42 N. H., 424. The court held in a case of refusal to deliver stock, that the measure of damages is the value of the stock at the time of the demand with interest, and not the value at the time of the trial, or at any intermediate period. Bellows, J., after thoroughly reviewing the authorities in the various jurisdictions, says: “The general rule is, undoubtedly, that he shall have the value of the property at the time of the breach ; and this is a plain and just rule, and easy of application, and we are unable to yield to the reasons assigned for the exception which has been sanctioned in New York and elsewhere. It is true that in some cases, the plaintiff may have been injured to the extent of the value of the property at the highest market price between the breach and the time of trial. But it is equally true that in a large number of cases, and perhaps generally, it would not be so. In that large class of eases where the articles to be delivered entered into the common consumption of the country, in the shape of provisions, perishable or otherwise, to hold that the plaintiff might elect as the rule in all cases, the highest market price between the time fixed for the delivery and the day of trial, which is often many years after the breach, would in many cases, be grossly unjust, and give to the plaintiff an amount of damages disproportioned to the injury. Eor in most of these cases, had the articles been delivered according to the contract, they would have been sold or consumed within the year and no probability of reaping any benefit from the future increase of prices. So there may be repeated .trials of the same cause, by review, new trial or otherwise. Shall there be a different measure of value at each trial ? In the case of stocks, in re
After a full examination of the subject, Mr. Sedgwick, says: “The value of the article at the time of the breach, with interest for delay .... seems to me as near an approach to the actual loss sustained as can be effected, without embarking upon a vague search after facts impossible, in most cases, to be proved with any degree of satisfaction.” Sedgwick on Meas, of Dam., 305. To the same effect is Berry v. Dwinel, 44 Maine, 268. And with these views we are satisfied. According to the agreement of the parties, the entry must be Judgment for plaintiff, for $1,131 and int. from Oct. 22, 1872.