321 F. Supp. 880 | D.D.C. | 1971
MEMORANDUM-ORDER
Joseph McKenney, plaintiff in this case, was an apprentice iron worker. At the time of the incidents which gave rise to this action, he was employed by the Major Steel Corporation. Major Steel was the structural steel subcontractor on a construction job in Lanham, Maryland; the defendant, Capitol Crane Corporation, was the subcontractor providing crane service at the site. On the day prior to the accident, employees of Major Steel had placed bar joists in position atop the building support beams; the joists were set into position but had not yet been welded into the structure. At the time of the accident plaintiff was assisting in placing skylight frames into position in the roof structure. The frames were being raised between the unattached bar joists by the crane which was being operated by an employee of Capitol Crane. During the operation a bar joist, allegedly dislodged by the crane, fell twenty-nine feet, striking plaintiff in the back and severely injuring him.
Plaintiff has received Workmen’s Compensation benefits from his employer as a result of the accident. He has initiated the present suit, however, alleging that his injuries were caused by the negligence of defendant Capitol Crane. The defendant has moved to bring in plaintiff’s employer, Major Steel, as a third-party defendant in order that any damage award may be reduced by one-half should the jury find that Major Steel negligently contributed to the injury.
Defendant’s position is based on the case of Murray v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 405 F.2d 1361 (1968). That case arose under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. A Federal employee was injured in an elevator of a building that was leased to and operated by the United States Government. The employee sued the building owner alleging that his negligence had caused the accident. The owner attempted to bring
Any inequity residing in the denial of contribution against the employer is mitigated if not eliminated by our rule in Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 300 F.2d 721 (1962). * * * jn our situation if the building owner is held liable the damages, payable should be limited to one-half of the amount of damages sustained by plaintiff, assuming the facts would have entitled the owner to contribution from the employer if the statute had not interposed a bar. A tortfeasor jointly responsible with an employer is not compelled to pay the total common law damages. 405 F.2d at 1365.
Before attempting to apply the Murray decision in the present circumstances we must determine whether the law of the District of Columbia or the law of Maryland governs the effect of Workmen’s Compensation Acts as a bar to impleading an employer in an employee’s third-party negligence action. In the case of Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 210 F.2d 868 (1954), a workman residing in the District of Columbia was employed by a District of Columbia subcontractor on a construction project being carried on by a general contractor in Maryland. The subcontractor had workmen’s compensation insurance for the employee’s benefit under both the Maryland Act and the District of Columbia Act. The general contractor also had workmen’s compensation insurance under the Maryland Act for his employees’ benefit.
In reaching this conclusion the Court considered the rationale underlying the workmen’s compensation laws. These laws give an employee an absolute right to be compensated for work-related injury without regard to the fault of the employer and the employer is guaranteed immunity from suit and subjected only to a limited and determinate liability.
The holdings of Woodner and Gasch and the reasons set out therein lead to the conclusion that Maryland law must be applied in the present case and, therefore, Murray is not controlling. The Maryland courts have not ruled on the precise question presented here; that is, whether a pro rata reduction in damages in employee third-party negligence suits can be achieved by impleading the employer and showing him to be a joint tortfeasor. Maryland has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Md.Code, Art. 50, §§ 16-30, which provides by its terms for a pro tanto reduction in damages awarded against one tortfeasor where there has been a settlement by another tortfeasor.
The Maryland courts have held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
Wherefore, it is by the Court this 22nd day of January, 1971,
Ordered that defendant’s motion to bring in third-party defendant be and it is hereby denied.
. Under Maryland law, a general contraetor may be the “statutory” employer of a subcontractor’s employee for the purpose of workmen’s compensation coverage although he is not that employee’s “contractual” employer. Md.Code, Art. 101, § 63.
. Although defendant’s motion seeks only to decrease its liability and not increase the employer’s liability, the granting of such a motion would subject the employer to the trouble and expense of defending the law suit since the reduction would be allowed only if he was found to be a joint tortfeasor. The exclusive liability of the compensation laws should be broad enough to protect an employer from these expenses also. See Smither & Co. v. Coles, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (1957); cf. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967).
. Md.Code, Art. 50, § 19:
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
See also Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 218 A.2d 184, 188 (Md.1966).
. Md.Code, Art. 101, § 15. “The liability prescribed by the last preceding paragraph shall be exclusive. * * * ”
. Note 1, supra.
. 33 U.S.C. § 905.
The liability of an employer [to pay compensation] shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee * * * and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death. * * *
. See, e. g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 84 S.Ct. 748, 11 L.Ed.2d 732 (1964); Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 83 S.Ct. 1349, 10 L.Ed.2d 448 (1963); Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d 1 (1963); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962); Waterman Steamship Co. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421, 81 S.Ct. 200, 5 L.Ed.2d 169 (1960); Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 78 S.Ct. 438, 2 L.Ed.2d 491 (1958).
. Other jurisdictions have likewise refused to apply the Ryan rationale to local compensation laws. E. g., Smith Petroleum Service Inc. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) (Mississippi law); Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co., 302 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1962) (Louisiana law).