32 N.W.2d 687 | S.D. | 1948
Respondent county filed with the administrator of the estate of Timothy J. Donovan, deceased, claim for the amounts expended by the county for the treatment and maintenance of the deceased as a patient in the State Hospital for the Insane at Yankton. After hearing and allowance of the claim, the administrator appealed to the circuit court contending that the statute under which the county sought reimbursement was void; that the county court erred in holding that no part of the claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations, SDC 33.0232; and that if the statute referred to is constitutional the county was not entitled to interest because the amount expended is the measure of reimbursement. From judgment of the circuit court sustaining allowance of the claim with interest, the administrator appeals.
There is no issue of fact in this proceeding. Only such facts as are necessary to an understanding of the controversy will be stated. Timothy J. Donovan, a resident of Roberts county, was committed to the State Hospital for the Insane at Yankton on February 8, 1905, and remained there and received treatment and care until July 24, 1906; that he was committed a second time on August 11, 1908, and was there continuously confined until his death on November 24, 1942; that the county has not been reimbursed for its expenditures in the amount of $558.93 in maintaining the deceased at the hospital from the time of his commitment to July 24, 1906, and from the time of his second sommitment to December 31, 1908, and for the further amount of $3,303.07 expended subsequent to January 1, 1926; and that Timothy J. Donovan died leaving no surviving wife, children or dependent heirs. *253
The statute under which the county seeks reimbursement originated as Chap. 98, Laws 1895, and was incorporated without change into the Political Code of 1903 as section 544. It was provided as set out in the first sentence thereof that "the amount incurred by any county of this state for treatment and maintenance of any insane person in the hospital for the insane shall be a charge against the estate of such insane person." No cause of action under its provisions arose until the death of the insane person when his "estate" came into existence. Minnehaha County v. Boyce,
This statute as amended in 1913 continued in effect, § 5484, Rev. C. 1919, SDC 30.0216, without any intervening change until amended by Chap. 118, Laws 1939, which reads in part as follows:
"The amount incurred by any county in this state for treatment and maintenance of any insane person in a hospital for the insane shall be a charge against the property and estate of such insane person, both during the lifetime and after the death of such person, and until paid and shall not be affected by any statuteof limitations; * * *" (Emphasis supplied).
Appellant administrator contends that the amendment of 1939 should not be construed to have a retroactive effect; that all claims for reimbursement already barred at the time of the effective date thereof remain so and have not been revived; and that respondent county is not therefore entitled to reimbursement for amounts expended prior to July 1, 1933. *254
The county in reply invokes application of Chap. 208, Laws 1923, amending section 10087, Rev. Code 1919, SDC 30.0120. The first paragraph of this section as amended provided for compensating certain members of boards of insanity and for the payment of expenses incurred in the determination of the status of alleged incompetent persons. These statutory provisions then followed:
"The compensation and expenses provided by this section shall be allowed and paid out of the `Insane Fund' in the County Treasury in the usual manner, if there is a sufficient amount in such fund to pay the same, and if not, it may be paid out of the General Fund. When the person examined shall be found to be insane or is committed to the Hospital for examination, observation and treatment, such expense when paid by the County shall be charged by the County Auditor to such person and to those legally bound to support such insane person and may be collected in the same manner as charges for the support of such insane person in the Hospital for the Insane; provided theStatute of Limitations shall not commence to run until the deathof the insane patient, but action may be begun at any time duringthe life time of the insane person." (Emphasis supplied.)
[1-5] Appellant stresses the point that this section applied to expenses incurred by a county in the commitment of an insane person and that the proviso related to and was limited by the preceding provisions and therefore applied only to reimbursement for expenses. As a general rule the purpose of a proviso is to modify the operation of that part of the statute immediately preceding it or to except something from the operation of the statute which would otherwise have been within it. The word "provided" does not in and of itself convert the words following into a "proviso." In Georgia Railroad Banking Co. v. Smith,
[6, 7] Appellant contends that the judgment is erroneous in that the county allowed interest upon the several amounts from the respective dates upon which the county made payment. SDC 37.1711 provides that interest is recoverable where the demand is certain or capable of being made certain by calculation. The obligation to reimburse arises at the time of disbursement by the county of an amount for the care of an insane person. It thus appears that all the items entering into and making up the total sum due from the estate of the deceased to the respondent county where known and the whole amount due was readily ascertainable. The statute under consideration in authorizing reimbursement does not in terms or by implication exclude the right of the county to recover interest. The court did not err in allowing interest. *256
[8-10] Appellant attacks the constitutionality of this statute providing that the amount incurred by a county for the support of an insane person shall be a charge against his property. The case of Bon Homme County v. Berndt,
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
All the Judges concur.