366 S.E.2d 231 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1988
Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana, in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and she appeals on the general grounds.
The evidence disclosed that Detective Lorenzo Dunlap of the Co
Williams testified as a State witness that Russell had called him over to appellant’s apartment; when he arrived, Russell gave Williams the cocaine which he was injecting when the police found him in the bathroom. Russell testified that when the police arrived she was scared because she was on probation, so she ran into the bedroom to hide. She denied giving cocaine to Williams, and denied any knowledge of the cocaine and marijuana found on the bed. Appellant testified that she did not know any marijuana or cocaine was in her apartment. Both appellant and her mother testified that Russell, who was visiting in the apartment, had departed to go shopping. When she returned about thirty minutes later, she was carrying a brown paper bag; Russell then went in the bedroom and closed the door. Appellant also testified that shortly after Russell returned from shopping Williams came over, asked to talk to Russell, and went in the bedroom. He came out of the bedroom very shortly and asked to use the bathroom. Appellant also testified that Sutton must have thrown the bag of marijuana found in the kitchen onto the table.
The primary issue in this case was the credibility of witnesses, which was a question for the jury. Williams v. State, 184 Ga. App. 68 (1) (360 SE2d 634) (1987). We find the evidence sufficient to meet the standard of proof required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560), insofar as the offense of possession of marijuana is concerned, since marijuana was found on or under the kitchen table, and appellant was in the kitchen when the police arrived. However, we do not find the evidence sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of possession of cocaine. Other than the fact that the apartment belonged to appellant, there is no evidence whatsoever connecting her with the cocaine residue found on a mirror in the bedroom where Russell was hiding, and where she had been for ten or fifteen minutes prior to arrival of the police. Such evidence indicated, if anything, that Russell had been using cocaine in the bedroom, since there was no evidence that appellant was ever in the bedroom where Russell was found, or that appellant used the bedroom at all. Further, Williams’ testimony that Russell had called him over to the apartment after she returned from shopping and had given Williams the cocaine he was injecting certainly supports an inference that the cocaine belonged to Russell. Such an inference is buttressed by the fact that the search warrant, based on information from an informant, was only for marijuana, indicating that the informant was unaware of any cocaine in appellant’s apartment. Under such circumstances we cannot say the evidence meets the standard of proof required by Jackson v. Virginia, supra. Accordingly, appellant’s conviction of possession of cocaine must be reversed.
Judgment affirmed as to possession of marijuana.