The State initiated this action to condemn a truck which it had seized in connection with appellant Franklin McKeever’s arrest for the sale of drugs. Although the certificate of title was in the name of appellant Johnny McKeever, it was the State’s contention that appellant Franklin McKeever was the actual owner of the vehicle. The issue of the ownership of the seized truck was tried before a, jury. In its verdict, the jury found appellant Franklin McKeever to be the owner of the vehicle. After the return of the jury’s verdict but before the entry of any judgment thereon, appellants filed a “Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion For New Trial.” Following a hearing, the trial court denied appellants’ motions. Within thirty days, appellants filed this appeal from the denial of their post-verdict, but pre-judgment motions for new trial or judgment n.o.v.
The record of this case contains no final judgment, and the clerk of the trial court has certified that no judgment has ever been entered on the jury’s verdict by the trial court. “ ‘The verdict of a jury, whether resulting from direction or from deliberation, is not an “appealable judgment.” [Cit.]. . . . The
verdict
itself is not a
judgment
or a
ruling,
and hence does not fall within the provision of [OCGA § 5-6-34 (a)] that “Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and [the] Court of Appeals from [. . .]
judgments
and
rulings
of the superior courts. . . .” ’ [Cits.] . . . . ‘ “(B)efore an appeal may be made, the judgment appealed from
must be in writing, and not verbal.
[Cits.]”. . . . [Cit.]’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
Littlejohn v. State,
The denial of appellants’ motions for new trial or judgment n.o.v. does not constitute a basis for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over this case. “A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial filed prior to entry of the judgment on the verdict is void.”
Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County,
In Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, supra, this court did address the merits of a direct appeal in a case in which a void motion for judgment n.o.v. or for new trial had been denied, but no valid final judgment had ever been entered on the jury’s verdict. However, no case cited in Wall supports the proposition that a Georgia appellate court would have jurisdiction to hear such a direct appeal. The cases cited in Wall merely hold that an appellate court has jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal in a case in which the final judgment was actually entered subsequent to the otherwise prematurely filed notice of appeal or motion for new trial. It is well-established that the appellate courts of this State have no jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal if a final written judgment has not been entered by the trial court. See OCGA § 5-6-34. To the extent that Wall suggests that an appellate court would have jurisdiction to address the merits of a case in which no final judgment has ever been entered on the verdict, it is expressly overruled and is not authority for the existence of appellate jurisdiction over the present appeal.
The denial of appellants’ void motions for new trial or judgment *447 n.o.v. left the case pending in the trial court and the jurisdictional requirement for a direct appeal has not been met. “After the entry of a final order in this case, appellant[s], if dissatisfied, may pursue whatever post-judgment remedies are available to [them]. In any event, the notice of appeal that appellants] previously filed is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this court and, if such jurisdiction is ever to be conferred, it must be by virtue of a notice of appeal timely filed by appellants] after the entry of a final judgment in this case.” (Emphasis in original.) Littlejohn v. State, supra at 32.
Appeal dismissed.