delivered the opinion of the court.
Thе plaintiff, James F. McKee, an electrician, was doing work on cable belonging to a television company and which was attached to poles of the defendant, Pacific Power and Light Company. The work involved disconnecting and unwinding tie wires which supported the cable. A tie wire broke and came in contact with high-voltage power lines of defendant causing еlectric shock and injury to plaintiff.
In a suit for damages, based on negligence of the power company, the trial court, at the close of all of the evidence, directed the jury to return a verdict for defendant. The plaintiff has- appealed from the judgment entered on such directed verdict. The sole issue presented to us is whether a prima facie cаse of negligence against the power company was proved, and *427 if so whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The pole on which McKee was working had two crossarms supporting a primary circuit on top and a secondary circuit 5.1 feet below the primary circuit. At a point 4.5 feet below the crossarm for the secondary circuit a TV messenger cable was attached. One foot below the TV cable was a telephone cable, and this cable was 21.7 feet above the ground. There were, then, three separately owned facilities located on the pole in question.
As we understand the contentions of appellant, it is suggested the defendant-power company was negligent: (1) because it did not insulate its high-voltage power lines; (2) because it did not inspect the TV installations of the television company and discover whatever kinlc or splice caused the t'ie wire which plaintiff was unwinding to break; or (3) because it did not cut off the power in its power lines while workmen were working on the cable of the television company.
It is undisputed that all of the facilities described above, including those of defendant-power company, were installed in compliance with the National Electric Safety Code. Also, counsel on bоth sides seem to agree the test to be applied in determining whether the negligence of an electric power company can be regarded as the proximate cause of an injury is whether, under all the circumstances, the injury might have been reasonably foreseen by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence. See Annotation
Thereforе, our question first of all is whether the probability of injury to someone who had a right to be in the vicinity of defendant’s high-voltage power lines might have been reasonably anticipated by the pоwer company. See 26 Am.Jur.2d, Electricity, Gas and Steam, § 43, p. 252. We use the term “first of all” in connection with this question because in this instance appellee claims, even if there was substantial evidence of a negligent omission on the part of defendant, plaintiff had assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
There is absent from the record any evidеnce to show the insulation of defendant’s high-voltage wires would have been practical and feasible, or that ordinary care would require it. We are shown no reason for believing thе power company had a duty to inspect the facilities of the television company for kinks or splices in its tie wires, and the evidence does not show the breaking of the tie wire wаs caused by a kink or splice. Also, with respect to cutting off the power in defendant’s lines while workmen worked on the television cable, it does not appear from the evidence that plaintiff or his employer or any of his fellow workmen requested or expected this to be done.
Although it is difficult for us to understand why plaintiff thinks a duty was owed to him and breached by the power сompany, it becomes unimportant under the circumstances admitted in this case. It seems to be well settled that there is no liability for injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apрarent, or as well-known to the person injured as they are to the owner of the facilities in question. Watts v. Holmes, Wyo.,
McKee’s own testimony in this case establishes clearly that all of the dangers of defendant’s power lines were obvious and apparent to him and as well-known to him as they were to the power company itself. We find nothing in the evidence from which it could bе inferred otherwise, and no evidence tending to show otherwise has been called to our attention.
McKee testified he had had 28 years experience as a lineman and elеctrician; that the operation he was performing was not a complicated one for a man of his experience ; that the clearance between the wires was sufficient; that he was aware of the fact that the high-voltage lines above his head were energized; that he had worked around this type of installatiori many times, and it was a typical structure; аnd also that *428 lie knew the lines of the power company were not insulated.
The accident occurred during daylight hours. McKee and his crew had been working on this particular project about three days, and McKee was fully aware of the locаtion of the lines of defendant and knew they were energized. McKee, according to his testimony, felt it was safe to work where he was working and in the manner he was working. Even after the accident he was unable to state that he would have proceeded differently than he did on the day the accident occurred.
Without deciding whether there was substantial evidence of a breach in the standard of care which defendant owed to plaintiff, we can say as a matter of law the accident, under the circumstances shown, necessarily resulted from onе of the following: (1) From an unavoidable accident; (2) from the assumption of a risk as well-known to plaintiff as it was to defendant; or (3) from the contributory negligence of plaintiff. In none of these events can defendant be held liable.
}' We have not heretofore found it necessary in this jurisdiction to distinguish between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. See Ford Motor Company v. Arguello, Wyo.,
However, where plaintiff establishes by his own testimony, leaving no possibility of a reasonable inference to the contrary, that he was fully cognizant of all the dangers which were shown by the evidence to be present, then it must follow as a matter of law that his accident came about either as a result of his assumption of risk, or as a result of an unforeseeable and unavoidable accident, or as a result of his own contributory negligence. That would be especially true where, as in this case, the plaintiff himself is the only actor present at the time of the accident.
In Benard v. Vorlander,
It is of interest to notice, because of the similarity to our case, that in answer to the allegation that the power company should have known plaintiff would move a rod in such a manner as to come in contact with the wires, the California court said, if that be true then plaintiff, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known the same thing. Likewise, in the case at bar, if it be assumed Pacific Power and Light Company should have foreseen that a person like plaintiff might break a tie wire while unwinding it from the TV cable, allowing the tie wire to fly upward and come in contaсt with the power lines, then plaintiff McKee in the exercise of ordinary care should have foreseen the same thing. That being so, if the power company was negligent, then McKee was contributorily negligent.
In Bunten v. Eastern Minnesota Power Co.,
*429
In Wyоming’, it is a settled rule that the owner of facilities is not an insurer of the safety of his invitees. Watts v. Holmes, Wyo.,
Affirmed.