OPINION
This case presents the narrow question of whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that six allegedly defamatory statements made by appellant Dennis Lau-rion regarding an encounter with respondent David McKee, M.D., survive summary judgment. We hold that none of the six statements is actionable either (1) because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of the statements or (2) because the statements are not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning that would harm respondent’s reputation and lower him in the estimation of the community. Therefore, we reverse.
On April 17, 2010, Kenneth Laurion, the father of Dennis Laurion (Laurion), was admitted to St. Luke’s Hospital in Duluth after suffering a hemorrhagic stroke. On April 19, Kenneth Laurion was transferred from the intensive care unit (ICU) of St. Luke’s to a private room. The attending physician arranged for Dr. McKee, a neurologist, to examine Kenneth Laurion. Dr. McKee had never met Kenneth Laurion before he examined him on April 19.
Three family members were present in Kenneth Laurion’s hospital room when Dr. McKee’s examination began: Laurion, his mother, and his wife. The examination lasted no longer than 20 minutes, during which time Dr. McKee made certain statements and acted in a manner that, as a whole, the Laurions perceived as rude and insensitive. After Kenneth Laurion had been discharged from the hospital, Laurion posted the following statements regarding Dr. McKee on various “rate-your-doctor” websites:
My father spent 2 days in ICU after a hemorrhagic stroke. He saw a speech therapist and a physical therapist for evaluation. About 10 minutes after my father transferred from ICU to a ward room, Dr. McKee walked into a family visit with my dad. He seemed upset that my father had been moved. Never having met my father or his family, Dr. McKee said, “When you weren’t in ICU, I had to spend time finding out if you transferred or died.” When we gaped at him, he said, “Well, 44% of hemorrhagic strokes die within 30 days. I guess this is the better option.” My father mentioned that he’d been seen by a physical therapist and speech therapist. Dr. McKee said, “Therapists? You don’t need therapy.” He pulled my father to a sitting position and asked him to get out of bed and walk.[ ] When my father said his gown was just hanging from his neck without a back, Dr. McKee said, “That doesn’t matter.” My wife said, “It matters to us; let us go into the hall.” Five minutes later, Dr. McKee strode out of the room. He did not talk to my mother or myself. When I mentioned Dr. McKee’s name to a friend who is a nurse, she said, “Dr, McKee is a real tool!”
Laurion also sent letters to a variety of medically-affiliated institutions complaining about Dr. McKee’s conduct. The letters included substantially the same statements communicated in the online postings. According to Laurion, his purpose in sending the letters was to get somebody to tell Dr. McKee (1) that he exhibited “poor behavior” and (2) that the recipients “don’t like getting letters like this.”
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the interference with business claim, but reversed the district court with respect to six of the allegedly defamatory statements posted online by Laurion. McKee v. Laurion, No. A11-1154,
• Statement 1: Dr. McKee said he had to “spend time finding out if you [Kenneth Laurion] were transferred or died.”
• Statement 2: Dr. McKee said, “44% of hemorrhagic strokes die within 30 days. I guess this is the better option.”
• Statement 3: Dr. McKee said, “You [Kenneth Laurion] don’t need therapy.”
• Statement ⅛: Dr. McKee said, “[I]t doesn’t matter” that the patient’s gown did not cover his backside.
• Statement 5: Dr. McKee left the room without talking to the patient’s family.
• Statement 6: A nurse1 told Laurion that Dr. McKee was “a real tool!”2
Id. at *6.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC,
To establish the elements of a defamation claim in Minnesota, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defamatory statement was “communicated to someone other than the plaintiff’; (2) the statement is false; (3) the statement tends to “harm the plain
Statements 1, 2, & ⅛
Truth is a complete defense to a defamation action and “true statements, however disparaging, are not actionable.” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
Viewing the evidence here in a light most favorable to Dr. McKee, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Statements 1, 2, and 4. As to Statement 1 (Dr. McKee said he had to “spend time finding out if you transferred or died.”), Dr. McKee described his account of the statement in his deposition testimony:
I made a jocular comment ... to the effect of I had looked for [Kenneth Lau-rion] up in the intensive care unit and was glad to find that, when he wasn’t there, that he had been moved to a regular hospital bed, because you only go one of two ways when you leave the intensive care unit; you either have improved to the point where you’re someplace like this or you leave because you’ve died.
In light of the substantial similarity between Statement 1 and Dr. McKee’s account, we conclude that any differences between the two versions are nothing more than “minor inaccuracies” that cannot serve as a basis for satisfying the falsity element of a defamation claim. Masson,
As to Statement 2 (Dr. McKee said, “Well, 44% of hemorrhagic strokes die within 30 days. I guess this is the better option.”), Dr. McKee acknowledged in his deposition that during the examination of Kenneth Laurion, he communicated to those present that some ICU patients die. However, he denies referencing a specific percentage. Thus, Dr. McKee posits that Statement 2 is false, or that, at the least, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Statement 2 because he never stated a specific percentage. The problem for Dr. McKee with respect to Statement 2 is that the gist or sting of Statement 2 is the mention of hemorrhagic stroke patients dying and not the percentage referenced. Statement 2 squarely satisfies the test for substantial truth because it would have the same effect on the reader regardless of whether a specific percentage is referenced (or whether the percentage is accurate). See Masson,
As to Statement 4 (Dr. McKee said, “That doesn’t matter” that the patient’s gown did not cover his backside.), Dr. McKee testified that he told the patient that the gown “looks like it’s okay” because it did not appear that the gown was at risk of falling off. We are not persuaded that there is any meaningful difference between the two versions of the statements sufficient to create a genuine issue as to the falsity of Statement 4. The substance or gist of the two versions is the same. Commenting that the gown “looks like it’s okay” is another way of communicating that “it didn’t matter” that the gown was not tied in the back. Thus, any inaccuracy of expression does not change the meaning of what Dr. McKee admits to having said. For these reasons, we conclude that Statement 4 is not actionable.
Statements 3, 5, & 6
Next, we consider whether Statements 3, 5, and 6 are capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. In order for a statement to be defamatory, it must tend to “harm the plaintiffs reputation and ... lower him in the estimation of the community.” Stuempges,
We conclude, as a matter of law, that Statements 3, 5, and 6 are not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. Statement 3 was published as follows: “Dr. McKee said, ‘Therapists? You don’t need therapy.’” We fail to see how this statement, standing alone, is capable of a defamatory meaning that would harm Dr. McKee in the eyes of the community. By itself, Statement 3 is harmless. Doctors routinely evaluate whether therapy is appropriate for a given patient. Reading Statement 3 in the context of the entire posting, see Morey, 212 Minn, at 156,
Statement 5 was published as follows: “Five minutes later, Dr. McKee strode out of the room. He did not talk to my mother or myself.” Laurion argues that Statement 5 is true because Dr. McKee did not stop to chat, provide reassurance, or report to the family regarding Kenneth Laurion’s condition. Dr. McKee asserts that, although he admitted during his deposition that he did not talk with Laurion or his mother when he finished examining Kenneth Laurion, the statement is false because Laurion admitted in his deposition that Dr. McKee said to the Lau-rion family, “you can go back in,” after leaving the hospital room. In the end, any dispute as to whether Dr. McKee spoke with Laurion or his mother upon leaving the room is not material because we conclude that Statement 5 is not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning.
As with Statement 3, taking “the language used in the light of surrounding circumstances,” Gadach, 236 Minn, at 510,
Statement 6 was published as follows: “When I mentioned Dr. McKee’s name to a friend who is a nurse, she said, ‘Dr. McKee is a real tool!”’ The parties dispute whether Statement 6 is protected opinion. The First Amendment protects statements of pure opinion from defamation claims. Diesen v. Hessburg,
Nonetheless, the assertion that a nurse told Laurion that Dr. McKee is a “real tool” is one of fact because whether a nurse actually made the statement to Laurion is an assertion that can be proven true or false. Dr. McKee argues that Laurion’s possible fabrication of the existence of the nurse, and thus the statement attributed to the nurse, creates a genuine issue of fact as to the falsity of Statement 6. As described above, Laurion’s assertion that the nurse made the statement to him and the implicit assertion that the nurse exists are susceptible to proof. We nevertheless conclude that even though Statement 6 includes a factual assertion that can be proven true or false, Statement 6 is not actionable because the statement is incapable of conveying a defamatory meaning. First, the part of the statement that can be proven true or false — whether a nurse made the statement to Laurion— does not itself place Dr. McKee in a negative light even if it is false. The assertion that a nurse made the statement only has the potential to cast Dr. McKee in a negative light when combined with the second part of the statement — that Dr. McKee is a “real tool.” However, attributing the statement to an unidentified nurse does not add defamatory meaning to the statement. See Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp.,
As a final matter, a review of Laurion’s online posting as a whole does not change our holding in this case. Given the reason
Because the six statements at issue, viewed individually or in the context of the entire posting, are not actionable, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Laurion.
Reversed.
Notes
. The nurse who allegedly made this statement was not involved in Kenneth Laurion’s treatment and has never been identified; she allegedly made the statement to Laurion at a post office after his father had been discharged from the hospital.
. For ease of discussion, we will refer to the individual statements by their number throughout the remainder of this opinion.