McKay v. LaCroixMcKay v. LaCroix
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Kurt D. Engelhardt, Jones, Willett
Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) senior trooper August McKay committed suicide in his own home after learning that the LSP was reassigning him and preparing to execute a search warrant on his house. His widow sued several LSP officers, alleging claims under
A.
In December 2020, the LSP Narcotics Division began investigating allegations that senior trooper August McKay was using fraudulent prescriptions to obtain controlled substances from a local pharmacy. As part of this investigation, LSP officers obtained a warrant to search August’s residence.1 On the morning that they planned to execute the search warrant, they asked Appellants, Sergeant Rohn Bordelon and Trooper David LaCroix, for their assistance. They instructed Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix to inform August that he was going to be reassigned and to gain a “Code Four”—a police signal code that indicates to other officers that “everything is under control and the scene is safe”—so that other detectives could execute the search warrant.
On the way to August’s home, Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix “discussed different scenarios,” including the possibility that August might arm himself and attempt to commit “suicide by cop.” August had been “in and out of the hospital for medical reasons and had been out on [family and medical leave]” so they “were not sure about the state of mind [he] would be in” and “were not sure how things were going to go.” They created a contingency plan that if August armed himself and attempted to commit suicide by cop, they would retreat and treat the situation as a “barricaded subject.”
When Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix arrived at August’s residence, they noticed that his take-home police vehicle was not there. They knocked on the door and were greeted by August’s minor child, P.M., and
Upon reentering the house, August made his way to the master bedroom closet. Trooper LaCroix observed two handguns on a closet shelf and confiscated them over August’s objection. Trooper LaCroix told him that “the department was going to take them anyway, so he would hold them.” August then proceeded to use his master restroom while Trooper LaCroix stood outside the open door and observed.
By the time August returned to the master bedroom, Sgt. Bordelon and Brandy had entered the bedroom. While Brandy spoke to the officers about what was happening, August walked back into the closet and retrieved his LSP department-issued firearm. As August chambered a round, Trooper LaCroix exclaimed, “Gus, no, what are you doing?” Following the contingency plan they made that morning, Sgt. Bordelon told Trooper LaCroix to “back out,” and both officers left the McKay home. Brandy unsuccessfully attempted to take the firearm from August, who then fatally shot himself.
B.
Appellee Brandy McKay, in her individual capacity and on behalf of her minor child, sued several LSP officers, including Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix. She brought claims under
Brandy filed a supplement to her original complaint, this time limiting her claims to the Fourteenth Amendment and various state laws. The defendants again filed a
When addressing the remaining defendants’ assertions of qualified immunity, the district court concluded that Brandy had pled sufficient facts to state
II.
We first assess whether we have jurisdiction. Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2022). Absent an exception, non-final district court
The collateral order doctrine only applies to the qualified immunity portion of a district court order. Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, in the interest of judicial economy, we may have discretion to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review other claims at the same time. Id. Pendent appellate jurisdiction is only proper in “rare and unique circumstances” though, Thornton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1998), and is always discretionary, Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg, 105 F.4th 313, 333 (5th Cir. 2024).
Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix seek interlocutory review of the district court’s entire order denying their motion to dismiss, wherein they sought dismissal of the
III.
We review orders on
IV.
A.
The defense of qualified immunity protects state officials from civil suit and liability when they could have reasonably believed that their actions were legal. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. A state official is entitled qualified immunity unless: (1) the plaintiff alleged a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) that right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232).
We may address either prong first. Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). Here, our inquiry begins and ends with whether Brandy alleged a violation of August’s constitutional rights.
A state generally has no affirmative obligation to protect its citizens from private harm. M.D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 248 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989)). “[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196. But when a state affirmatively acts to restrain an individual’s freedom “through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty,” the state establishes a “special relationship” with the individual. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). Where a special relationship exists, a state may have a constitutional duty to protect the individual from dangers, including in certain circumstances, private harm such as private violence, id., or self-inflicted harm, Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Such a relationship has arisen between a state and prisoners, see, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994), pretrial detainees—including suspected criminals injured while being apprehended by police, see City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983), and involuntarily-committed mental patients, see, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
Yet, no constitutional duty exists where, like here, the state has not restrained an individual’s liberty. This is not a case like City of Revere, where police injured a suspect while apprehending him. 463 U.S. at 244. There is no indication from the alleged facts that Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix planned or attempted to arrest August or confine him to his home. They visited August’s home to inform him that he was being reassigned at work, and to confirm that the premises were safe for the LSP to execute the search warrant. After they left his house, August tragically proceeded to commit suicide.
Without a restraint of liberty, there is no constitutional duty. Without a constitutional duty, there can be no constitutional violation. And without a constitutional violation, Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix are entitled qualified immunity.
* * *
Because Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix are entitled qualified immunity, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment as to qualified immunity. As to the state law claims, we DISMISS the appeal without prejudice. We REMAND this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.