97 Tenn. 236 | Tenn. | 1896
This is a suit upon a note against the principal, A. MeNabb, and bis sureties, N. Me-Nabb and J. A. Greene. There was judgment in the Court below against all parties for the amount of the note and interest, and the surety defendants appealed and assigned errors. The cause has been heard by the Court of Chancery Appeals and the decree of the Chancellor affirmed, and the same party defendants have appealed to this Court and assigned substantially the same errors as_ have been passed upon by the Court of Chancery Appeals. The defense made by the sureties is that on maturity of the note an extension of one year’s time was granted the principal upon, the note, which had the effect to release them in law and equity from liability upon it. There is no question but that the extension was granted. It is claimed by complainant that it was done with the assent and approval of the sureties. The sureties deny this, however, and the Court of Chancery Appeals has not passed upon this question of fact. That Court finds, however, that there was no legal consideration for the extension, and, hence, no valid agreement to that effect. It appears from their finding that wlffin the note fell due the principal defendant, A. MeNabb, paid, within the three days of grace, sixty dollars, the legal interest
Daring the progress of the cause, defendant Greene, one of the sureties, died. His son, Luther Greene, went before the County Court and had himself appointed special administrator to defend this suit, and for no other purpose, and the order of Court appointing him so recites. He was brought before the Court as such administrator, and filed an answer and made defense without objection. In the Court of Chancery Appeals he assigns thiü action as error, and insists that the appointment, being limited to a special purpose, was void, and the revivor against him as admin
In the case of Jordon v. Polk, 1 Sneed, 428, it was held that such limited administration may be granted, either as to certain specific effects of the deceased or for a certain specific purpose — such as filing a bill or carrying on proceedings in chancery— and if such limited administrator is made a party to the' suit, the estate of the deceased is thereby properly represented, and a decree against such limited administrator will be binding on a general administrator, but will not prevent a grant of general administration, and the two administrations may well subsist together. See, also, McNairy v. Bell, 6 Yer., 302; Smith v. Pistole, 10 Hum., 205; Crozier v. Goodwin, 1 Lea, 368; Pritchard on Wills, Sec. 564.
We can see no error in the decree of the Court of Chancery Appeals, and it is affirmed with costs.