37 N.W.2d 923 | Neb. | 1949
Lead Opinion
Appellee brought this case to recover damages to his lands and crops claimed to have been caused by water which was alleged to have escaped from the reservoirs and canal of appellant. The verdict was for the appellee. Motion of appellant for a new trial was denied, and it has appealed.
The cause of action of appellee as stated in the petition is based on the allegation that the use by appellant of its power and irrigation works caused water to seep from its canal and reservoirs and damage the lands of the appellee, and that waters from the works have seeped from the canal and reservoirs and traveled through the subsoil and alkali deposits to his lands, and have seeped in and through the soil. Appellant made no effort to secure a more specific statement in this regard. Appellee by his reply states that the damages were caused by the lands becoming saturated with water pushed in and under the topsoils by leakage of water from the works of appellant and from waters seeped from its canal and reservoirs. Prejudicial variance is claimed between the petition, the
Appellant makes the contention that there is a failure of evidence to sustain a finding that water from its works escaped and reached, affected or damaged the lands of appellee, that causal connection between water lost from the canal or reservoirs of appellant and the waterlogged condition of land of appellee is not shown, and the only support of the award in his favor is speculation. Proof thereof is indispensable to recovery herein. Smith v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, supra. That the lands of appellee were seeped as early as 1943 and continued to the time of the trial in 1948, except as to the year 1947, is not a subject of dispute herein. The issue was what was the cause and source of it.
In deciding the correctness of the action of the trial court in submitting the case to the jury, the evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the party for whom the verdict was returned, controverted facts will be decided in his favor, and .he will be given the advantage of any inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Remmenga v. Selk, 150 Neb. 401, 34 N. W. 2d 757.
Appellee produced evidence tending to show that after appellant diverted water in its canal and reservoirs a very considerable amount thereof was lost by seepage, that the seepage augmented and put pressure upon the then existing ground water, and caused the ground water to rise under the land of. appellee. This resulted in his lands becoming badly seeped. The evidence of appellant is that any water lost from its works did not reach the lands of appellee, and the condition complained of by
The trial court allowed interest at legal rate on the amount of the verdict from October 1, 1945 to June 15, 1948. The judgment was entered on the latter date. The damages claimed were a matter of reasonable controversy, unliquidated, incapable of being fixed by computation, and could only be ascertained by agreement of the parties or by suit. Recovery of interest on such a claim may be had only from the date of the determination of the right of recovery and the ascertainment of the amount. Smith v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, supra.
This case involved the questions: Did the conditions of the lands and crops of the appellee, of which he complained, . result wholly from waters from the works of appellant; or were they caused wholly by precipitation and other conditions natural to that area; or were they the result of both waters from the reservoirs and canal of appellant and rainfall and other natural causes?
There is evidence tending to show that:
The lands of appellee are first bottom valley lands, very near the South Platte River. A part of it is accretion land. The river as it proceeds east approaches the land, and at the northeast corner is adjacent thereto. Beer Slough is between the river and the north part of the land. Fremont Slough meanders across nearly the entire length of the south part. Two draws cross this-land as indicated by the map. Low marshy condition of
Appellee bought the west half of the southwest quarter of the section in which his other lands are in June of 1947 for $4,100, after this case was commenced. This land is traversed by the slough, and the same type as his
In years past persons trapped in the wintertime and fished along in the slough on the McKain land. The slough then had a gravel and sand bottom. People walked up and down it barefoot without difficulty, and there was then no mud or obstructions. There were springs along the slough in the early years, and some of them are about the same as they were in 1890. The water in Fremont Slough varied in wet and dry years. In wet years the land would become waterlogged and the lowland produced coarser grass, and in dry years there was less grass on the highland and finer and better grass on the lowland. The slough has filled up and become obstructed. The channel can hardly be identified, and after heavy rains it goes out of its banks, spreads over the meadows, and it takes from several days to several weeks before the water moves out. About 1900, a part of what is now the McKain land was broken and cultivated, but that section was so wet the party in possession gave it up and moved to higher land.
The relative position of the underground water is primarily determined by rainfall, evaporation, and transpiration. The fluctuation shown by test wells in 1946 and 1947 was such as to show that the source or cause of any damage to appellee was not water from the south, the direction of the works of appellant. The source of the water in the ditches along the road south of the McKain land was rainfall that could not get away. The water was higher in Fremont Slough than the water table of the surrounding lands. The water in the slough was feeding the land on either side of it instead of the ground water going into the slough. The same situation is true as to Beer Slough. No water lost out of the reservoir or canal of appellant has reached or affected the McKain lands. Any seeped or waterloggéd condition of these lands was the result of high rainfall, low evaporation, the clogged condition of Fremont Slough, and inadequate drainage.
The evidence would have sustained a finding that any damage sustained by appellee because of the seeped condition of his land: (1) Was wholly the result of waters from the works of appellant; or (2) was wholly caused by rainfall and other things natural to that area; or (3) was the result of both the waters from the canal and reservoirs of the appellant and natural conditions including high precipitation.
An issue as to the extent natural conditions had contributed to the waterlogging of lands of appellee, and any damage resulting therefrom, was made in the trial court, and its failure and refusal to instruct the jury in reference thereto is assigned and discussed in this court. The attention of the court was directed to this issue by a proper instruction tendered by appellant. It is the mandatory duty of the trial court, without request,
Appellant was liable for. seepage damage to the land of appellee caused by water from its works. No recovery could be had from it for seepage damage caused by water from another source. If-water from the works of appellant combined with water from another source, and the combined water caused damage to the land of appellee, before he could recover any amount he must prove either that the damage would have been done by the water from the works of appellant without the water, from the other source, or he must establish the amount of the damage done by the water of the appellant. Smith v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, supra. Whether the damage was caused by the combined sources of water and would not have occurred from the water of appellant’s canal and reservoirs alone was a question for the jury. If they so found, then, in the condition of the record in this case, they would have been required to deny appellee any recovery herein, because he failed to offer any proof in separation or allocation of damages from natural causes and from artificial causes attributable to appellant. Smith v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District, supra. The failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to this issue is reversible error.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed, and remanded.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the majority. I submit that the rule announced with reference to the damages for which the district is liable is neither clear nor understandable.
The district is liable for seepage damage to the lands of appellee caused by water escaping from its works. No recovery- can be had from the district for seepage damage caused by water from other sources. If waters escaping from-the works of appellant combined with waters from natural causes or conditions to damage the lands of appellee', ánd the damage would not have occurred but for such escaping waters, the district is liable for all of such damage. Damages caused by natural conditions, such as rainfall, diffused surface waters, or any other waters with which the land is burdened, must be borne by the owner of the land. But, if damage results only by the addition of waters escaping from the district’s works, the district is liable for all the damages thus resulting. “As stated by the decisions and authorities, if by any act of man in conjunction with the act of nature an injury is inflicted, he will be held to respond for the injury suffered.” Amend v. Lincoln & N. W. R. R. Co., 91 Neb. 1, 135 N. W. 235. See, also, Davis v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 Neb. 769, 157 N. W. 964.
“It is universally agreed that, if the damage is caused by the concurring force of the defendant’s negligence and some other cause for which he is not responsible, including the ‘act of God’ or superior human force directly intervening, the defendant is nevertheless responsible, if his negligence is one of the proximate causes of the damage, within the definition already given. * * * But if the superior force would have produced the same damage, whether the defendant had been negligent or not, his negligence is not deemed the cause of the injury.” 1 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence (6th ed.), § 39, p. 76.
A purchaser of land takes it subject to natural'conditions such as excessive rainfall, diffused surface waters,
No question of apportionment or allocation is involved. The district, stating it simply, is liable for all the damage proximately caused by its escaping waters.