McIntire v. StateMcIntire v. State
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Hanna
The appellant was indicted, tried and convicted in the Decatw Circuit Court, for receiving stolen property.
Thе evidence for the state tеnded to show that a horse was stolen from one Mahan, in Oldham county, Kentucky, by a person there calling himself Divran, who brought the horse to Decatw county, where he passed by the name of Spencer; that the prisoner received the horse from Spencer, and sold him to one Holmes. The prisoner’s dеfense was, that he had purchased the horse from Spencer in good faith.
It appeared in evidence that soon after Spencer brought the horse to Decatw county, he left that vicinity; and there*27upon the state was permitted, against the defendant’s objection, to prоve by one Bimer, that during the week, and about the time Spencer left, another horse was stolen from the witness’s father, which was recovered by the witness frоm one Hopwood, in Oldham county, Kentucky.
This evidence was plainly inadmissible. Suppose it to havе been sufficient to raise a presumption that’ Spencer had stolen Bimer‘s horse, it was wholly disсonnected with the theft of the horse received by the prisonеr. The proof of that larceny did not tend to show that Spencer had stolen Mahan‘s horse, much less that Mclntire had recеived it knowing it to be stolen. It was a fact not in issue, and one which the рrisoner could not have reasonably anticipated, nor was he required to meet it with evidenсe.
This proof may have prejudiced the defendant. That the hоrse had been stolen by Spencer, was a fact which the state was required to prove. In aid of the prosecution, it was attempted to show that Spencer was a thief, by proving another larceny in addition to the onе alleged in the indictment, and from thаt proof to presume a lаrceny by Spencer of the horse in question. This wаs clearly erroneous; for another material point to bе established by the state, was, that the defendant knew, at the time he received the horse, that he wаs stolen property. On acсount of the relations which existed, in this instance, between Spencer and the dеfendant, this knowledge may have depended upon whether Spencer was thе actual thief; and that he was such could not, we think, be presumed frоm proof of the commission оf another and distinct offense by him. See Engleman v. The State, 2 Ind. R. 91, and authorities there cited.
A new trial should have been granted.
Per Curiam. — The judgment is reversed. Cause remanded for a new trial.