The plaintiff sued for a divorce, alleging that the defendant had offered to her such indignities as rendered her condition in life intolerable, also indicating the character of the indignities. The defendant denied the charges against him, and by way of cross-bill asked for a divorce on the ground of cruel and barbarous treatment inflicted upon him by the plaintiff. There is no bill of exceptions in the case, and we are necessarily confined to the record in our review of errors.
The trial resulted in a decree of divorce in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff'. It gives the custody of the child to the plaintiff, and concludes as follows: “And the court further orders, adjudges and decrees, that the said plaintiff have judgment for and receive of said defendant the sum of $1,000 for alimony, and that she have execution against the defendant therefor.” This writ of error is prosecuted for the purpose of reversing so much of said decree as adjudges alimony in favor of plaintiff. This is an extraordinary decree, which gives a divorce to the defendant
How can tbe decree in this case be justified in face of tbe statute, which declares that: “ In all cases of divorce from tbe bond of matrimony, tbe guilty party shall forfeit all rights and claim under and by virtue of tbe marriage.” R. S. 1879. § 2182. Section 2179 was never intended to authorize permanent alimony in favor of tbe wife, except as incident to a decree of divorce in her favor. She may have alimony pendente lite, which is necessarily before final decree. But this can be given only as incident to tbe suit and under tbe provisions of tbe statute. Under tbe law as it prevailed in tbe revision of 1855, alimony pendente lite was accorded to tbe wife only when sbe was plaintiff R. S. 1855, § 8, p. 662. Tbe right of tbe court to decree alimony pendente lite to her when sbe was defendant, was denied by tbe Supreme Court. Morton v. Morton,
It does not appear that tbe defendant made any motion in arrest of tbe judgment against him, and tbe question arises whether be can urge in tbe appellate court tbe error now assigned by him for reversal. Tbe decisions on this point have not been uniform. It has been laid down in broad terms that a motion in arrest was necessary in order to give tbe trial court an opportunity to correct its error before resorting to tbe appellate court. Railroad Co. v.
In the ease of Richardson v. George,
It may be safely. asserted that the appellate court will reverse for fatal error apparent on the face of the record, although no motion in arrest or for review has been made, such for instance as that the court has no jurisdiction of the cause or parties, or that the petition fails to state a cause of action. There may be defects and irregularities apparent of record, but the appellate court will not always reverse on account of them. It has refused to reverse for errors of misjoinder of parties and causes of action. Ames v. Gilmore,
In the present case the error is not only apparent of record, but it is a material one which discloses a judgment in favor of a party who is not entitled to it upon the record made by the pleadings and proceedings in the case. The court having adjudged the divorce in favor of the defendant, had no jurisdiction to render a decree for alimony in favor of plaintiff. This error is palpable, and may be corrected on writ of error. Accordingly it is ordered that the decree be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the court below to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion.
