*1 affirm the remainder agreement. We McINNIS, Charboneau Janine judgment.
the trial court’s D.V.M., Appellant GUZMAN, J., concurring and v. dissenting. MALLIA, J.D., Mallia The Michael GUZMAN, Justice, concurring M. EVA Hastings, P.C., Tommy Firm, dissenting. J.D., Appellees. analysis and majority’s agree I with No. 14-06-00354-CV. unenforcea that the Mahr is
its conclusion I further premarital agreement. as a ble Texas, Appeals Court enforcing trial court’s award agree that the Dist.). (14th Houston and the must be reversed agreement of the remanded for reconsideration case 17, 2008. June I re parties’ assets. distribution however, the ma disagree,
spectfully facts, that, on these
jority’s conclusion justice by allowing served
interests of are to recharacterize opportunity
Afreen the enforceability relitigate
the Mahr and its theory. parties do not
under another on the
contend that the case was tried try
wrong theory, and the decision solely premarital agreement as a
Mahr the intent of the con
presumably reflects I therefore con
tracting parties. would appropriate case
clude this is not power of a is best
for the exercise compelling for more circumstances.
reserved Fanning Fanning, v.
Cf . (Tex.1993) curiam) (per (remand jus
(op. reh’g) in interests of changed appeal
tice after law while Liebman,
pending); Scott (Tex.1966) (counsel represented in Texas relied on statement that was subse
Supreme opinion Court Bader, Inc. v.
quently disapproved); Scott Prods., Inc., 248 S.W.3d
Sandstone 2008, no (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] (trial de prevented sanctions
pet.) court’s evidence).
velopment of *2 against a claims suit, alleged
tice corporation professional surgeon and seeking to belonged, surgeon to which the allegedly suffered damages she recover *3 surgi- following a complications a result representation In its procedure. cal to non-suit Mclnnis, agreed Firm the Law Houston, Morrow, Elizabeth Heather corporation, professional surgeon’s TX, appellants. defen- party as a surgeon leaving only Houston, TX, Rubenstein, E. Andrew trial on the After a in the suit. dant appellees. in favor merits, a verdict jury a returned surgeon. of the FOWLER, Panel consists of Justices (FROST, J„ FROST, and SEYMORE unsuccessful medical-mal- Following her majority). corrected Mclnnis, 2005, suit, 28, as May practice legal-malpractice filed a pro plaintiff, se MAJORITY OPINION CORRECTED alleging that against suit underlying medical-mal- in the her loss FROST, Justice. KEM THOMPSON to the Law attributable practice suit was majority opin- This court withdraws its of fiducia- negligence and breaches 10, because of ion issued June 2008 According handling in her claims. ry duty this cor- error and issues typographical legal-malprac- petition to Mclnnis’s majority place. in its opinion rected non- suit, Firm’s decision to the Law tice case, appellant, legal-malpractice In this corporation, surgeon’s professional suit the client, challenges a no- a law firm’s former jointly and sev- allegedly was in summary judgment favor gave damages, erally liable for Mclnnis’s repre- lawyers firm and the the law claims. legal-malpractice her rise to lit- prior medical-malpractice her in sented Procedure Rule of Civil Texas Under among things, other inad- igation, alleging, 3) (level court issued 190.4 conclude equate time We legal-malprac- order for the docket control in its discretion that the trial abused suit, following deadlines: setting tice for dis- determining adequate that an 3, join additional therefore the 2005 Deadline covery passed and October parties the no-evidence granting court erred seeking 23, parties 2006 Deadline March and re- summary judgment. We reverse designate affirmative relief experts mand. designate 24, all oth- April Deadline to 2006 er-experts Background 23, discovery period End of I. Factual Procedural June challenges to Deadline for June medical-malpractice pursuing In her testimony expert Mcln- claim, appellant Janine Charboneau pleadings to amend Deadline June setting July Trial appel- from representation sought legal nis and dur- discovery process Mallia, J.D., part As The Mallia Law Michael lees designated ing period Firm, P.C., Tommy Hastings, J.D. requests production Mclnnis served collectively as are referred to
(Appellees and the Mal- on Mallia interrogatories individually as “Mal- Firm” and the “Law Firm, for dis- well as Firm,” “Has- lia lia,” “the Mallia medical-malprac- closure. ensuing In the tings”).
Eight months before the end of the dis- there was “adequate time.” In re covery period, on October Co., Mohawk Rubber Law Firm filed a no-evidence motion for (Tex.App.-Texarkana orig. proceed summary judgment by to be heard submis- 166a(i) ing). The comment to pro rule sion without hearing oral on November vides, “A discovery period pre[-]trial In the five-page the Law order should opportunity for Firm asserted that there already had been discovery unless there is a showing to the The Law contrary, ordinarily a motion under Firm served Mclnnis responses (i) paragraph [a no-evidence motion] discovery requests on November permitted would be but *4 2005, which is the day same Mclnnis’s 166a(i) cmt. Tex.R. Civ. P. before.” response to the summary- no-evidence (emphasis added);1 see Specialty judgment motion was due. Mclnnis claims (Tex. Fuqua, Inc. v. 29 S.W.3d to have response filed a to the Law Firm’s App.-Houston 2000, pet. [14th de Dist.] no-evidence motion and a motion for con- nied). Unlike other notes and comments tinuance on that date.1 In the motion for procedure, rules of civil this com continuance, Mclnnis claimed she needed ment specifically intended to inform further discovery. support To plea her application construction and of this time, additional Mclnnis explained that she 166a(i) cmt.; rule. See Tex.R. Civ. P. Spe needed to review eighty over boxes of Retailers, Inc., cialty records, and she also stated she suf- Applying plain language of the com fers from severe pain and chronic ment, a no-evidence summary judgment problems in legs. The trial court de- motion ordinarily is not permitted before and, nied Mclnnis’s motion for continuance expiration of the period set January on granted the Law by pre-trial Thus, order. principal our Firm’s motion summary judgment. On task is to if determine this provides record appeal to this court Mclnnis challenges the support for the trial court’s consideration summary court’s judgment.2
of a no-evidence summary-judgment mo
Analysis
II.
tion more than seven months before the
Issues
end of
discovery period.
perti
issue,
In her
first
nent date for
inquiry
this
is the final date
claims,
alia,
inter
that there was not an
on which the no-evidence
pre
motion is
adequate amount of time for discovery. A
sented to the trial court for
party may
ruling, which
move for a no-evidence sum
mary
this case was November
2005. On
“[a]fter
time for
166a(i).
date,
discovery.” Tex.R.
this
the lawsuit
Civ. P.
had been on file for
Nota
bly,
months,
not'require
rule does
six
that discov
less than half of the dis
ery
completed,
must have been
covery
but rather
expired.3
In resolving
parties dispute
timely
1. The
dissenting colleague
.whether Mclnnis
3.Our
focuses on the date
response
granted
on
summary-
filed a
to
which
trial court
the Law Firm’s no-evi-
however,
judgment;
the time between final
summary-judgment
dence
motion.
submission of the motion to the
court
ruling
court’s
on the motion cannot be count
2. Mclnnis also raises two other issues: denial
part
ed
2),
(issue
of Mclnnis’s motion for new trial
Johnson,
See Brewer &
P.C. v.
and failure to rule on Mclnnis’s motion for
(Tex.App.-Houston
[14th
3).
(issue
explained
sanctions
For reasons
denied)
(stating
Dist.]
that a
below, we do not reach either.
may move
summary judg
for a no-evidence
a “suit
issue,
prior litigation,
prove
Mclnnis must
if the trial
we must determine
demonstrating that “but
within a
decision
treat
this case as an
suit”
court’s
negligence,
she would
ordinary
to the
rule constitutes
for” the Law
exception
underlying
medical-
prevailed
on
an abuse
discretion.
enti
and would have been
malpractice suit
In
considering whether
v. Clem
Schlager
judgment.
tled
adequate time for dis
permitted
ents,
(Tex.App.-Hous
939 S.W.2d
following factors:
covery, we consider the
denied).
A
writ
[14th Dist.]
ton
(2)
(1)
the nature of the
the nature of
suit is re
plaintiff
legal-malpractice
in a
necessary
to controvert
expert testimony regard
quired
present
(3)
length
of time
no-evidence
of skill
care ordinari
ing
standard
(4)
active,
the case was
the amount of time
attorney.
ly
by an
See Ersek
exercised
(5)
file,
the no-evidence motion was
Davis, P.C.,
268, 271
Davis &
requested
whether the movant had
stricter
denied).
2002, pet.
Be
(Tex.App.-Austin
the amount of
deadlines
legal-mal
requirements,
cause of these
already
place,
had taken
litiga
complex
is considered
practice suit
*5
(7)
deadlines in
the
tion.
specific
vague.
place were
Brewer &
Johnson,
P.C. v.
167 S.W.3d
case,
a
In this
the trial court entered
460,
(Tex.App.-Houston [14th
467
Dist.]
forth various
docket control order
denied);
pet.
Specialty
parties
The
were
pre-trial deadlines.
Inc.,
quate time.” See Factors on the facts of Depending are for consideration The final factors may more time allocated for (1) specific were or whether the deadlines and, thus, necessary is than (2) movant had re- vague, may be less than the amount the quested stricter deadlines Likewise, court allocated. circumstances discovery already how much might entry arise the docket place. taken control render the time order would control order The trial court’s docket initially for discovery inadequate. allocated place was to take specified however, Ordinarily, specified the deadline language of through June 2006. The in the is docket control order the best specific is the docket control order indicator. length unambiguous regarding the that, us ordinarily, rule tells “ade- Thus, discovery period. discovery pe- quate be gauged time” uncertain, not vague riod in this case is designated pretrial ap- order. This and this factor is neutral. See Restaurant proach makes sense because deadlines Int’l, Inc., 95 Teams typically are the onset of the case that the Law The record does reflect based on provided by par- information formally requested Firm stricter deadlines ties complexity about the nature and However, by seeking a no- litigation. Litigants lawyers need eight summary judgment months rely be able planning the schedule in *7 discovery the and before deadline less than pursuing discovery. Adherence to halfway through discovery the designated in deadlines the docket control holds order implicitly requested the Law Firm period, promise meeting parties’ most for discovery cut the trial court to legitimate expectations discovery for short, accordingly, impose stricter a fair promoting orderly develop- id.; discovery. deadlines for See accord ment of In this the evidence. 166a(i). factor weighs Tex.R. Civ. P. This not identify, Law Firm did and the record in favor of McInnis. See Restaurant suggest, any does not factors that would Inc., Int’l, 95 Teams S.W.3d weigh application ordinary of against rule. discovery already As to much how place, Mclnnis complexity
Given the of this “suit within taken the record reflects multiple Law Firm with response a suit” and the fact-intensive re- had served the minimal id. quired, length of time the case See written responses re- pro- had been on file The Law Firm’s were not motion did after vide See Mclnnis until adequate time turned P.C., summary judg- Brewer 167 at Firm filed its motion for & S.W.3d 729; Furthermore, 468; McClure, 20 at ment. accord S.W.3d Initiatives, alleged that Cmty. responses, also Inc. its Mclnnis see v. Chase served Texas, 278, wholly all 270, 153 279 the Law Firm did not answer Bank of 204
requested
According
discovery process;
admissions.4
to abused the
the record
Mclnnis, the Law Firm had abused the
reflects Mclnnis filed a motion for sanc
discovery process by withholding informa
against
tions
Firm based on
tion that
summary-
she intended to use as
allegations
discovery
of the Law Firm’s
response
evidence in her
to the
Retailers, Inc.,
abuse.5
Specialty
See
Law Firm’s motion. A party should not
(indicating
S.W.3d at 145-46
that upon a
be
discovery
able to
process by
abuse
abuse,
showing
discovery
beyond mere
key
withholding
evidence
op
from
accusation, “it would
likely
enough to
ponent and then use that
lack
establish that there
not an adequate
to win a judgment.
Specialty
See
Retail
discovery”).
time for
v. Quality
Green
Cf.
ers, Inc.,
(providing
sustain Mclnnis’s first issue.6 A trial court an abuse of discre- commits judgment of the trial court is re- arbitrary it acts in an only tion when pro- is versed this case remanded or acts ref- unreasonable manner without ceedings with this opinion. consistent any principles. rules or guiding erence to Martinez, 219, 222 Garcia
SEYMORE, J., dissenting. record, (Tex.1999). I reviewing After the trial court acted cannot conclude SEYMORE, Justice, CHARLES W. man- arbitrary or unreasonable either dissenting. guiding acted reference to ner or without summary party may A file a no-evidence I re- Accordingly, principles. rules or “[ajfter for dis- adequate time dissent. spectfully 166a(i). However, covery.” P. Tex.R. Civ. no requirement there is an ade-
completed; requirement is *9 Specialty Retail-
quate amount of time.
ers, Fuqua, Inc. 2000, pet.
(Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
denied). had ade- Whether nonmovant issue. Having part first first issue her second of Mclnnis's sustained issue, of her we need not reach remainder
