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McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police
309 A.2d 801
Pa.
1973
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*1 Dissenting Opinion bt Mr. Justice Roberts: I dissent from the Court’s and would disposition affirm without modification the decree of President Court Orphans’ Division Judge Taxis Pleas of Montgomery County. Court of Common Mr. Nix joins dissenting opinion. Justice Appellant, McIlvaine,

Police. C. J., 26,1973. Jones, Eagen, Before Argued April Pomeroy JJ. and Nix, Roberts, *2 O’Brien, for Walker, H. Boyd appellant. with Smyser, Attorney General,

J. Andrew Deputy for Attorney Israel Paokel, General, appellee. him for Human Relations Kahn, Pennsylvania Sanford amicus curiae. Commission, by

Opinion 3, 1973: October Pomeroy, Mr. Justice In 1970, appellant Joseph Mcllvaine, having July, of was retired age sixty, involuntarily reached the Police after of State some 37 years Pennsylvania the other than In his respects all chronological service. for admittedly suitable em- was continued appellant age, dismissal was Commissioner of His ployment. to Section of the Adminis- acting pursuant Police, April L. P. Act trative Code §65(d).1 Shortly filed P.S. after dismissal, petition declaratory judgment Common praying and de court construe wealth that the Court, provision of the Admin clare the cited unconstitutional (the the defendants Commis istrative Code sioner of the Police and Secre tary Commonwealth) he directed to continue employ plaintiff until time as he should sub such dismissing resignation mit his In attain 65. although suit, Commonwealth Court held that immunity sovereign doctrine of not a in this was bar, type recovery against offi the state and its case, (Philadelphia cers Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, Life (1963)), Pa. 190A. 2d 111 result nevertheless, history declaratory judgments of “the doleful Pennsylvania”, improper such a suit was because “there remedy”. appropriate exists another available and Mc *3 Ilvaine McKetta, Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 268, (1971). Thereupon, following the advice offered in opinion, appellant the Commonwealth Court com menced the same forum the instant suit mandamus. Appellant both below and here has contended that 205(d), supra, (1) Section is invalid as unreasonable discriminatory; (2) appellant’s and of violative civil rights Pennsylvania under the constitution2 and the 205(d) provides: “(d) Any Pennsyl- member of the Police, except Deputy vania State the Commissioner and Commis- sioner, regardless rank, of who has attained who shall attain the age sixty years, resign membership police of shall in the said Provided, however, provision paragraph force: That of this shall apply upon attaining to the State members Police Force of who age sixty years twenty years of shall have less than of service. twenty years Upon completion service, provision of of of this paragraph applicable persons.” become shall to such I, (adopted May 16, 1967) provides: 2 Article Section 26 “Nei any political Commonwealth nor subdivision ther thereof shall Human Relations violative Act;3 of Amendment the Federal Constitu the Fourteenth to all three rejected argu tion. Commonwealth Court 296 A. 2d 630 ments Pa. Commonwealth Ct. (6 and this followed. (1972)) appeal feel to to the At we obliged speak proce outset, of mandamus, dural aspects litigation. Through seeks to a official compel public (the Pennsyl State Police to and act Commissioner) vania disregard to the directive of the statute directly contrary plain of the Police him, member continuing employ This is Force, beyond sixty years. precisely the antithesis of what mandamus is to accom designed As said Philadelphia Presbytery Homes, we plish. Inc. v. Board Commissioners, 440 Pa. Abington (1970): 269 A. 2d 871 303-4, “Mandamus compel ministerial officer to act in disobedience governmental of the before requirements relevant there statute, been a judicial has inva pronouncement Act’s is not the normal lidity, the con procedure testing of a statute.” See also stitutionality Unger Hamp ton 437 Pa. A. 399, 263 2d 385 Township, (1970); Booz Pa. 157 A. Reed, 2d 170

Under normal utilization of circumstances, a remedy so would be completely inappropriate fatal, would foreclose treatment the merits. any Appellant’s case, does not fit normal however, any pattern. When the Court dismissed the Commonwealth declaratory judg- any enjoyment deny person any right, civil nor discrim- against any person any right.” in the exercise inate civil *4 2(b) example For Act of October P. L. 952(b) provides amended, pertinent part: P.S. as in “It public policy hereby to be the declared this Commonwealth to employment of all individuals in foster accordance with their regardless capacities ., safeguard of their . . . . . fullest and to employment right to obtain and hold without their such discrimina- . . .” tion.

ment it on the then suit, relied, correctly, applica quite declaratory for a ble of this Court that a suit holdings is an as to alternate extraordinary judgment opposed IN 435 Pa. A, C. H. Pitt v. remedy. See, e.g., Corp. Pa. 551, 257 A. 2d 857 Sheldrake (1969); Estate, Pa. A. 2d 802 McCabe, McWilliams (1965); other 179 A. 2d Since there were in available and was adequate remedies,4 plaintiff it He to however, as were. was wrong store, advised, been pursue pointed as has mandamus, which, already out, wholly inappropriate. in of our in Frie

Considered recent decision light stad Travelers 452 Pa. 306 A. 2d Indemnity Co., 295 (1973) which established declaratory judgment an alternate line of cases overruled the remedy, on in relied the first Commonwealth Court opinion, Pa. Commonwealth Ct. the effect our dismissal action on the of mistaken present ground remedy kick would be to with plaintiff pillar post out any fault whatever his Rather than caus part. him the loss time and in ing money entailed starting all choose over we to treat the instant action as again, one declaratory relief. So we affirm requesting viewed, the order the Commonwealth Court on the opinion of President 6 Pa. Judge Commonwealth Ct. Bowman. 296 A. 2d 630 See also Soltis Appeal, 390 Pa. 135 A. 2d 744 (1957); Boyle Philadelphia, 12 A. 2d 43 (1940). 338 Pa. 129, Mr. Justice Manderino took no part the consid- of this case. eration decision Eagen Mr. Justice concurs the result. sought Appellant equity compel eould have aid of his

reinstatement, appealed to the courts from the informal decision of assumpsit wages or sued Commissioner recover for unlaw- fully withheld. *5 Opinion

Dissenting : Mr. Justice Roberts of the Common- After service to thirty-seven years retired. involuntarily Mcllvaine was wealth, Joseph concedes that was admitted- majority “appellant The for continued ly employment.” Nevertheless, suitable in of the Commonwealth Court, the adopting opinion It the Mcllvaine’s dismissal. is un- majority upholds for reason that sole disputed appellant’s discharge of I was the that he had attained the age sixty. fact join cannot termination a conceded- arbitrary this servant. ly competent public I that of the rather agree majority with view bizarre case it should treat procedural history ed as an action for relief. Friestad declaratory Co., Travelers Pa. 306 A. 2d 295 Indemnity McKetta, McIlvaine v. Pa. (1973); Commonwealth I Ct. 262 am (1971). However, to dissent compelled from the conclusion majority’s that Mcllvaine’s invol termination is untary constitutionally statutorily In the action of view permissible. my Common the Pennsylvania wealth violated Article Constitution, as well as Protection I, Equal Clause to the the Fourteenth Amendment United States Con stitution.

I of the Commonwealth opinion Court, adopted “ states that o today by majority, reach the con [t] clusion would have us reach ... plaintiff we would have to hold that Human Pennsylvania Relations Act discharge employment prohibits by reason age a conclusion which exception, without the statute does to reach.” McIlvaine us permit Pa. Police, 6 Commonwealth Ct. 296 A. 2d Were this the only available analy I would case, join majority sis denying relief. However declaratory readily admits provision itself makes Human Relations Act general prohibition exceptions to its two discrimination. practice, discriminatory un-

“It shall be an unlawful qualification, upon occupational fide less based bona corporation or in the association, case fraternal *6 regu- security except upon applicable ... or where based by lations or the Common- established the United States Pennsylvania: wealth of . . .

“(a) any employer For of color, because the race, religious ancestry, origin of or sex national creed, age, any employ, to or individual to hire or to bar refuse or discharge employment to from toor individual, such otherwise discriminate re such with individual spect compensation, to or conditions hire, tenure, terms, privileges employment, of if the best individual competent perfrom able and most to [sic] services ,”1 required. statutory provision abundantly . . This il every “discharge employ lustrates that it is not by age” prohibits. being ment reason of which the Act It only age-inspired discharges clear that certain violate question the Act, the is whether Mcllvaine’s involuntary 205(d) retirement, mandated Section of rights Administrative Code2 his violates as declared by the Human Relations Act. provision paragraph “The of this apply, shall not to employment termination of because of the terms or conditions of

any pension bona plan, (2) operation fide retirement or any or terms conditions pension of plan bona fide or retirement which have the effect of requirement, (3) oper- a minimum service any ation group or employe terms of conditions bona fide plan.” 27, 1955, 744, §5, amended, insurance Act of October P. L. (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added). express §955 43 P.S. I do here any opinion question constitutionality on the of non of 43 P.S. vel §§955(a) (2) attempted jus- and The Commonwealth has not grounds. tify appellant’s on either of these dismissal Any Pennsylvania except “(d) Police, member of Deputy regardless Commissioner, rank, Commissioner only this case involved majority asserts, as the If, seemingly harmonization two the interpretation rely one might persuaded statutes, contradictory mandatory pronouncements on this Court’s pre-1968 reli such However, employment.3 in public retirement the 1968 our view power no within ance. is longer invalidates necessarily amendment which constitutional Code. of the Administrative 205(d) Section Constitu- 26 of the I, Article unconstitutional declares May tion, adopted Commonwealth. by the discrimination nor subdi Commonwealth any political “Neither the the enjoyment deny any person shall vision thereof nor against any person discriminate of any right, civil civil Commonwealth right” any the exercise deny rights nor it reasonably could not, does are constitutionally protected.4 employees public Human Eelations Act declares that, Furthermore, for an individual to obtain employ opportunity “[t]he *7 and to obtain all the for he is qualified, ment which facilities and advantages, privileges accommodations, of and commercial of accommodation of any place public age sixty years, attain the of or who shall has attained shall who membership police Provided, resign in the said from force: how- paragraph apply provision ever, of this shall not to mem- That upon attaining age sixty Force Police who of bers State twenty years Upon years comple- of have less than service. shall twenty years provision service, paragraph of of tion shall of persons.” April applicable 9, 1929, 177, Act of to such P. L. become July 10, 1957, 682, amended, §65(d) (Supp. P. L. Act of 71 P.S. as 1973). 3 Appeal, 416, (1957) Boyle ; Pa. A. Soltis 390 135 2d See 744 v. Philadelphia, (1940). Beynon A. Pa. 12 2d 338 43 See also Superior Scranton, (1968); A. Pa. Ct. 243 2d 212 190 iani S Superior Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Ct. A. 2d 67 Examiners, Board Bar 238-39, Schware U.S. my dissenting opinion in Adler S. v. Mon Hospital, (joined 453 Pa. 311 A. 2d tefiore J.) by cases cited Manderino, and therein. housing color, because race, without discrimination origin religious ancestry, age, are or national sex creed, rights hereby recognized and declared to be civil as in this act.”5 which shall be enforceable as set forth right age employment free from discrimina Thus, right protected by Rela tion is a both the Human civil majori tions Act and the 1968 Constitution. as If, ty 205(d) appellant’s re mandates determines, solely age sixty, tirement at based this termination age discriminatory Human Re both the violates lations Act and Article Section 26 the Constitu I, tion. correctly

The Commonwealth Court observed that Pennsylvania Human “[t]he Relations Act does not absolutely protect against discharge employ- one from by age; guarantee ment reason it does not retention employment proof employee’s until death or inability perform. designed protect Rather, it discharge employment discrimination in by age doing recognizes reason of so a ‘bona fide occupational qualification’ nondiscriminatory. . . .” 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 296 A. 2d at 633.

However, court erred when it declared: appears any supporting “[PJlaintiff to assert, without proof mandatory age that a record, retirement police occupa- officers as a class is not a bona fide qualification. merely say tional enough, par- To so is not ticularly light Boyle supra. of the Soltis and cases, particular police The fact physically that a officer is fit perform and able to his may duties or that minds differ particular upon mandatory retirement selected Legislature proof is not of want of bona fides as *8 qualification applied to the uniformly otherwise and nondiscriminatorily to the selected class.” Id. 296 A. 2d at 633. §1, Act October P. amended, L. §953 P.S.

(Supp. 1973). and its for Commonwealth agencies are, pur poses Human Relations Act to be treated as any other a bona “employer.”6 When fide occupational an em qualification (BFOQ) exemption is sought ployer, must he, complaining employee, prove job facts classification bringing particular within the Human exception. Philadelphia v. Relations 4 Pa. Commission, Commonwealth Ct. 287 A. 2d 703 (1972).7

Federal Title VII the Civil courts, interpreting Act 42 U.S.C. Rights et seq. (Supp. §§2000 have likewise held the burden of 1972),8 establishing BFOQ a on the For employer. Weeks example, Southern Bell Co., 408 F. 2d 228 Telephone Cir. (5th a sex discrimination 1969), the Court case, Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded “that the principle of nondiscrimination that in or requires we hold that der to rely the bona fide occupational qualification an exception employer has the burden of that proving he had reasonable cause to that factual believe, is, for basis that all or believing, all substantially women would be unable to perform safely efficiently job duties involved.” Id. at 235 (emphasis supp lied).9 v. Southern 444 F. Co., 2d 1219

Rosenfeld Pacific Cir. (9th presented another 1971), attempt by an em- sexual ployer justify discrimination on the basis of BFOQ. Judge Hamlet, writing ob- court, served “that . . . Congress, established by Title VII individuals must be policy judged as individu- §954(b) (Supp. 1973). 6 See Id. at 43 P.S. Stroudsburg Dist., East See also Cerra v. Area School 450 Pa. (1973). A. 2d Developments generally, VII, See the Law—Title 84 Harv. Rev. 1176-95 L. Griggs Co., Duke Power 401 U.S. 91 S. Ct. 849

139 generally at- and not on the basis of characteristics ais, groups. religious, Id. at . . .” tributed to or sex racial, deciding em- Pacific’s 1225. The in that court Southern ployment policy conclud- excusable as a BFOQ, was not [Equal Opportunity Em- ed “that the Commission ployment determining that in Commission] is correct exception inapplicable BFOQ establishes narrow employment opportunities on are denied where, as here, capabili- physical the basis characterizations the charac- ties and endurance of those even when women, legislation.” recognized in Id. at teristics are state persuasive 1227. are in accord with These authorities Pennsylvania Philadelphia our v. Human Rela- cases. Stroudsburg supra; tions Cerra v. East Commission, District, Area School 450 Pa. 299 A. 2d 277 Shifting appellant, the burden Commonwealth clearly in Court did this erroneous. is instance, The Commonwealth asserts that it is well settled Pennsylvania power mandatory that the to establish a age police retirement officers is constitutional. Sol Appeal, (1957); Boyle tis Pa. A. 2d 744 390 135 (1940).10 Philadelphia, 12 A. 338 Pa. 2d 43 While may represented prevailing have at one time adoption of Article view, 1968 Section 26 of I, denuded Constitution those cases precedential all The value.11 Commonwealth Court and 10 Bey Scranton, Superior Accord, non v. 212 Pa. Ct. A. 243 (1968) ; Wilkes-Barre, Superior Siani 2d Pa. A. 2d 776 holding Appeal, 416, 135 in Soltis A. 390 Pa. 2d 744 rejected I, Boyle Philadelphia, has been Article 26. inapplicable (1940), present Pa. 12 A. 2d to the case. Writing Boyle, for the Court in Justice Drew addressed facts re markably similar to the instant case. course, express statutory prohibition, “Of in the absence of power municipality prescribe is inherent reasonable and non- discriminatory superannuation classifications, similar to those here up, respect policemen.” set with to its firemen and Id. majority undoubtedly recogniz- of this while Court, ing rely supremacy of the Constitution, nevertheless pre-1968 apparent on decisions. It is Section 205 (d) applied by Code of 1929 as Administrative solely majority permitting denial based in clear Article Section 26 the Penn- conflict with I, sylvania prohibits age Constitution which discrimina- tion.

II my majority’s I must also note from the dissent adoption of the conclusion that Commonwealth Court’s discharge appellant pursuant 205(d) of of to Section of Administrative Code 1929 does not violate the Equal of Protection Clause the Fourteenth Amendm presents paradigmatic equal ent.12 The a instant case protection violation which this Court not hesitate should recognize and correct. Failure to afford re suggested, give lief it is serve to aid and comfort will, may to those continue to who believe that citizens be arbitrarily pigeonholed for the of convenience the bu reaucracy. of the of Administrative Code “Any Pennsylvania

reads: member State Police, . . . or who has attained who shall attain the sixty years, resign membership shall in the said Boyle A. at 44. This conclusion was correct in 1940 2d when was However, 1973, “express statutory prohibition,” an decided. Pennsylvania Act, Human Relations as well as the constitutional opposite mandate the result. amendment my requires view Constitution While re- equal law, protection provides a matter of state versal as clause ground separate Karst, for this dissent. and distinct Serrano Responsibilities Opportunities A Court’s v. Priest: in the Development Law, Constitutional L. of Federal Calif. Rev. 720

Ml ,”13 faced force. . . The which must police question determination whether such squarely legislative within the function.14 proper scope legislative its the equal protection

Since adoption interp judicial through has and matured grown clause of as a conceived vehicle Originally retation.15 the of the lately emancipated race,16 black protection scrutiny” has been extended to mandate “strict its scope ancestry,17 classification based on national any race, sex19 emerged Of have alienage.18 late, signs joined techniques require has which group sorting judicial It has been further sug- searching analysis. April July 10, amended, Act of P. L. Act of §65(d) 1973). (Supp. For P. 71 P.S. the full text L. supra. this section see note I See 6 Pa. Commonwealth at 296 A. at 634. do 2d express any opinion propriety on the Commonwealth exemption Court’s that neither the of the commissioner decision twenty deputy nor that with commissioner of officers less than years equal protection of service clause. violates Id. A. 2d at 632-33. Laws, tenBroek, Equal Protection of the See Tussman & *11 ; Law—Equal (1949) Developments Pro in the Calif. Rev. 341 37 L. ; Gunther, Supreme (1969) tection, The 1065 Court 82 Harv. L. Rev. Chang Evolving In Search of Doctrine on a Term—Foreword: 1971 Protection, ing Equal A L. Rev. for a Newer 86 Harv. Court: Model (1972). 1 16 (16 Wall.) (1872). Slaughter-House Cases, 83 36 U.S. 17 Dist., 621, Free School U.S. Kramer v. Union 395 S. Ct. 1886 89 Loving Virginia, 1, (1967); (1969) ; 388 87 S. Ct. 1817 Kore v. U.S. ; Plessy States, 214, (1944) U.S. Ct. 193 v. United 323 65 S. matsu 1138, (1896) (Harlan, Ferguson, 1144 163 16 Ct. U.S. S. v. dissenting). J., 18 Comm’n, 410, Fish & 334 S. Takahashi v. Game U.S. 68 See (1948) ; Oyama California, 633, 332 U.S. Ct. 269 v. 68 S. 1138 Ct. (1948).

Reed cation) ; (four traditional [19] v. Frontiero Reed, Stanley eight participating 404 U.S. rational v. v. Richardson, Illinois, 71, 92 S. Ct. 251 basis 405 Justices declare test). 411 U.S. U.S. 645, 677, 92 S. Ct. sex a 93 (nominally applying S. 1208 Ct. suspect 1764 (1972). classifi (1973) 142

gested having impact a that classifications differential particular groups income added to the cir should be reviewing require in cle of cases which the court will justify “compelling in order state interest” to classif ication.20 requiring heightened equal pro recognized

Also analysis involving been “fundamental tection have cases procreation,21 interests.” This class interests includes voting,22 rights of the criminal defendant,23 right more limited somewhat extent, education,24 right privacy.26 and the travel,25

To “rational traditional basis” test is sure, yet applied, particularly regulat cases economic recently, only legisla ion.27 one Until case has a wanting been found tive classification under the tradi question exempted tional statute test, there, 28 purview corporation. from its one named 20 Supreme Michelman, Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting Through Amendment, the Poor the Fourteenth 83 Harv. (1969). L. Rev. 7 21 Williamson, 535, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 316 U.S. 62 S. (1942). Ct. 1110 22 Blumstein, 330, (1972); Harper Dunn v. 405 U.S. 92 S. Ct. 995 Virginia Elections, 663, (1966) ; Bd. v. U.S. S. Ct. 383 86 1079 Sims, Reynolds 533, (1964). 377 84 Ct. 1362 v. U.S. S. 23 Illinois, 12, See, e.g., (1956). v. 351 U.S. 76 S. 585 Griffin 24 Ed., See, e.g., 483, Board 347 U.S. Brown v. 74 S. Ct. 686 Inequalities Financing: (1954) ; Goldstein, in School A Interdistrict Analysis Progeny, of Serrano Priest and Its Critical v. U. Pa. (1972). 505, Antonio But see San Ind. School Dist. v. L. 534-44 Rev. (1973). Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 93 S. Ct. Blumstein, (1972); 405 U.S. 92 S. Ct. 995 Sha Dunn v. Thompson, piro 394 U.S. 89 S. Ct. (1973); Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 410 U.S. Griswold v. Roe v. Connecticut, Ct. 1678 U.S. 85 S. York, Express Agency Railway New 336 U.S. 69 S. Ct. Optical, ; (1949) Lee 348 U.S. 75 S. Ct. 461 Williamson *12 Virginia, Royster (1955) ; Co. v. 253 U.S. 40 S. Ct. F. S. Guano Dowd, Morey 354 U.S. 77 S. Ct. 1344 perhaps Recently, of a reluctance because however, scrutiny, subject categories to strict to new declare thereby moving revitalized rational basis test has been concep- to the late Justice Jackson’s its effect closer equal protection. tion of equal protection does . . . clause,

“Invocation dealing any body governmental from with not disable subject merely prohibi that the at hand. It means impact. regulation I re have a broader tion must gard salutary and the that states cities, it as doctrine powers must exercise their so Federal Government except up inhabitants not to discriminate between their fairly related to the differentiation some reasonable merely object regulation. equality ab is not This justice. knew, of the Constitution stract The framers forget today, no more that there is should not we arbitrary guaranty against practical and un effective require government princi than to that the reasonable impose upon ples a minori officials law which would Conversely, nothing ty imposed generally. be must a,s effectively arbitrary opens action so the door only pick those officials to and choose few allow escape they apply legislation and thus to will whom might upon political if that be visited them retribution larger can no numbers were affected. Courts take bet just that laws than to re measure to assure will ter equal operation.”29 quire laws be perceptively Gerald Gunther has Professor noted, As Supreme the United States Court has moved since away rigid compelling steadily standards—either testing legisla- or rational basis—in state interest state protection equal clause. Gunther, tion Supreme Foreword: In Term, Search of Court Express Agency York, Railway 106, 111-13, v. New 336 U.S. J., (Jackson, concurring), Gunther, cited S. Ct. supra 22-23. n.15

144 on A Model for Doctrine a Court: Changing Evolving a 86 1 Protection, Newer Harv. L. Rev. Equal There notable the two-tiered drop have been attempts for a test all adopt equal protection rhetoric and single model of cases.30 “The modest interventionism emerging would do more than for they have the courts have done the last to assure with generation rationality means, out on impinging legislative unduly prerogatives regard ends.”31 ing

The development single-test equal protection formula is illustrated Mr. Justice White's concur by ring Vlandis 412 93 opinion Kline, U.S. 441, 456, S. Ct. 2238 of the Court de 2230, opinion clared on ir invalid due process grounds Connecticut’s rebuttable that a presumption student, non-resident when in the for beginning state tui college remained, tion a non-resident his purposes, throughout education. Mr. Justice White based his on concurrence the equal protection clause.

“From these and other cases, such as Dandridge 397 U.S. Williams, 90 S. Ct. 471, 25 L. 2d 1153, Ed. 491 Reed v. 404 (1970); Reed, U.S. 92 S. Ct. 30 71, L. Ed. 2d 225 Frontiero (1971); 411 U.S. Richardson, 93 S. Ed. Ct. 36 L. 2d (1973), Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. L. Ed. 2d 1400, 31 it clear (1972), that we em- or ploy just one, but, as two, Brother my Marshall has so ably demonstrated, ‘spectrum standards discrimination reviewing allegedly violative Protection Equal Clause.’ San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, U.S. 1, pp. S. 98-99, 93 L. Ct. Ed. 2d p. (dissenting opinion). just Sometimes we the claim say is ‘invidious’ and let the matter rest as Mr. there, Justice Stewart for did, Gunther, supra n.15 at 17-20.

31 Id. 23. But other in Frontiero. example, concurring it is justifiable if times we sustain discrimination, down, or it rational strike basis, conceivable any some interest compelling sustained unless discrim a State as, imposes when State, example, of a con exercise ination burdens penalizes Shapiro v. See, Thompson, stitutional right. e.g., I 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969). U.S. 89 S. for it must now with the dichotomy, am unconfortable Court’s as the along, or has been all obvious, that, *14 of the individual of the value assessment weight the it that mere adminis likely interest less escalates, or inves hearings convenience and trative avoidance will what otherwise justify be sufficient tigations 412 to be irrational would discriminations.” appear at U.S. 93 S. Ct. at 2239-40.32 458-59, ex scale” approach equal protection “sliding found by expression Mr. Justice White has pounded recent the Court.33 Mr. Justice two opinions Mar in Police majority the speaking Department shall, 92, v. 408 U.S. 92 S. Ct. 2286 concluded Mosley, (1972), in all equal cases, however, protection “[a]s an is whether there is question appropriate gov crucial the differential by ernmental interest furthered suitably 92 Ct. at 2290. In v. treatment.” Id. S. Weber & Aetna 406 U.S. 92 S. Casualty Surety Company, Mr. Justice examined the two- (1972), Ct. Powell test concluded that neither tiered standard would strictly applied. in all the inquiry “The essential cases foregoing is, one: inevitably dual What state however, legitimate Strange, (1972) ; U.S. Ct. James v. 92 S. See (1972) ; Humphrey Indiana, 406 92 S. Ct. 1845 U.S. Jackson (1972) ; Baird, Cady, 92 S. Ct. 1048 Eisenstadt 405 U.S. U.S. 92 S. supra Gunther, 17-18. n.15 at promote? does the funda- interest classification What personal rights might mental endan- classification ger.” Id. at 92 Ct. at S. 1405. clear

It is thus that the lines the strict two-tiered equal protection becoming are In blurred. an effort to application rigid, dog- avoid mechanistic of a stultified Supreme the United States Court has ma, moved toward single, sliding-scale equal protection test. move- This applauded may analyze ment is to be since courts now employed by Legislature the means in all Al- cases. though judicial thorough inquiry legislative more into possible, classifications is now determination of sub- goals past, particular stantive inas remains, province Legislature. may The courts under not, equal protection, usurp legislative the rubric of function.

Testing the instant case these it standards, discharge is clear that pursuant Mcllvaine’s 205(d) to Section Administrative Code is vio right equal protection lation of his to the of the laws. reaching In this conclusion under the test outlined necessary together it gravity above, consider legislative of the interest affected classification— *15 appellant’s right employment—and to continued the thereby characteristic of the class regulated—attaining age against 60. This factor must then be balanced the interest of the in arbitrary state age means—an implement particular classification—used to regula tory age scheme—dismissal of all sixty who attain irre spective competency performance to continue of as signed duties.34 34 protection equal may only In cases courts consider the means Legislature adopts in which order to effectuate its substantive policy. Only through studious equal adherence pro to this tenet of analysis may tection return to the discredited doctrine of substan process be York,

tive due avoided. See Lochner v. New 198 U.S. 25 Ct. 539 S.

M7 In the case is clear that the Act’s is scope instant it admittedly broad. is Appellant unreasonably qualified Physi- to continue his duties as commander. troop mental he meets all state standards. His cally police in no declined. in order to capacity pro- has Yet way no more mote what can be than mere administrative it Commonwealth asserts that has convenience, I him. absolute to dismiss cannot right agree. Under the test which protection my equal should, the classification must demonstrate a view, apply, “sig nificant relationship” legislative purpose.35 Where such a fact it exists, must then be bal relationship anced the nature the class thereby disadvan taged. Here the means used to achieve the Act’s pur an is classification.36 pose arbitrary age There is no 35 Co., v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Weber 406 U.S. 92 S. Ct. Reed, See also Reed v. 404 U.S. S. Ct. 251 ; Gunther, (1971) supra I n.15 34-35. note that the classification accomplish here is not the narrowest involved which could Legislature’s present purpose. The classification scheme over- is Tucker, (1960); U.S. Ct. broad. Shelton S. (1964); Alabama, Develop 84 S. NAACP v. 377 U.S. Ct. Law, supra n.15, at 1086-87. ments question here in The nature of the classification should also weigh heavily in A sub our consideration. classification must be searching analysis jected where to more it closed-ended—that is through may not, efforts, his own member remove where a class disadvantaged group. are, Such from the classifications himself course, age. alienage, origin, sex, and, example, race, national age affecting imply classifications “funda that all This is constitutionally impermissible. rights” Minimum re are mental outgrown. eventually here, may However, where, quirements distinguished by special singled treatment out for the class membership permanent. age, once achieved is Thus class maximum distinguishing go deeper analysis than it would were the must our sug As Mr. Justice Stone class otherwise. characteristic to United States v. Carolene Products gested footnote famous in his n.4, 152-53, 58 S. 783-84 n.4 Co., U.S. opinion). (concurring

showing significantly related to Mcllvaine’s performance troop of his duties as commander. On the contrary, appellant the Commonwealth concedes that respects physically mentally competent in all perform required system all his duties. A classification which mandates this anomalous result is violative equal protection clause where, Common- here, wealth has advanced no interest other than mere ad- convenience. ministrative This record demonstrates that through application has, mechanistic discriminatory equal oppor- been denied an statute, tunity profession—one to continue in his chosen admittedly eminently qualified. which he is preemptory right Such a denial of Mcllvaine’s to the equal protection of the laws mandates that he be rein- majority’s grant appellant stated. The refusal relief compels dissent. joins dissenting opinion.

Mr. Justice Nix in this “[Prejudice may discrete and insular minorities special condition, seriously operation which tends to curtail political processes ordinarily upon protect of those to be relied may minorities, correspondingly searching which call for more judicial inquiry.” Appellant. m on

Com wealth v. Shadd,

Case Details

Case Name: McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Oct 3, 1973
Citation: 309 A.2d 801
Docket Number: Appeal, 151
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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