HAIDY McHUGH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANTA MONICA RENT CONTROL BOARD, Defendant and Appellant; LINDA L. SMITH et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents; HELEN McCLELLAN et al., Interveners and Respondents.
L.A. No. 32062
Supreme Court of California
Aug. 17, 1989
348, 352
Joel Martin Levy, Jana Zimmer, Michael Heumann, Stephen P. Wiman and Marsha Jones Moutrie for Defendant and Appellant.
Marsha N. Cohen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Christopher M. Harding, Mark Garrett, Lawrence & Harding and Rhodes, Maloney Hart, Mullen, Jakle & Harding for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Thomas A. Seaton as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
David M. Shell, Craig Mordoh, Thomas A. Nitti, Sherman L. Stacey and Stacey & Jones for Interveners and Respondents.
OPINION
LUCAS, C. J.—In this appeal we consider whether a provision of the Santa Monica Rent Control Charter Amendment (art. XVIII, Santa Monica City Charter, hereafter Charter Amendment) which provides for administrative adjudication of excess rent claims and imposition of treble damages (id.,
We will conclude that administrative adjudication of excess rent claims under the Charter Amendment does not, in and of itself, violate the judicial powers clause. We will hold, however, that imposition of treble damages is a power beyond the Board‘s authority. We will also conclude that, on the facts of this case, the Board‘s order, which authorizes immediate rent withholding, violates the judicial powers clause.
I. Facts
A. The Charter Amendment
In April 1979 the voters of the City of Santa Monica adopted by initiative a rent control ordinance to be administered by the Board. The Charter Amendment gives the Board power to promulgate pertinent regulations, and to hear and determine complaints of violations of the system as administered. (§§ 1803, subd. (g), 1805, subd. (d); former § 1809, subd. (b).)
The Charter Amendment regulates the maximum allowable rents for controlled rental units and authorizes adjustments in maximum rents by way of both general (i.e., “across the board“) and individual proceedings. (§§ 1804, 1805.) Under section 1810, any violation of the Charter Amendment by a landlord constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months in county jail, or both. Under section 1811, the Board, tenants or landlords of controlled units may seek a court order enjoining violations of the rent control law.
In addition, section 1809 of the Charter Amendment permits a court action for damages. (Id., subds. (a) & (d).) At the time this case arose (see post, fn. 2), subdivision (a) of section 1809 provided: “Any landlord who demands, accepts, receives, or retains any payment of rent” in excess of the maximum allowed under the ordinance or the rules promulgated thereunder “shall be liable . . . to the tenant . . . for reasonable attorney‘s fees and costs as determined by the court, plus damages in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) or three (3) times the amount by which the payment received or retained exceeds the maximum lawful rent, whichever is the greater.”
Section 1808 provides for review of the Board‘s decision. “A landlord or tenant aggrieved by any action or decision of the Board may seek judicial review by appealing to the appropriate court within the jurisdiction.” The method of “appeal” utilized has been the filing of a petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to
B. The Proceedings Below
Two tenants, Smith and Plevka, filed an administrative complaint under the Charter Amendment, asserting plaintiff McHugh had charged them excess rent. After a hearing officer made initial determinations and orders, all parties appealed to the Board. The Board held the tenants had been overcharged, and awarded restitution of excess rent as well as treble damages. It expressly authorized Plevka (who remained in possession of the rental unit) to withhold $2,797.91, calculated as follows: $2,448 in treble damages ($816 for excess rent charged before the hearing examiner‘s findings, multiplied by three) plus $252 (excess rent charged after the hearing examiner‘s findings) plus $97.91 (interest on excess rents). The Board‘s order further stated, “The withheld amounts shall not form the basis for an unlawful detainer proceeding based upon non-payment of rent.” (See § 1806, subd. (a).) The Board ruled that Smith (who had since vacated the rental unit) was entitled to total recovery of $1,593.08, calculated as follows: $1,411.50 in treble damages ($470.50 in excess rent charged before the hearing examiner‘s findings, multiplied by three) plus $130 (excess rent
Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate (
After a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiff‘s and interveners’ motions for summary judgment and entered judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. It issued a peremptory writ ordering the Board to vacate the Plevka and Smith decisions, and declared former section 1809, subdivision (b), of the Charter Amendment “invalid because it requires the . . . Board to exercise judicial powers which fall within the ambit of
II. Analysis
A. Background
We have often noted that agencies not vested by the Constitution with judicial powers may not exercise such powers. “[A]rticle VI disposes of all judicial power not expressly disposed of elsewhere in the Constitution . . . . [A]lthough the Legislature retains the authority to grant a multitude of powers to local bodies pursuant to article XI, powers of a judicial nature are no longer at its disposal.” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 42, italics in original.)4 In this case we must determine whether the challenged Charter Amendment provision unconstitutionally authorizes the Board to exercise “judicial powers” within the meaning of
B. The Jersey Maid Decision
Almost 50 years ago we held an ostensibly similar grant of power to an administrative agency unconstitutional under article VI, section 1. (Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock (1939) 13 Cal.2d 620, 651-652; see also Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 171 Cal. 319, 322 [commission that is authorized to finally settle liability disputes between employers and employees exercises judicial power] [dictum]; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 407, 411-413 [same] [dictum].) Plaintiff asserts Jersey Maid controls this case, and requires that we affirm the trial court. As we explain below, however, we decline to apply Jersey Maid‘s holding to the challenged remedial powers in this case.
Jersey Maid involved a broad constitutional challenge to the Milk Stabilization Act. In creating the act, the Legislature expressly declared that production and distribution of milk was “a business affected with a public interest.” (13 Cal.2d at p. 626.) The declaration explained that milk was a necessary product and its availability vital to the public health and welfare. Because of “unfair, unjust, destructive and demoralizing trade practices” that constituted a “constant menace” to California‘s citizens and degraded
This court upheld most of the act‘s provisions against various due process and equal protection challenges. (13 Cal.2d at pp. 636-651, 652-660.) We specifically rejected numerous attacks grounded on the notion that the act unconstitutionally conferred legislative power on the director, by allowing him to decide whether to set minimum prices, and to fix such prices. In addition, we rejected broad challenges (asserting violations of both the “judicial powers” and “legislative powers” clauses (Cal. Const., arts. VI, § 1, IV, § 1)), to the director‘s authority to employ “judicial power . . . in that he is empowered to hold hearings at which evidence is produced and findings of fact are made by him.” (13 Cal.2d at p. 659.)
Nonetheless we invalidated—on grounds that it violated the Constitution‘s judicial powers clause—a provision allowing the director to entertain and resolve complaints by milk producers against milk distributors. The challenged section permitted the director to “determine the amount of damage, if any, to which a complainant is entitled as a result of a failure of the distributor to pay for fluid milk or fluid cream as in this chapter provided, and in such case the director may make an order directing the offender to make reparation and pay to such person complaining such amount on or before the date fixed in the order.” (13 Cal.2d at p. 651.)5 Responding to the contention that this provision improperly clothed the director with judicial power, we stated, “There can be no answer to this contention. No citation of authority is necessary to support the same. While the attorney-general does not concede the invalidity of this provision of said section, he makes no attempt to defend its constitutionality, and we must therefore assume that he recognizes the serious defect in this provision of said section. . . .” (Id.,
Plaintiff asserts the director‘s power held unconstitutional in Jersey Maid is indistinguishable from the Board‘s authority to determine excess rents and order reparations under section 1809, subdivision (b). Plaintiff‘s premise is that the “damages” which the Jersey Maid court found to be beyond the agency‘s powers were merely restitutive in nature (i.e., the difference between the minimum price and the actual price). She reasons that because the milk board was prohibited from adjudicating and awarding such restitution in Jersey Maid, the Board here is likewise prohibited from doing the same (and, it follows, from imposing treble damages).
Precise interpretation of Jersey Maid is difficult; discussion of the damages issue was, at best, conclusory. It may be, as plaintiff suggests, that the court considered an award of “damages” of any kind to be beyond the board‘s powers. But because the Jersey Maid court did not explain or articulate the nature of the “serious defect” of the statutory provision, it is unclear whether that decision was based on plaintiff‘s view, or on some other rationale. For example, the Jersey Maid decision might have rested on a conclusion that the provision was unconstitutional because it did not specifically provide for judicial review of the administrative determination. (See post, pp. 361-362 [discussing the “principle of check“].)6
When, as here, a decision treats an issue in a “summary and conclusory” manner, and is “virtually devoid of reasoning,” its authoritative status is undermined. (City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 533.) Moreover, we note that Jersey Maid addressed an issue of first impression without discussing precedents from other jurisdictions, or the policy implications of its rule. (I.J. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson (1985) 40 Cal.3d 327, 336.) Most important, as we explain below, the intervening five decades of case law show that unquestioning and rigid adherence to Jersey Maid‘s holding would place us out of step with every sister-state court of this country that has considered administrative awards of “restitutive” damages. Given this fact, we decline to treat Jersey Maid with the same deference we would normally accord an earlier opinion under the doctrine of stare decisis.
C. Constitutional Propriety of the Powers at Issue in This Case
The challenged powers exercised by the Board in this case are of two distinct kinds: (i) the power to adjudicate “excess rent” claims, and (ii) the power to award treble damages. We address them in turn.
1. The power to make “restitutive” money awards
As we explain below, prior California cases provide no direct guidance on the propriety of administrative restitutive money awards. Cases dealing with administrative licensing agencies, however, suggest that such agencies may properly order reparations as a probationary condition of a licensee, and hence these cases shed some light on the issue posed here. Moreover, the decisions of our sister states provide helpful guidance. The out-of-state decisions unanimously hold that an administrative agency may—consistently with the “judicial powers” doctrine—make restitutive money awards provided (i) doing so is reasonably necessary to effectuate the administrative agency‘s primary, legitimate regulatory purposes, and (ii) the “essential” judicial power remains ultimately in the courts, through review of agency determinations. We will conclude that these limitations on agency adjudication provide a reasoned and workable test by which to measure challenges under our Constitution‘s judicial powers clause, and will adopt that test as our own.
a. California cases
Other than Jersey Maid, supra, 13 Cal.2d 620, we have found no California case addressing directly the authority of “nonconstitutional” agencies (ante, p. 355) to make restitutive money awards.7 There is, however, at least
Nor do our recent cases dealing with administrative authority to award compensatory or punitive damages shed significant light on the constitutional issue presented here. In Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, and Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, we held the relevant statutes did not authorize awards of either compensatory or punitive damages by the California Horseracing Board, or punitive damages by the FEHC. Accordingly, we did not reach constitutional claims.9
In subsequent professional license revocation cases we rejected other “judicial power” challenges to administrative action. In so doing, we implied that so long as appropriate judicial review was available, the challenged administrative determination was not subject to attack on the ground of unlawful delegation of judicial power. (See, e.g., Drummey, supra, 13 Cal.2d 75, 84-85 [“It is the essence of judicial action that finality is given to findings based on conflicting evidence. If the statute be so construed it would violate the state Constitution. . . . [¶] In view of these principles, it necessarily follows that the court . . . must exercise an independent judgment on the facts.“]; Laisne, supra, 19 Cal.2d 831, 840 [“[A vested property right] cannot be finally destroyed by a nonjudicial body if the action of that body is questioned in a court of law in a mandate proceeding. [¶] [I]f finality were given to the action of an administrative agency, such would be an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power.“]; see also Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 142-143.) These decisions recognized as a limiting condition on administrative power—what Professor Davis has later termed the “principle of check“: “In the organic arrangements that we have been making in recent decades in the establishment and control of administrative agencies, the principle that has guided us is the principle of check, not the principle of separation of powers. We have had little or no concern
We have never held, however, that the mere availability of judicial review insulates all forms of administrative adjudication from constitutional challenge under the judicial powers clause. And, we note, none of our prior cases involved an administrative restitutive award. The question arises whether, even assuming appropriate judicial review is assured, an administrative agency may constitutionally adjudicate restitutive money claims. Once again, we derive some illumination from our licensing cases.
Some commentators suggest that a licensing board‘s authority to revoke or suspend licenses stems from the inherent strength of the police power itself. Professor Brown, for example, reasons that the administrative board‘s authority to grant a license necessarily implies an authority to regulate license holders, and to take appropriate disciplinary action against those who violate licensing standards. (Brown, Administrative Commissions and Judicial Power (1935) 19 Minn.L.Rev. 261, 287-288; see also Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (1966) p. 114.) But if an administrative board‘s exercise of “judicial-like” power is justified as a reasonable means of effectuating its regulatory goal, it is difficult to explain why a price control board may not order restitution in order to effectuate its own regulatory goal—unless an order for monetary recovery is itself of such a character that it is purely judicial, and may be imposed only by a court.
The cases, however, have not suggested that an order for monetary recovery per se is of such character that it may be made only by a court. In practice, our administrative agencies commonly order money reparations, as when restitution is imposed as a probationary term on a licensee (e.g., Russell v. Miller (1943) 21 Cal.2d 817, 818 [electrical contractor‘s license suspended “until defendant makes restitution” to his client “satisfactory to the Registrar of Contractors“]; American Funeral Concepts v. Board of Funeral Directors & Embalmers (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 303, 308 [license conditionally revoked; licensee subject to 300-day suspension on condition it make restitution]), and we have referred to the exercise of such power with apparent approval. (Youst v. Longo, supra, 43 Cal.3d 64, 82, fn. 15 [“We do not mean to imply that the Board is
One recent Court of Appeal decision discussed the implications of administrative power to make restitutive money awards. McKee v. Bell-Carter Olive Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1230, involved an administrative body that regulates the conduct of its licensees—food “processors“—in relation to the processors’ suppliers, food growers.12 Among other things, the administrative board has authority to entertain a grower‘s complaint that a processor has failed to pay for products under a contract, and to suspend a processor‘s license until restitution is paid to the grower.13 Addressing the grower‘s assertion that the administrative scheme failed to provide a remedy for recovery of his claimed damages (restitutive, compensatory and punitive), the McKee court stated: “It is certainly true . . . that despite this broad statutory framework, the Director has no authority to award damages directly. . . . [T]his apparently stems from the decision of the California Supreme Court in Jersey Maid. . . .
“Nevertheless, [Food and Agriculture Code] sections 55749 and 55851 make clear that once the Director has determined a [grower] is entitled to payment from a licensed processor, the Director may indirectly compel compliance with such an order by conditioning suspension of the processor‘s license upon payment of the money due the [grower]. Setting aside for the moment plaintiff‘s claims for damages in excess of the contract price, resort to the statutory remedy would have sufficed to make plaintiff whole, i.e., to attain for him the properly computed contract price for his olives. Thus while the statutory procedure is facially punitive, its effect is to provide an administrative remedy clearly relevant to plaintiff‘s claim. Notwithstanding the Director‘s inability to directly order the payment of damages, the Director‘s power to conditionally suspend a processor‘s license until payment
Plaintiff here appears to concede the exercise of this type of restitutive/remedial power by a licensing board does not violate
In conclusion, although we acknowledge the constitutional importance of ensuring judicial review of administrative determinations, our prior cases do not stand for the proposition that an administrative agency may exercise all manner of “judicial-like” power on the simple condition that judicial review of the administrative decision remains available. On the other hand, our prior licensing cases have accepted without constitutional debate the authority of licensing agencies to impose a restitutive award as a probationary
b. Sister-state cases16
Our constitutional provision confining “judicial powers” to the courts (
The accommodating view of modern courts, however, generally has been conditioned by two limiting principles, one procedural and the other substantive. First, our sister-state cases, like our own (ante at p. 361), universally recognize the constitutional necessity of the “principle of check.” They hold the availability of judicial review of administrative decisions is sufficient to satisfy the “principle of check.”19
The substantive limitation is expressed in an opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court: “As a rule which meets most situations, when an executive board has regulatory functions, it may hear and determine controversies which are incidental thereto, but if the duty is primarily to decide questions of legal right between private parties, the function belongs to the judiciary. . . . [¶] The creation of an executive board is justified if its service is to determine and maintain a public right or interest. To accomplish its purposes judicial powers may be necessarily exerted. But they must concern matters of an executive character. They are proper if it may fairly be said that there is need of them in order to produce an efficient and effective administrative enforcement of the public interest. . . . [¶] Whatever the borderland of doubt and interchange, argument seems unneeded to demonstrate that the function of trying and deciding litigation is strictly
With these two principles in mind, we review the decisions of our sister states.
At least nine states, all of which have constitutional provisions substantially identical to California Constitution, article VI, section 1, have considered the propriety of administrative adjudication of restitutive and compensatory “damages.” The decisions unanimously hold such remedial power as is involved here does not constitute an impermissible exercise of judicial power. In order to provide more explicit illumination, we will discuss in detail two decisions which, in our view, best express the “limiting principles” mentioned above.
The Maryland Constitution, like ours, provides that the “judicial power” of the state is vested in the state high court and lower courts. (Compare Md. Const., art. IV, § 1,21 with
An assortment of remedial powers conferred on the landlord-tenant board were challenged: “(1) to impose a civil penalty not exceeding $1,000; [¶] (2) to award money damages [to either party] not exceeding $1,000; [¶] (3) to award payments for temporary substitute housing; [¶] (4) to terminate leases; [¶] (5) to order repairs; [and] [¶] (6) to order the return of security deposits and rental moneys paid.” (312 A.2d at p. 238.)
The landlords asserted such remedial powers were judicial in nature, and therefore could not be exercised by the administrative agency. (312 A.2d at
p. 243.) Rejecting that claim, the court first noted that the board did not make “final,” but merely “initial” decisions, because an aggrieved party could seek judicial review of the board‘s decision. Nor, the court reasoned, was the board‘s decision “binding“: the board had no power to enforce its orders; instead, court action was necessary to enforce the board‘s orders. Thus, the court concluded, the “principle of check” stressed by Professor Davis, ante, page 361, was not violated by the administrative adjudicatory scheme. (Ibid.)
The court next specifically rejected the landlords’ claims that “the remedies entrusted to the [board‘s] discretion are remedies exclusively reserved to the courts” (312 A.2d at p. 244), and instead found all of the above-listed remedial powers were proper. The court explained that the ““pivotal point in determining the permissible extent of delegable adjudicatory functions is not merely their inherent nature but the context of the regulatory scheme and the enforcement procedure provided by the administrative process.“” (312 A.2d at p. 245.) Considering the exercise of the listed remedial powers “in the context of the regulatory scheme,” the court approved the use of such powers as being “reasonably necessary” to the board‘s regulatory goals: “We think it plain that the function of the [board] is primarily administrative and the power vested in it to hear and determine controversies involving landlords and tenants is granted only as an incident to its administrative duty; in other words, the [board‘s] function is not primarily to decide questions of legal rights between private parties, but [that remedial role] is merely incidental, although reasonably necessary, to its regulatory powers.” (Id., at pp. 245-246.)22
The
The Missouri court acknowledged that in exercising its authority the commission necessarily determined factual questions, and exercised discretion, and that it thereby “does exercise judicial functions.” (632 S.W.2d at p. 484.) Nevertheless, the court reasoned, this did not constitute exercise of “true judicial power.” It defined such power as ““the power to ‘decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect. . . .“” (ibid.), and noted that the commission had no such “final” authority: “It determines if the respondent employer has discriminated against the complainant, and it determines what orders to issue. But it cannot ‘pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect;’ only a court can enforce the Commission‘s order. A party aggrieved by the Commission‘s order may obtain judicial review of that order. [Citation.] After review, there is a judgment from a court to be enforced. If a decision is not appealed, the Commission must obtain a court order to enforce the Commission‘s order. [Citation.] Of course, the respondent, against whom an order has been issued, may comply voluntarily with that order.” (Ibid., italics in original.)
Decisions of New Jersey, Wisconsin, Oregon, West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Florida—all of which have “judicial powers” provisions substantially identical to
All of the foregoing sister-state decisions support an expansive view of constitutionally permissible administrative powers. Indeed, some contain broad statements that in our view may well accord too little consideration to the “substantive limitations” principle discussed above. We explain below the guiding principles we glean from these decisions.
c. Guiding principles: substantive and procedural limitations on the remedial power of administrative agencies
Although many of these decisions—including Investors, supra, 312 A.2d 225—were discussed in the brief of amicus curiae for defendant, plaintiff
The better analyzed and more thoughtful decisions, as we read them, set out the following guidelines: An administrative agency may constitutionally hold hearings, determine facts, apply the law to those facts, and order relief—including certain types of monetary relief—so long as (i) such activities are authorized by statute or legislation and are reasonably necessary to effectuate the administrative agency‘s primary, legitimate regulatory purposes, and (ii) the “essential” judicial power (i.e., the power to make enforceable, binding judgments) remains ultimately in the courts, through review of agency determinations. As noted above, the “procedural” aspect of this test (ante at p. 361) is entirely consistent with (and indeed, dictated by) established California law concerning administrative revocation of professional licenses (ante at p. 361). We review below the merit, scope, and propriety of our sister states’ substantive limitations on administrative remedial power.
(i) Substantive limitations on the remedial power of administrative agencies
The view of the judicial powers doctrine embraced by our sister states has the advantage of avoiding meaningless, wooden distinctions (used in a number of older cases) between “quasijudicial” and “judicial” powers,30 and at the same time remaining true to the fundamental teaching of the various constitutional judicial powers clauses. The decisions forthrightly recognize that administrative agencies do indeed exercise “judicial-like” powers, and accept the need for broad administrative powers in our increasingly complex government. At the same time, the view espoused by our sister states includes a crucial and workable limiting principle: The agency may exercise only those powers that are reasonably necessary to effectuate the agency‘s primary, legitimate regulatory purposes. Thus, contrary to plaintiff‘s suggestions, we perceive no danger that the view of judicial power embraced by our sister states will lead to a proliferation of agencies created to adjudicate specialized private disputes, thereby undermining the traditional role of the
Practical considerations also militate against a less accommodating view of the judicial powers doctrine. If nonconstitutional administrative agencies were barred from adjudicating all money claims between private individuals who are subject to administrative regulation, such agencies would be precluded from exercising powers routinely employed, and not previously challenged.32 For example, the authority of the FEHC to award backpay might thereby be called in doubt (see ante, fn. 8), and the authority of licensing agencies to adjudicate and conditionally order restitution (ante, pp. 362-364) might also be questioned.
(ii) Procedural limitations on the remedial power of administrative agencies
In addition to placing reasoned and workable substantive limitations on the remedial powers of administrative agencies, the view of the judicial powers doctrine embraced by our sister states also reserves to the courts the “true” judicial power. Consistently with our prior cases dealing with administrative revocation of professional licenses, the decisions uphold an agency‘s authority to exercise a challenged remedial power only if the administrative scheme also respects the “principle of check” by providing for judicial review of administrative determinations. It remains, of course, to resolve in different categories of cases, the procedures for and scope of judicial review necessary to fulfill the goal of reserving to the courts this essential attribute of judicial power.33
As observed above, there is no modern decision of this state addressing the precise administrative remedial power challenged here. With the exception of Jersey Maid—which, for the reasons discussed above, we do not believe should be viewed as controlling—our prior cases do not conflict with the approach taken by our sister states, and indeed they recognize the constitutional necessity of the “principle of check.” We believe our sister states’ approach (i.e., embracing substantive as well as procedural limitations on administrative power) reflects a practical and reasoned understanding of the judicial powers doctrine. With the following considerations and concerns in mind, we, like our sister states, conclude that administrative adjudication and awarding of restitution does not offend our Constitution‘s judicial powers clause when these substantive and procedural limitations are respected.
We too will carefully apply the “reasonable necessity/legitimate regulatory purpose” requirements in order to guard against unjustified delegation of authority to decide disputes that otherwise belong in the courts.34 Specifically, we will inquire whether the challenged remedial power is authorized by legislation,35 and reasonably necessary to accomplish the administrative agency‘s regulatory purposes. Furthermore, we will closely scrutinize the agency‘s asserted regulatory purposes in order to ascertain whether the challenged remedial power is merely incidental to a proper, primary regulatory purpose, or whether it is in reality an attempt to transfer determination of traditional common law claims from the courts to a specialized agency whose primary purpose is the processing of such claims. Thus, for example, we would not approve the Board‘s adjudication of a landlord‘s common law counterclaims (extraneous to the Board‘s regulatory functions) against a tenant. Such adjudication would (i) not reasonably effectuate the Board‘s regulatory purposes—ensuring enforcement of rent levels—and (ii) it would shift the Board‘s primary purpose from one of ensuring the enforcement of
d. Application of the limiting principles to the facts of this case
(i) The “reasonable necessity/legitimate regulatory purpose” requirement
As noted above, the Board held hearings, heard testimony, and determined that plaintiff charged excess rents of $1,068 to tenant Plevka, and $600.50 to tenant Smith.37 We conclude that such actions, although judicial in nature, are both authorized by the Charter Amendment and reasonably necessary to accomplish the administrative agency‘s primary, legitimate regulatory purposes, i.e., setting and regulating maximum rents in the local housing market. The Board‘s legitimate regulatory authority, and hence its incidental remedial authority, is circumscribed. It may not, and does not, hear and adjudicate all manner of disputes between landlords and tenants. Its authority is derived from the local police powers (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 655 [209 Cal.Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261]; Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 140-142 [130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001]), and extends only so far as necessary to set and regulate rents. Incidental to that legitimate primary purpose—and “in order to produce an efficient and effective administrative enforcement of the public interest” (Opinion of the Justices, supra, 179 A. 344, 346), the Board may review the rents actually charged, and order necessary adjustments to assure compliance with its price control regulations.
The trial court erred therefore in concluding that the Board exercised judicial powers in violation of the Constitution by adjudicating (subject to judicial review) tenants’ claims for excess rents, and ordering restitution of the excess amounts.38 We conclude, however, that the administrative orders in this case violated the “principle of check.”
The Board authorized tenant Plevka to “withhold[] his entire month‘s rent in the first month following the Board‘s decision . . . and the remaining monies in the months thereafter. The withheld amounts shall not form the basis for an unlawful detainer proceeding based upon nonpayment of rent.”39 Plaintiff asserts that by allowing such withholding, and by setting up the Board‘s decision as a defense to any unlawful detainer action based on nonpayment of rent, the Board in practical effect issued a self-enforceable judgment, thereby violating the judicial powers clause.40
Plaintiff‘s concern is significant. Under present procedures, the Board possesses the ability to make an order that, although not “final” or “self-enforcing” in the typical sense of those terms, is in fact immediately enforceable in a real sense at the discretion of a private party. By its own regulations, the Board‘s decision becomes final “at the time of Board action,” i.e., immediately after the Board renders its decision. Thereafter a tenant may withhold rent up to the amount specified by the Board. In this fashion the Board‘s order is given immediate practical effect: before the landlord has even the opportunity to obtain judicial review by petition for writ of mandate41 (
Although the trial court eventually issued temporary stays limiting somewhat the Board‘s orders in this case,42 the “principle of check” was not
An administrative order of this nature is unlike any other of which we are aware. And, in our view, for the reasons set out above it represents an unwarranted intrusion into the power of the courts to “check” administrative adjudications. We thus conclude that the rent withholding order in this case violated the judicial powers provision of our
Having reached this determination, we agree with the trial court insofar as it found the administrative orders in this case violated the judicial powers clause. The court erred, however, insofar as it held that Board adjudication of excess rent claims under section 1809 of the Charter Amendment in and of itself violates the judicial powers clause, and enjoined future adjudication under that provision.
In addition to the “restitutive” excess rent amounts, the Board assessed treble damages against portions of both tenants’ excess rents. Tenant Plevka was awarded an extra $1,632, and tenant Smith was awarded an extra $941.
We emphasize at the outset the limited question posed here. We do not consider the constitutional propriety of administrative imposition of penalties,45 nor do we consider the propriety of relatively minor “punitive damages” under statutory schemes that expressly authorize such damages, and set a cap on such awards.46 We consider only the authority of the rent control board to impose treble damages.47
Applying the “substantive limitations” prong of the test set out ante, page 372, we conclude treble damages, although authorized by the Charter Amendment, may not constitutionally be imposed by the Board. First, we note that administrative agencies regularly exercise a range of powers de-
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court insofar as it held imposition of treble damages under former section 1809, subdivision (b) of the Charter Amendment violates the judicial powers clause, and enjoined future imposition of treble damages under that provision.49
3. Right to a jury trial
Plaintiff interveners assert that administrative adjudication of monetary relief claims violates the state constitutional right to jury trial (
Our Constitution states: “Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all. . . .” We have long observed, “It is the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law which is preserved [by
When deciding whether a jury trial is required for a matter prosecuted in court we look to the “gist of the action.” If the “gist” is legal, as
A number of our sister states have addressed state constitutional jury trial challenges to similar administrative schemes.52 These decisions, which involve money awards by “antidiscrimination” commissions (Fraser, supra, 625 S.W.2d 852, 854; Plasti-Line, supra, 746 S.W.2d 691, 693-694; General Drivers & Helpers, supra, 124 N.W.2d 123, 128; Pearlman, supra, 239 S.E.2d 145, 147-148; Williams v. Joyce, supra, 479 P.2d 513, 522-523), and by a “landlord-tenant” board (Investors, supra, 312 A.2d 225, 243, fn. 12), unanimously hold that no jury trial right exists as to adjudication of a matter otherwise properly within the regulatory power of an administrative agency.
Our sister courts have emphasized aspects of the federal courts’ “public rights” concept (discussed post, pp. 381-385) as well as other concerns, such as the existence of the action at common law, and the nexus between the challenged power and the agency‘s regulatory purpose. Read together with their discussions of the judicial powers issue, we adduce from these decisions the following proposition: Once a court has determined that exercise of a challenged administrative power meets the “substantive limitations” requirement imposed by the state constitution‘s judicial powers doctrine—i.e., the challenged activities are authorized by statute or legislation, and are reasonably necessary to, and primarily directed at, effectuating the administrative agency‘s primary, legitimate regulatory purposes—then the state constitution‘s jury trial provision does not operate to preclude administrative adjudication. Neither plaintiff, nor the amicus curiae and interveners appearing on her behalf, offer a compelling reason to reach a different conclusion under our own constitutional provision.
Without addressing the merits of the other states’ approach to the jury trial issue, plaintiff interveners propose a different analysis. They offer neither support for their proposed test, nor any compelling reason why our jury trial provision should be construed to preclude administrative adjudication of issues within the scope of an agency‘s regulatory authority. In any event, we conclude that even under the novel test proposed, plaintiff interveners have shown no violation of the right to jury trial in these circumstances.
Plaintiff interveners suggest there is or should be a state constitutional right to jury trial if (i) the administrative body is “nonconstitutional” (see ante, pp. 355-356), (ii) the rights involved are “private” rather than “public,” and (iii) the “private” right is grounded in the common law. Their argument fails under the second prong of their test because, according to the very cases on which plaintiff interveners rely, the interests at issue here would be deemed “public” rights properly adjudicable by an administrative agency without a jury.
The “public” versus “private” rights distinction is drawn not from California jurisprudence, but from the federal cases addressing similar issues under, inter alia, the
Under federal law, the right to jury trial does not attach to the administrative adjudication of “public rights.” (Atlas Roofing, supra, 430 U.S. 442, 455, 460 [51 L.Ed.2d 464, 475, 478].) Behind the “public rights” doctrine lies the idea that when a legislative body acts by statute to promote
In Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U.S. 135 [65 L.Ed. 865, 41 S.Ct. 458, 16 A.L.R. 165], the court rejected a jury trial challenge to a federal rent control statute, under which rents were regulated and tenants were permitted to hold over despite expiration of their leases. Writing for the court, Justice Holmes upheld the administrative board‘s authority to regulate rents as a reasonable exercise of police power to address a matter of “public interest.” (Id. at pp. 153-158 [65 L.Ed. at pp. 869-872].) The court also rejected the landlord‘s jury trial claim: “The statute is objected to on the further ground that landlords and tenants are deprived by it of a trial by jury on the right to possession of the land. If the power of the commission established by the statute to regulate the relation is established, as we think it is, by what we have said, this objection amounts to little. To regulate the relation and to decide the facts affecting it are hardly separable.” (Id. at p. 158 [65 L.Ed. at p. 872].)
Similarly, in Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin (1937) 301 U.S. 1 [81 L.Ed. 893, 57 S.Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352], the court held the
Subsequently, in Pernell v. Southall Realty (1974) 416 U.S. 363 [40 L.Ed.2d 198, 94 S.Ct. 1723], the high court considered a tenant‘s jury trial claim in a court action by a landlord to recover possession of real property.
Thereafter, in Atlas Roofing, supra, 430 U.S. 442, the high court considered, against a
The court rejected this argument. Quoting the above cited passages of Block v. Hirsh, supra, 256 U.S. 135, Jones & Laughlin, supra, 301 U.S. 1, and Pernell, supra, 416 U.S. 363, the court explained: “[T]he cases discussed above stand clearly for the proposition that when Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the
The court then reviewed the historical context of the federal jury trial provision (430 U.S. at pp. 458-460 [51 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478]), and summarized as follows: “The point is that the
Finally, the court concluded: “Thus, history and our cases support the proposition that the right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of the issue to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be resolved.” (430 U.S. at pp. 460-461 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 479], italics added.) The court noted that under the statutory scheme at issue Congress had “created a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law, and placed their enforcement in a tribunal supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved. The
It is true, as plaintiff notes, that in the course of vindicating a general “public right” in the enforcement of maximum rents, the administrative proceedings challenged here also determine the rights of private individuals as they relate to those rents. Nonetheless, as the United States Supreme Court observed in Thomas, supra, 473 U.S. 568, the same is true of administrative schemes involved in the high court‘s cases (most notably the landlord-tenant scheme in Block v. Hirsh, supra, 256 U.S. 135), yet the court has never found exercise of administrative power improper on that ground.57 The same can be said for plaintiff‘s assertion that because landlords do not submit voluntarily to administrative adjudication, such adjudication is outside the proper scope of agency power. Neither Atlas Roofing, supra, 430 U.S. 442, nor the earlier cases discussed ante, draw this distinction; in fact they disclose that submission to the administrative agency was involuntary. (Block v. Hirsh, supra, 256 U.S. 135, 158 [65 L.Ed. 865, 872]; James & McLaughlin, supra, 301 U.S. 1, 25, 48-49 [81 L.Ed. 893, 905, 918].)58
III. Disposition
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude former section 1809 is not constitutionally infirm except insofar as it authorizes the Board to award treble damages and permits orders awarding restitution to become effective before there is an opportunity for the court to pass on whether to stay the challenged order pending review of the administrative decision by writ of mandate.
The judgment is reversed with directions to recall and/or set aside the peremptory writ of mandate issued by the court on November 15, 1983, to issue a new and different writ commanding the Board to reduce its awards in conformity with this decision, to stay enforcement of any future order in accordance with this decision (see ante, fn. 44), to deny the petition for writ of mandate in all other respects, and to deny the motions of plaintiff and interveners for summary judgment.
Mosk, J., Eagleson, J., Kaufman, J., and Arguelles, J.,* concurred.
PANELLI, J.—I concur fully in the judgment and its underlying reasoning. I write separately to emphasize that we do not in this case decide the validity of an administrative scheme that, in the guise of advancing “public” rights or the general welfare, permits an agency to award substantial general compensatory damages to an aggrieved individual on grounds such dam-
In Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin (1937) 301 U.S. 1 [81 L.Ed. 893, 57 S.Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352], cited by the majority (ante, at p. 382), the high court rejected an employer‘s
In determining the application of our constitutional jury trial provision (
As in Jones, supra, the damages at issue in the instant case—excess rent—are restitutive in kind and limited in amount. Resolution of the jury trial issue, as the majority suggests, “might be different in a situation in which an agency purports to adjudicate substantial ‘damage’ claims such that recovery of damages becomes the primary focus, as opposed to merely an incidental aspect of the regulatory scheme.” (Ante, at p. 381, fn. 53.)
Although the award of general compensatory damages may have substantive effect, in that it deters violation of the regulatory scheme, and thus arguably may meet the substantive-limitations requirement, when the damages awarded advance a substantial private interest in remuneration that is disproportionate to the concept of public relief, the right to jury trial is implicated and a jury is required. Regardless of the substantive effect of a general damages award in effectuating an agency‘s legitimate regulatory purposes, an administrative hearing cannot, consistent with the right to trial by jury, be transformed into a forum for adjudicating general damages. Neither the substantive-limitations test, nor our opinion, should be understood as sanctioning an administrative award of unlimited general compensatory damages.
Eagleson, J., concurred.
I do not agree that the portion of the Santa Monica Rent Control Ordinance, which permits the rent control board (Board) to order a landlord who has overcharged to pay damages of three times the overcharge, violates this standard. Nor do I agree that a Board order that is effective immediately so inhibits effective judicial review as to make the order unconstitutional.
1. Treble Damages.
The majority distort the scope of judicial review of legislative enactments and ignore the rationale for their own standard in rejecting the treble damage element of the ordinance. They do not question the general power of administrative agencies to impose penalties. They cannot; their own citations demonstrate that the matter is settled at the state and federal levels, and that many of our own state regulations provide for administrative penalties. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 378, fn. 45.) They conclude, too, that “restitutive” compensatory damages are appropriate in the rent control context. Nonetheless they reject the former provision of the Santa Monica ordinance which provided that the Board may order a landlord who has overcharged on rents to pay the tenant “three (3) times the amount by which the payment . . . received or retained exceeds the maximum lawful rent.” (Santa Monica City Charter, art. XVIII, § 1809(a).) They offer two explanations. The first is that other methods such as “imposition of fines or penalties, awards of costs and attorney fees” could be used to induce compliance with the rent control ordinance, and there is no reason to think these would be insufficient. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 378.) Second, they worry that the authority to award treble damages will encourage arbitrary and “disproportionate” results. (Ibid.)
The translation for these objections is that the majority do not like treble damages, think other methods of enforcement would work, and think that a treble damage award is too high for the sin being punished. These are proper considerations for legislating, not judging. Our job is to determine whether the provision is constitutional, not if it is a good idea. The provision is constitutional if it is reasonably necessary to the administrative body‘s proper regulatory purpose, and if there is judicial review. It is and there is. That should be the end of the matter.
We start with the premise that legislative action is reasonable and constitutional. “[A]ll presumptions and intendments favor the validity of a
The majority fail to abide by these principles of judicial deference to legislative policymaking. We do not sit to determine the wisdom of legislation or the political worthiness of legislative goals or action. (Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d 805, 814.) If we follow the majority‘s lead in this case, we will put ourselves in the business of deciding whether the thousands of administrative regulations that bind up modern commercial activity are a good idea, and whether enforcement mechanisms cause businesses to incur “disproportionate” costs. This judicial encroachment on the legislative sphere will be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; what the Santa Monica ordinance authorized is not.
As the majority and the authorities they rely on explain, the reason we require that administrative adjudication be reasonably necessary to a legitimate administrative purpose is to avoid relegating purely private disputes, the traditional core of common law actions, to administrative resolution. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 366, 368, 372, 374.) A treble damage award for violating administrative regulations does not endanger judicial hegemony over traditional common law actions.
The treble damage award here is a penalty against the landlord for failing to comply with the ordinance. It is obviously not compensatory, but punitive. The tenant is compensated for the rent overcharge when the Board orders the payment of damages in the amount of the rent overcharge. The portion of the ordinance providing for an award of an additional $500, or three times the overcharge, whichever is greater, is clearly punitive and designed to enhance enforcement.
A penalty against an individual for violating a legitimate state regulation is completely unlike a traditional common law action between individuals. It is inextricably intertwined with the essential regulatory purpose of the Board—to set and enforce stabilized rents. The fact that it is payable to an individual rather than the state does nothing to detract from its essentially regulatory purpose. If we conclude that “restitutive” compensatory damages to remedy individual harm are necessary to the fulfillment of the
The majority are concerned that the power to award treble damages makes the risk of arbitrariness “inherent in any scheme of administrative adjudication” too high. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 379.) There is a short answer to this concern: judicial review. Any arbitrariness in awarding treble damages is just as susceptible of correction by way of judicial review as arbitrariness in awarding “restitutive” compensatory damages.
2. Effective Date of Order.
The ordinance provides that a tenant “may deduct the penalty from future rent payments in the manner provided by the Board.” A Board regulation provided that its orders were final immediately. In this action, the Board authorized one tenant to withhold rent in the first month following the Board‘s decision, and for additional months, and provided that the withholding should not be the basis for an unlawful detainer proceeding based on nonpayment of rent. The majority conclude that the order is unconstitutional because it was immediately enforceable at the “discretion of a private party.”
The majority complain that the tenant could withhold rent and resist an unlawful detainer action before the landlord had an opportunity to obtain judicial review. What is really at stake, however, is the landlord‘s ability to seek a stay of the Board‘s order pending judicial review. “Before there was an opportunity for the court to pass on whether to stay temporarily the Board‘s rent withholding order, tenant Plevka immediately withheld rent, and continued to do so for three months thereafter.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 377.) Apparently, this makes the order unconstitutional in the view of the majority, though they never explain why this is so.
The majority‘s unspoken assumption is that a tenant who has withheld rent will be unwilling or unable to satisfy a judgment ordering the repayment of the withheld rent. Since the landlord may be faced with a judgment-proof opponent, they conclude that the landlord has not had adequate judicial review. They provide no authority for this view. The fact that one may not be able to collect on a judgment does not mean that one has not had access to the courts. Many litigants take this risk; it is not a risk with constitutional significance.
The narrow holding of this case is only that the Board‘s order was unconstitutional because it did not allow the landlord sufficient time to seek
The majority explain that the Board can avoid the constitutional problem by regularly staying enforcement of its orders for a period of time sufficient to allow an aggrieved party to seek a stay from the superior court. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 377, fn. 44.) As the facts of the present case demonstrate, such a stay would normally be unnecessary. Since a Board order authorizing withholding of rent authorizes a future act, it may be effective immediately in the sense that the aggrieved party can immediately seek review of the order, but it is not enforceable in the sense that the tenant can immediately do anything unless the order is filed the day the rent is due. Furthermore, even a stay which is sought after the effective date of an order may undo the order and require remedial action pending judicial review. (See Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 1966) § 10.8, p. 178.) Thus the status quo ante may be preserved even if the stay is sought and granted after the order became effective. For example, in this very case, once the landlord did request a stay, the court granted one, adding an order to the tenant to pay the withheld rent, retroactive to April 1, into a trust account held by the landlord‘s attorney, until the matter had been finally adjudicated in court. The landlord then had unimpaired judicial review and no practical obstacle to enforcing a judgment in his favor.
The majority say that this decision applies only to these facts, and has no effect on other administrative orders having immediate effect, “including immediately effective restitutive orders issued by professional licensing boards.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 377, fn. 44.) Yet they provide no basis for distinguishing this case from others in which an immediately effective order is available.
It is established that an agency has the authority to make its orders effective immediately. (Hohreiter v. Garrison (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 384, 402-403 [184 P.2d 323]; Cal. Administrative Hearing Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1984) § 4.45, p. 246.) The Administrative Procedure Act provides for the many agencies operating under its terms that an agency decision is effective 30 days after it is delivered unless the agency orders that the decision become effective sooner. (
Although the majority have no desire to do so, their opinion casts into doubt whether administrative agencies may ever order any act to be done before judicial review or a stay is available. For the purpose of effective judicial review, there is no distinction between an immediately effective order suspending or revoking a license or requiring a licensee to reimburse a sum of money, an order requiring a polluter to cease and desist, and an order authorizing the withholding of rent. I fear that this opinion unwittingly will call into question the legitimacy of administrative action which is widespread and necessary for the protection of the public.
The petition of respondent McHugh for a rehearing was denied November 1, 1989.
Notes
We noted without criticism, however, that the Board possessed powers to suspend licenses and impose fines (id. at p. 82), and we expressly declined to imply that the Board lacked “authority to require compensatory relief as a condition for reinstatement of licenses” (id. at p. 82, fn. 15).
In Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1379, we construed a provision of the Fair Employment and Housing Act authorizing remedies including “backpay” for employees discriminated against by their employers. Again, Dyna-Med was a statutory interpretation case, and did not address constitutional concerns relating to administrative power; we held that the statute did not allow the commission to impose punitive damages. In the course of our discussion we
described remedies such as backpay as different from punitive damages because such remedies are “exclusively corrective and equitable in kind. They relate to matters which serve to make the aggrieved employee whole in the context of the employment.” (Id. at p. 1387.)If he selects the administrative remedy, the grower files a complaint. Thereafter, the director must review the processor‘s accounts. If he finds a violation of law—including failure or refusal to pay the grower for “farm products“—he may issue a complaint against the processor. If the director cannot effect settlement of the dispute, he may hold a hearing for which he may issue subpoenas, and at which he may take testimony, and decide if the processor has violated the law. (186 Cal.App.3d at p. 1236, citing Food & Agr. Code.)
Both parties, sometimes quoting the same language, assert these cases support their respective views that the rent board may, or may not, adjudicate the “excess rent” claims involved here. We find, however, that the cited cases provide no clear guidance on the judicial powers question posed here. (See Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III (1988) 101 Harv.L.Rev. 915 [criticizing the high court‘s analysis in the above cases and proposing that availability of judicial review should be sufficient to protect the values underlying the separation of powers/judicial powers doctrine].) Suffice it to say that the state cases cited below, and our holdings in this case, do not conflict with the holdings of these high court cases construing the federal Constitution.
Additionally, courts have frequently approved the exercise by antidiscrimination commissions, and other boards, of broad remedial powers to issue injunctions, cease and desist orders, etc. (E.g., State v. Bergeron (1971) 290 Minn. 351 [187 N.W.2d 680, 682-684] [state antidiscrimination commission has power to remedy illegal transfers of real property by compelling defendant to cancel a fraudulent transfer, and offer the property for sale to the person discriminated against].) At least one court has noted the similarity between the power to issue injunctions governing personal conduct, and the power to “issue orders to pay money.” (See General Drivers, supra, 124 N.W.2d at p. 127.)
The Board may avoid the constitutional problem outlined above by (as a matter of regular procedure) staying enforcement of its orders for a period of time sufficient to allow an aggrieved party to seek from the courts a stay of the Board‘s order under
Although defendant cites no other administrative scheme in which treble damages are allowed, we have discovered one such scheme in the rent control law of the District of Columbia. In Mudd v. D.C. Rental Housing Com‘n (D.C.App. 1988) 546 A.2d 440, 442-443, the court upheld, against due process challenges, imposition of treble damages. Mudd, however, did not address the judicial powers questions in issue here.
The high court upheld the agency‘s power to adjudicate the counterclaim. The opinion concluded that exercise of such power does not violate the “structural interests” that inform
Additionally, the court ordered the Board to stay operation of its administrative decision, “on the terms and conditions set forth in subparagraphs ‘A’ and ‘B’ above, pending the hearing of this order to show cause.”
A month later, on defendant‘s motion, the court modified its temporary stay order. The new order retained provision “A,” but additionally required plaintiff to place in her attorney‘s trust account, in three monthly installments, the $1,593.08 declared by the Board to be owed to Smith. It also modified provision “B,” absolving tenant Plevka of responsibility to place in trust the withheld rents of April, May, and June, and ordering instead that he begin in July to place rents in the trust account.
holdings or dicta did not subsume the proposition that a jury trial was not required.” (Atlas Roofing, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 456 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 476].) the judicial powers clause. (478 U.S. at pp. 850-857 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 692-697].) It suggested, however, that had the parties not consented to agency adjudication of the counterclaim, resolution of that matter would have violated the customer‘s “personal right” under* Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.