1 Foster 101 | Pa. | 1873
The opinion of the court was delivered, March 24th 1873, by
When a vendor fails to comply with his contract the general rule for the measure of damages undoubtedly is, the difference between the contract and the market price of the article at the time of the breach. This is for the evident reason that the vendee can go into the market and obtain the article contracted for at that price. But when the circumstances of the case are such that the vendee cannot thus supply himself the rule does not apply, for the reason of it ceases: Bank of Montgomery v. Reese, 2 Casey 143. “It is manifest,” says Mr. Chief Justice Lewis, “ that this (the ordinary measure) would not remunerate him when the article could not be obtained elsewhere.” If an article of the same quality cannot be procured in the market, its market price cannot be ascertained, and we are without the necessary data for the application of the general rule. This is a contingency which must be considered to have been within the contemplation of the parties, for they must be presumed to know whether such articles are of limited production or not. In such a case the true measure is the actual loss which the vendee- sustains in his own manufacture, by .having to use an inferior article or not receiving the advance on his contract price upon any contracts which he had himself made in reliance upon the fulfilment of the contract by the vendor. We do not mean to say, that if he undertakes to fill his own contracts with an inferior article, and in consequence such article is returned on his hands, he can recover of his vendor, besides the loss sustained on his contracts, all the extraordinary .loss incurred by his attempting what was clearly an unwarrantable experiment. His legitimate loss is the difference between the contract price he was to pay to his vendor and the price he was to receive. This is a loss which springs directly from the non-fulfilment of the contract. The affidavits of defence are not as full and precise upon this point as they might and ought to have been, but they state that the defendants below had entered into such contracts, and that they were unable to get the same quality of iron which the plaintiff had agreed to deliver, and this, we think, was enough to have carried the case to a jury.
Judgment reversed, and a procedendo awarded.