72 Minn. 2 | Minn. | 1898
Lead Opinion
This was an action of ejectment. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds, (1) that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action; (2) that the complaint did not state a cause of action. From an order overruling the demurrer, the defendant appealed.
The complaint is very voluminous, but all the facts that can be at
July 2, 1864, congress passed what is known as the “Northern Pacific Land Grant Act,” covering what are known as the “granted limits” and the “first indemnity limits” of the road. May 31, 1870, congress, by joint resolution, provided further indemnity for losses of granted or “place” lands, by fixing the second indemnity limits. October 12, 1870, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company filed a map or plat showing the proposed general route of its railroad. The land here in controversy is an odd-numbered section, within 20 miles of this line. In November, 1871, the company definitely located its line, and caused to be accepted by the secretary of the interior, and filed in the office of the commissioner of the general land office, its map of definite location. The land in controversy is within 30 miles of said line, and hence within the company’s first indemnity limits.
In January, 1872, the commissioner of the general land office instructed the local land officers to withdraw from sale or homestead entry all lands within the granted or indemnity limits of the road, as determined by the map of definite location. In 1882 the defendant, a qualified homesteader, settled upon the land, and has ever since occupied and cultivated the same, but never filed upon or made application to enter it as a homestead until November, 1887. June 19, 1885, the company, complying in all respects with the instructions of the secretary of the interior, and under his directions, selected the land in question as indemnity land, and on the same day filed in the proper district land office a list showing its selections; but the officers of the land office wrongfully, and without authority of law, refused to approve the selection.
At the time of the definite location of the line of road, all the lands in the indemnity limits were insufficient to satisfy the losses in the place limits arising from previous appropriations and dispositions. In October, 1887, the secretary of the interior revoked the withdrawal order of January, 1872.
November 10, 1887, the defendant made application at the proper district land office to enter the land as a homestead, but his application was rejected, and thereupon he appealed to the commissioner
Inasmuch as the legal points involved present federal questions, of which the supreme court of the United States is the final arbiter, it would be useless for us to discuss them at length, or to do much more than state our conclusions upon such of them as are necessary to the decision of this appeal.
1. Defendant’s contention in support of his first ground of demurrer is, to use the language of his counsel, “that the question of the title of the land is still within the executive branch of the government, and has not yet reached the point where the judicial department may assume cognizance of it,”—in other words, that the matter is still in fieri, and under the control of the land department.
We are of opinion that this contention is not sound. It is, of course, familiar law that the courts—state or federal—have no right to invade the functions confided by law to other departments of the government, and interfere with the discharge of their duties in matters exclusively intrusted to their determination in the first instance, so long as these matters are still pending and undetermined. But after they have fully exercised their functions, and
In the present case the rights of the parties have been fully and finally determined by the secretary of the interior, and nothing remains to be done, except the merely ministerial act of issuing a patent, which will be evidence of the right previously acquired, and will, when issued, relate back to the date of entry. Whichever party is entitled to the land, nothing now remains in the United States except the bare legal title. The equitable title is in either the plaintiffs or the defendant. There is now no question pending and undetermined before the land department. The mere fact that, by reason of the non-issuance of a patent, the department still has the power to reopen the case and reverse its decision, does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to inquire into its correctness when determining a question of private right between conflicting claimants.
The action of the courts in awarding the possession of the land to one or other of them will not deprive the department of this power, or devest the United States of the legal title. There is no presumption that the land department will ever reopen the case, or reverse its decision. It may, and presumably will, never do so; and, so long as its decision stands, it is a final determination of the matter, and there is now nothing pending and undetermined before the department. Neither party can compel the secretary of the interior to issue a patent, and, if the courts have no jurisdiction until one is issued, the defendant is not likely to request its issuance. Hence, if his contention is correct, the defendant may remain quietly in possession to the end of time, and the plaintiffs will be utterly powerless to assert their claim to the land, or to test in the courts the correctness of the decision of the department.
Counsel for the defendant feel compelled to concede in their brief that the courts have in certain cases jurisdiction of the equitable title to lands while the legal title remains in the United States; but their contention is that, in a case like the present, if the department has decided erroneously as to which party is entitled to a patent the error cannot be corrected in an action at law, but is the
The authorities upon the precise point under consideration are rather meager, inasmuch as, in most of the cases where the correctness of the decisions of the land department have been passed upon, patents had in fact been issued. Moore v. Bobbins, 96 U. S. 530, would seem to support the contention of the plaintiffs. Counsel for defendant cite Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473, as a decision in their favor. In that case the plaintiff himself was in possession, and the relief which he sought was that his right to the legal title, which was still in the United States, should be decreed paramount to that of the defendant, to whom the department had awarded the land; and the court seems to have viewed this as an attempt to transfer the legal title to the plaintiff, remarking that “it is impossible to transfer a title which is still in the United States.” The court also cites Moore v. Bobbins, supra, without any suggestion of disapproval.
Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372,15 Sup. Ct. 635, and Pierce v. Frace, Id., when considered in connection with the same cases in 2 Wash. St. 81, 26 Pac. 192, 196, also seem to support the position of the plaintiffs. In those cases the question of jurisdiction had been squarely raised and passed upon in the state court. This being apparent on the face of the record, a consideration of the cases on the merits by the supreme court of the United States would seem
2. Whether the provisions of section 6 of the act of 1864 amounted to a statutory withdrawal of indemnity land, whether the same section prohibits an executive withdrawal, and whether the indemnity lands were appropriated to the grant without any selection by the company, by .reason of the fact that there was not enough of lands in the indemnity limits to make up the losses in the place limits, are questions which it is not necessary to consider. We shall assume, without deciding, that the first and third of these questions should be answered in the negative, and the second in the affirmative; also, that this land remained subject to homestead entry until actually selected by the company for indemnity purposes.
Under the allegations of the complaint, admitted by the demurrer, this land was within the indemnity limits of the grant, and the railroad company had a right to select it for indemnity purposes,—at least, until some other right attached. While the defendant entered into the occupancy and cultivation of the land in 1882, yet he did nothing by way of compliance with the homestead law, and made no application to enter it as a homestead, until November, 1887. Mere occupation and cultivation, without compliance with the law in the matter of placing the claim on record in the land office, was insufficient to defeat the right of the railroad company, under its grant, to select the land for indemnity purposes. Northern v. Colburn, 164 U. S. 383, 17 Sup. Ct. 98.
Under the categorical allegations of the complaint, it must be taken as true that the railroad company duly, and in compliance with all the requirements of law, selected this land for indemnity, and duly filed a list of their selections in the land office in June, 1885, but that the land officers wrongfully and unlawfully refused to approve them. Although the selection of the lieu lands was to be made under the direction of the secretary of the interior, they were to be selected by the railroad company, and not by the secretary. If the company was entitled to select the land, and did so in conformity with all the requirements of law, the officers of the land department had no authority arbitrarily to refuse to recognize and ap
We have assumed that a patent is necessary to transfer the legal title of indemnity lands from the United States to the railway company. The act of 1864 was a grant, as well as a law, and it has been repeatedly decided that in such cases a patent is not necessary to vest the railroad company with the legal title of place lands. St. Paul v. Northern, 139 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 389; Deseret v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241, 12 Sup. Ct. 158; Northern v. Colburn, supra. Whether a patent is necessary to transfer the legal title of lieu lands, we are not prepared to say. We have not met with any case where the question has been passed upon.
Order affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
, I cannot concur. I am of the opinion that the courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of the legal title to the land until that title has passed out of the United States. The controversy between the plaintiffs and defendant is still pending in the land department of the federal government, and the matter will not become functus officio in that department until the patent issues. The controversy between the parties cannot be transferred to the courts until the matter becomes functus officio in the land department. Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72.
“If they [the register and receiver] give patents to the applicants for pre-emption, the courts can then, in the appropriate proceeding, determine who has the better title or right.” Litchfield v. Register, 9 Wall. 575, 578.
See, also, last paragraph of Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347. The only case cited in which the United States supreme court have acted in disregard of this principle is Moore v. Robbins, 96 Ü. S. 530, and there the question does not appear to have been raised.
The majority give as a reason for their position that while the'
The position of the majority seems to be that, because the land department may neglect its duty, therefore the judgment of the court should supplant and supersede the patent, and be substituted for it. If this is not their position, then what other function will the judgment perform? Unless the land department sees fit to recognize the judgment, the plaintiffs will be in no better position to demand the patent after they have obtained their judgment than they were before, and the obtaining of the judgment will not hasten the issuing of the patent. The court could not in such a case enter a judgment which would be binding on the land department, even if the officers of that department were made parties to the suit. The patent must be signed by the president, and no proceeding in court will lie to compel its issue. Secretary v. McGarrahan, 9 Wall. 298, 314.
Then after the plaintiffs obtain their judgment the land department may go on and issue its patent without any interference from the court, and the plaintiffs must, after the patent is issued, commence a new action to have the title declared held in trust for them. In order to obviate the necessity for bringing such second action, the majority must hold that the judgment in the first action supplants, supersedes, and annuls in advance any patent that may thereafter be issued to any person other than the plaintiffs or their railway company; in other words, that the court has supplanted the land department, and has itself issued the patent.
In my opinion, the courts cannot usurp the powers of the executive in any such manner. Before the patent issues the courts may deal with the mere question of possession pending the proceedings in the land department, and may award such possession to the party showing such equitable title as entitles him to it. Such were
There are cases where congress has so completely disposed of public land that the department has no power to issue a patent for it to any one other than the one designated by congress, and a patent erroneously issued to some one else is absolutely void. In such a case an action will lie by a private party to cancel the patent. But this doctrine has no application to cases where the disposal of the land in question is committed to the land department, and its officers must exercise their judgment and discretion in determining who is entitled to the land. In such a case the issuing of the patent is the final and authentic act in the exercise of such judgment and discretion, and, if the patent is issued to the wrong person, it is not void. It transfers the legal title from the government, and the rightful claimant must then pursue that title in equity, and cannot pursue it before.
I am also of the opinion that the title to this land must pass from the government by patent. The land here in question is claimed by plaintiffs, under the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, as indemnity land. It seems to me that the grant of such lands was not one in prsesenti. The right to such indemnity land would naturally depend on the existence and proof of so many extrinsic facts that it is fair to presume that congress intended that the title should pass by patent. Believing that the court has no jurisdiction to pass on the merits in this case, I decline to consider them.