95 P.2d 261 | Kan. | 1939
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action to foreclose mechanics’ liens on real property. Judgment was for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
The story told in briefs and oral arguments covers a good deal of ground and is somewhat involved. But it all boils down to simple enough questions, as far as this review is concerned. The essential questions presented are whether there was substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the plaintiff was the owner of the
Charles I. McHenry, the plaintiff and appellant, is the father of C. J. McHenry, one of the defendants. To avoid confusion they will be referred to herein as father and son. The father alleged that about February 1, 1936, he entered into a contract with his son to erect two houses on certain lots in the city of Topeka; that at the time the contract was entered into the defendants, Charles Powell and Lizzie Powell, his wife, were the legal title owners of the lots, but that the son was. the equitable owner under a purchase contract with the Powells; that subsequent thereto the Powells gave a quitclaim deed to the lots to defendant Malcolm S. Smith; that he almost completed the two houses as provided in the contract; that labor and materials furnished had not been paid for; that the son had such title to the property as would give him a right to create a lien thereon, and sought foreclosure of the liens.
The case was tried before the court, which made extended findings of fact on October 1, 1938. In the findings reference is made to prior litigation involving the rights of the parties in the property in question. In- view of the narrow issue here presented, it would serve no useful purpose to recite in detail all the contentions of the various parties to the proceeding. We merely summarize the court’s findings which bear upon the issue before us.
The court found that on February 18, 1936, contracts were entered into for the purchase of lots 3 and 4 and 5, 6 and 7 on California avenue in the Western Land and Lot Company’s addition to the city of Topeka, for the total sum of $450, and payment of $25 was made on each of the two contracts and no further payments were made upon either of the contracts; that on February 17, 1936, Malcolm S. Smith loaned $250 to the father and son and as security took a chattel mortgage from both father and son upon a house located on Lime street which was to be and subsequently was moved to lots 3 and 4, already referred to; that in the affidavit contained in the said chattel mortgage, the father swore that he and his son, doing business as McHenry & Son, were the lawful owners of the property; that default was subsequently made in payment of the debt to Smith and that Smith brought suit and recovered judgment for $261.25 against both father and son, doing business as McHenry
“I made rather voluminous findings, and while they cannot convey all that the court saw and took into consideration in deciding the case, I took into consideration the attitude of the father and son, their manner of testifying, their manner of conducting their business and the manner in which they made their claims here, and all of the various things that were shown in the evidence. . . .
“I can come to but one conclusion in this case, and that is that the plaintiff, C. I. McHenry, was in truth and in fact the real owner of these improvements; and I believe that he was the one that invested the money in these lots. He took the title in the name of his son, but that the son is not the real party in interest.
“This being an action under the mechanic’s-lien law, I do not believe the father is entitled to a mechanic’s lien upon his own property.”
Upon such findings of fact, the court held that the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proof resting upon him and was not entitled to recover.
While there was conflicting testimony as to some matters covered in the findings of fact, we find from a careful examination of the record that there was ample evidence to support the findings heretofore recited. This court has said in a long and unbroken line of decisions that findings of fact in the face of conflicting evidence will not be disturbed where there was competent and substantial evidence to support them. (Money v. Safford, 127 Kan. 520, 274 Pac. 269; Brown v. Byers, 118 Kan. 503, 235 Pac. 866; Hughes v. Vossler, 112 Kan. 466, 211 Pac. 123.)
While the appellant discusses other findings, those already stated determine the issue here. The only question remaining is whether on the basis of such findings the court properly concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff could not maintain the action to foreclose the mechanic’s liens. It is well settled that a mechanic’s lien, being a creature of statute, can be claimed and enforced only under the terms of the statute (G. S. 1935, 60-1401). (Potter v. Conley, 83 Kan. 676, 112 Pac. 608; Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 96 Kan. 778, 153 Pac. 554; Doane v. Bever, 63 Kan. 458, 65 Pac. 693.) The statute makes the lien available to persons who furnish labor or material, under the conditions stated, “under a contract with the owner of any tract or piece of land or with the trustee, agent, husband or wife of such owner.” The court having found that the father, rather than the son, was the real owner at the time in question, it follows that he was
The judgment is affirmed.