90 N.Y. 58 | NY | 1882
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The complaint shows that the plaintiff is pledgor of shares of railroad stock transferred on the books of the company to the defendant as trustee for the pledgee, and the action is brought to restrain the defendant from voting upon the shares at the meetings of stockholders, which it is alleged he has heretofore done, and claims the right to do in the future by reason of his title and right as trustee of the stock. The order from which this appeal is taken, granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendant, pendente lite, from voting on the shares. We think the injunction was improperly allowed, *62
for the reason that it does not appear from the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the final relief for which the action is brought, and in such case a temporary injunction is unauthorized. (Code, § 603.) It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff that within the general rule that a pledgee has no right to use the thing pledged, the defendant is not entitled to vote upon the shares, which, it is insisted, is a use of the shares in violation of this rule. On the other hand the defendant claims that the voting power passes to the pledgee of corporate shares transferred on the books of the corporation to the pledgee, as incident to the pledge, and according to the presumed intention of the parties. Without considering this question, but conceding the plaintiff's claim, it does not follow that he is entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from voting on the shares. It is not sufficient to authorize the remedy by injunction, that a violation of a naked legal right of property is threatened. There must be some special ground of jurisdiction, and where an injunction is the final relief sought, facts which entitle the plaintiff to this remedy, must be averred in the complaint, and established on the hearing. The complaint in this case is bare of any facts authorizing final relief by injunction. It is true that it is alleged that the defendant by the use of the shares, has been enabled to a great extent to control the management of the corporation in the interest of the New York, Lake Erie and Great Western Railway Company, with little or no regard to the best interests of the company issuing the shares. But there are no facts supporting this allegation, nor is it averred that the interests of the latter company have been prejudiced, or that the value of the shares has been impaired by the acts of the defendant. So also it is alleged that it is greatly against the plaintiff's interest as a shareholder, to permit the defendant to vote upon the shares, and that the plaintiff will suffer great and irreparable injury, if the defendant is permitted to do so. But no facts justifying these conclusions, are stated, and the mere allegation of serious or irreparable injury, apprehended or threatened, not supported by facts or circumstances tending to justify it, is clearly insufficient. *63
Neither injury to the plaintiff's property, inadequacy of the legal remedy, or any pressing or serious emergency, or danger of loss, or other special ground of jurisdiction, is shown by the complaint. The complaint, therefore, does not show that the plaintiff is entitled to final relief by injunction. (Corporation, etc., v. Mapes, 6 Johns. Ch. 46; N YPrinting, etc., Establishment v. Fitch, 1 Paige, 98; High on Injunctions, §§ 22, 34, 35, and cases cited.) The preliminary injunction was granted upon the complaint, and an affidavit verifying the statements therein, without stating any additional facts. It is doubtless sufficient that a probable or primafacie case be made, to justify the granting of an injunctionpendente lite, but where, as in this case, it clearly appears that the complaint shows no cause of action, then a preliminary injunction is unauthorized, and the granting of it is error of law, which may be reviewed by this court, on appeal. (Code, § 190, sub. 2; Allen v. Meyer,
The order of the General and Special Terms should therefore be reversed, with costs.
All concur, except RAPALLO, J., dissenting, MILLER and TRACY, JJ., absent.
Order reversed.